

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 23-cv-10741

Total Deleted Page(s) = 126

Page 138 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 139 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 140 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 141 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 142 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 143 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 144 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 145 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 146 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 147 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 148 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 149 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 150 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 151 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 152 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 153 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 154 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 155 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 156 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 157 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 158 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 159 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 160 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 161 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 162 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 163 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 164 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 165 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 166 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 167 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 168 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 169 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 170 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 171 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 172 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 173 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 174 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 175 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 176 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 177 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 178 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 179 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 180 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 181 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 182 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 183 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 184 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 185 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 186 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 187 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 188 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 189 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 190 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 191 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 192 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 193 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 194 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 195 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 196 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 197 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 198 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 199 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 200 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 201 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 202 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 203 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 204 ~ Duplicate;

Page 205 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 206 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 207 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 208 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 209 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 210 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 211 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 212 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 213 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 214 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 215 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 216 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 217 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 218 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 219 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 220 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 221 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 222 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 223 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 224 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 225 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 226 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 227 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 228 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 229 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 230 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 231 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 232 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 233 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 234 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 235 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 236 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 237 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 238 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 239 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 240 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 241 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 242 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 243 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 244 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 245 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 246 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 247 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 248 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 249 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 250 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 251 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 252 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 253 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 254 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 255 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 277 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 278 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 292 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 293 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 294 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 295 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 296 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 297 ~ Referral/Consult;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/20/81

At approximately 2:06PM at the San Jose, California Airport, [redacted] was observed getting into a 1973 Lincoln Continental, California license [redacted] driven by an individual later identified as [redacted] and the vehicle then was driven to airport parking lot and parked. Photographs of [redacted] were taken when they left the vehicle to go into the airport and when they returned to vehicle at approximately 3:06PM this same date.

b6 -3, 4  
b7C -3, 4

Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 5/8/81

b6 -1  
b7C -1

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3651

89-543-53

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/20/81

At approximately 2:06PM at the San Jose, California Airport, [redacted] was observed getting into a 1973 Lincoln Continental, California license [redacted] driven by an individual later identified as [redacted] and the vehicle then was driven to airport parking lot and parked. Photographs of [redacted] were taken when they left the vehicle to go into the airport and when they returned to vehicle at approximately 3:06PM this same date.

b6 -3, 4  
b7C -3, 4

Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294

by SA [redacted] Date dictated [redacted]

89-543-5 b6 -1  
b7C -1  
JUN 1 1981

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3652



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 5/12/81

On May 8, 1981, a physical surveillance was conducted by SA's [redacted] at the San Jose Municipal Airport of a meeting between [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4

This surveillance, which was conducted with the [redacted] was recorded on a surveillance log maintained by SA [redacted]. This surveillance log will be maintained in the 1A Section of the file.

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-28  
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 5/11/81

b6 -1  
b7C -1

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 5/12/81

On May 8, 1981, a physical surveillance was conducted by SA's [redacted] and [redacted] at the San Jose Municipal Airport of a meeting between [redacted]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4

This surveillance which was conducted with the [redacted] was recorded on a surveillance log maintained by SA [redacted]. This surveillance log will be maintained in the 1A Section of the file.

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-28

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]

Date dictated 5/11/81

SEARCHED [redacted] INDEXED [redacted]  
SERIALIZED [redacted] FILED [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

JUN 1 1981

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3654

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 5/13/81

On May 8, 1981, SA [ ] drove an FBI van to the San Jose Airport where SA [ ] observed [ ] enter a silver Lincoln Continental in front of the Air California entrance to the airport lobby; said Continental was driven by a white male adult identified as one [ ] SA [ ] followed the vehicle as it entered the main parking area of the airport and parked. SA [ ] observed [ ] leave the Continental and walk towards the airport lobby. SA [ ] was in a position to [ ]

Approximately one hour later, [ ] were observed walking from the airport lobby towards the Continental, and after a short conversation between the two outside the vehicle, [ ] was observed to get into the vehicle and drive away. [ ] was observed returning towards the airport lobby. At this point, the surveillance was terminated.

Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-29

by SA [ ] Date dictated 5/12/81

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 5/13/81

On May 8, 1981, SA [ ] drove an FBI van to the San Jose Airport where SA [ ] observed [ ] enter a silver Lincoln Continental in front of the Air California entrance to the airport lobby; said Continental was driven by a white male adult identified as one [ ] SA [ ] followed the vehicle as it entered the main parking area of the airport and parked. SA [ ] observed [ ] leave the Continental and walk towards the airport lobby. SA [ ] was in a position to [ ]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

Approximately one hour later, [ ] were observed walking from the airport lobby towards the Continental, and after a short conversation between the two outside the vehicle, [ ] was observed to get into the vehicle and drive away. [ ] was observed returning towards the airport lobby. At this point, the surveillance was terminated.

Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-29

by SA [ ] Date dictated 5/12/81

SEARCHED [ ] INDEXED [ ]  
SERIALIZED [ ] FILED [ ]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3656

b6 -1  
b7C -1

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/13/81

[REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16

[REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16

[REDACTED]

b7E -4,9,16

A summary of the conversation between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is as follows:

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3

[REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16

The conversation began with [REDACTED] discussing [REDACTED] They then went on to discuss the possibility of [REDACTED] being able to obtain some

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-30

SA's [REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1by [REDACTED] Date dictated 5/12/81

b6 -1  
b7C -1b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16

[redacted] then discussed specific political figures, including David Rockefeller, John Volker, and Henry Kissinger. [redacted] indicated that he believed that all three of those individuals were primarily responsible for many of the problems experienced by this country. At one point, he stated that they should be killed, but he did not indicate a willingness to do so himself. He furthermore, did not discuss specifically who should kill any of those individuals or when it should be done. He also indicated at one point that he did not have any available money that would enable him to hire anyone to do anything.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16

The conversation terminated in an open-ended type fashion. No definite plans were made for any specific dates or times when future meetings between [redacted] would occur, but it was agreed that they would stay in contact.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/13/81b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16

b7E -4,9,16

A summary of the conversation between [ ] and [ ] is as follows:

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7E -4,16

The conversation began with [ ] discussing [ ] They then went on to discuss the possibility of [ ] being able to obtain some

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-30b6 -1  
b7C -1

by SA's [ ]

Date dictated 5/12/81SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED

INDEXED

FILED

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3659

SE 89B-294

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16

[redacted] then discussed specific political figures, including David Rockefeller, John Volker, and Henry Kissinger. [redacted] indicated that he believed that all three of those individuals were primarily responsible for many of the problems experienced by this country. At one point, he stated that they should be killed, but he did not indicate a willingness to do so himself. He furthermore, did not discuss specifically who should kill any of those individuals or when it should be done. He also indicated at one point that he did not have any available money that would enable him to hire anyone to do anything.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3  
b7E -4,16

The conversation terminated in an open-ended type fashion. No definite plans were made for any specific dates or times when future meetings between [redacted] would occur, but it was agreed that they would stay in contact.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/13/81

SAs [redacted]

met [redacted]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

After meeting [redacted]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7E -16While at the San Jose Resident Agency, SA [redacted] instructed [redacted]  
[redacted]b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

While at the San Jose Resident Agency, [redacted]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7E -16

SA [redacted]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

At approximately 1:45 PM, [redacted]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

At approximately 1:47 PM, SAs [redacted]

SSRA [redacted]

Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-31b6 -1  
b7C -1

by SA [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] Date dictated 5/13/81

SF 89B-294

[REDACTED]

At approximately 2:02 PM, SA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/13/81

SAs [ ] met [ ]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

After meeting [ ]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7E -16

While at the San Jose Resident Agency, SA [ ] instructed [ ]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

While at the San Jose Resident Agency, [ ]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7E -16

SA [ ]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

At approximately 1:45 PM, [ ]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

At approximately 1:47 PM, SAs [ ]

SSRA [ ]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-31

SA [ ]

and [ ]

by [ ]

Date dictated 5/13/81

SERIALIZED [ ]

INDEXED [ ]

100

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3663\*

SF 89B-294



At approximately 2:02 PM. SA



b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 7/20/81

[redacted] appeared at the Office of the San Jose, California FBI Resident Agency and furnished the following voluntary information after being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents:

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] indicated that he did not advocate the violent overthrow of the United States Government by force or any other illegal means. He also stated that he did not associate with or want anything to do with any type of a militant group. He stated that he had never conspired to assassinate or eradicate Henry Kissinger, Paul Volker, William Casey or any other politician that he might not agree with. At this point in time [redacted] made an inquiry as to who William Casey is and he was informed that Casey is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. [redacted] indicated that he could not recall ever having discussed Casey with anyone.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] indicated that he had strong political feelings and became very emotional when discussing the way that the government is operating. He further stated that he could understand how someone might misconstrue his intentions.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] stated that he would never engage in any paramilitary, clandestine, or illegal activities and if any illegal acts came to his attention he would immediately report them to the appropriate authorities.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] indicated that the California Coastal Commission was not one of his favorite bureaucratic agencies. He denied that he ever considered bombing that organization or doing any other act that would be illegal. He stated that he was against all bureaucratic agencies that were engaged in the acquisition or management of private land.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

Investigation on 7/17/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294

b6 -1  
b7C -1

by [redacted] Date dictated 7/20/81

SF 89B-294

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7D -5

[redacted] also stated that he strongly disagreed with the way the country is currently being run but that he would never do anything illegal in an effort to change it. He stated that however, bad the country might presently be any type of anarchy or terrorism would be worse.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] stated that he had never engaged in any illegal activities and that he did not plan to do so in the future.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] stated that he served in the United States Army between [redacted] He stated that he served in Viet Nam and received the Silver Star during that period of time.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

The following descriptive data was obtained through observation and interview:

Name  
Sex  
Race  
Date of birth  
Height  
Weight  
Hair  
Eyes  
Education  
  
Employment  
  
Permanent address  
  
Temporary address  
  
Arrest record  
Military service

[redacted]  
Male  
Caucasian

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

SF 89B-294

b6 -1  
b7C -1



b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] indicated that he considered himself a loyal American and a good citizen.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] then went on to state that he was totally against all acts of violence and terrorism. He specifically mentioned at this time the situation in Iran, El Salvador, and Nicaragua and cited them as an example of terrorism that he did not personally agree with.



b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5



[redacted] concluded by stating that he would always be available to assist the FBI in anyway that he could.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 7/20/81

[redacted] appeared at the Office of the San Jose, California FBI Resident Agency and furnished the following voluntary information after being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents:

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] indicated that he did not advocate the violent overthrow of the United States Government by force or any other illegal means. He also stated that he did not associate with or want anything to do with any type of a militant group. He stated that he had never conspired to assassinate or eradicate Henry Kissinger, Paul Volker, William Casey or any other politician that he might not agree with. At this point in time [redacted] made an inquiry as to who William Casey is and he was informed that Casey is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. [redacted] indicated that he could not recall ever having discussed Casey with anyone.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] indicated that he had strong political feelings and became very emotional when discussing the way that the government is operating. He further stated that he could understand how someone might misconstrue his intentions.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] stated that he would never engage in any paramilitary, clandestine, or illegal activities and if any illegal acts came to his attention he would immediately report them to the appropriate authorities

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] indicated that the California Coastal Commission was not one of his favorite bureaucratic agencies. He denied that he ever considered bombing that organization or doing any other act that would be illegal. He stated that he was against all bureaucratic agencies that were engaged in the acquisition or management of private land.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

Investigation on 7/17/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294

b6 -1  
b7C -1

by SA [redacted] Date dictated 7/20/81

89-543-68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3676

JUL 24 1981



SF 89B-294

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7D -5

[redacted] also stated that he strongly disagreed with the way the country is currently being run but that he would never do anything illegal in an effort to change it. He stated that however, bad the country might presently be any type of anarchy or terrorism would be worse.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] stated that he had never engaged in any illegal activities and that he did not plan to do so in the future.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] stated that he served in the United States Army between [redacted] He stated that he served in Viet Nam and received the Silver Star during that period of time.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

The following descriptive data was obtained through observation and interview:

Name  
Sex  
Race  
Date of birth  
Height  
Weight  
Hair  
Eyes  
Education  
  
Employment  
  
Permanent address  
  
Temporary address  
  
Arrest record  
Military service

[redacted]  
Male  
Caucasian

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

SF 89B-294

[REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED] indicated that he considered himself a loyal American and a good citizen.

[REDACTED] then went on to state that he was totally against all acts of violence and terrorism. He specifically mentioned at this time the situation in Iran, El Salvador, and Nicaragua and cited them as an example of terrorism that he did not personally agree with.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] concluded by stating that he would always be available to assist the FBI in anyway that he could.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS ~~E F T O~~  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 7/22/81

TO DIRECTOR, FBI  
 FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543)(C-1)(P)  
 RE [REDACTED]

WILLIAM CASEY -  
 VICTIM;  
 ET AL  
 CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR  
 INJURE AN OFFICER OF  
 THE UNITED STATES  
 OO: Los Angeles

b6 -1,4  
 b7C -1,4  
 b7D -5

Re Los Angeles teletype to the Bureau, et al, dated 5/6/81.

For the information of New Rochelle, Los Angeles has been conducting an investigation since January, 1981 of captioned subject who has made threats towards several prominent figures including Henry Kissinger, David Rockefeller, William Casey and Paul Volcker. Investigation, however, has failed to substantiate the original allegations, and the U.S. Attorney in the Central District of California (CDC), Los Angeles, and in the Northern District of California, San Jose, California, have declined prosecution of the subject for possible violations of

- 2 - Bureau
- 2 - New Rochelle
- 1 - New York (Info)
- 1 - San Francisco (89B-294)(Info)
- 1 - WFO (89B-681)(Info)
- ② - Los Angeles

JMB:ijk  
 (9)

89-543-70

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

OFFICE COPY [REDACTED]

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_  
(Number) (Time)

Per \_\_\_\_\_  
 SEARCHED  
 INDEXED  
 SERIALIZED  
 FILED

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3679

LA 89B-543

the AFO or related CIO statutes.



b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

During a meeting with the informant in this case on [redacted] in San Jose, California, [redacted] threatened the "ex-head of IBM," and now the ambassador to Russia, not further identified, along with other individuals as previously mentioned. [redacted] was interviewed by BuAgents at San Jose on 7/17/81 at which time he denied making serious threats to anyone and engaged in political rhetoric in conversation with the interviewing Agents.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

On 7/9/81 WFO advised that Thomas Watson, who served as Ambassador to Russia from 8/2/79 to 2/4/81, was formerly associated with IBM. Watson can be reached in Armonk, Westchester County, New York, at telephone number 914-765-7001.

LEAD

NEW ROCHELLE

AT ARMONK, NEW YORK: Provide Watson with a summary of captioned investigation and advise that he was mentioned (although not by name) by the subject.

- 2\* -

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS ~~E F T O~~  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 7/22/81

TO DIRECTOR, FBI  
 FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543)(C-1)(P)  
 RE [REDACTED]

WILLIAM CASEY -  
 VICTIM;  
 ET AL  
 CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR  
 INJURE AN OFFICER OF  
 THE UNITED STATES  
 OO: Los Angeles

b6 -1,4  
 b7C -1,4  
 b7D -5

Re Los Angeles teletype to the Bureau, et al, dated 5/6/81.

For the information of New Rochelle, Los Angeles has been conducting an investigation since January, 1981 of captioned subject who has made threats towards several prominent figures including Henry Kissinger, David Rockefeller, William Casey and Paul Volcker. Investigation, however, has failed to substantiate the original allegations, and the U.S. Attorney in the Central District of California (CDC), Los Angeles, and in the Northern District of California, San Jose, California, have declined prosecution of the subject for possible violations of

- 2 - Bureau
- 2 - New Rochelle
- 1 - New York (Info)
- 1 - San Francisco (89B-294)(Info)
- 1 - WFO (89B-681)(Info)
- ② - Los Angeles

JMB:ijk  
 (9)

89-543-70

OFFICE COPY

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

SEARCHED  
 INDEXED  
 SERIALIZED  
 FILED

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Number) (Time)

Per \_\_\_\_\_

LA 89B-543

the AFO or related CIO statutes.



b6 -4  
b7C -4

During a meeting with the informant in this case on [redacted] in San Jose, California, [redacted] threatened the "ex-head of IBM," and now the ambassador to Russia, not further identified, along with other individuals as previously mentioned. [redacted] was interviewed by BuAgents at San Jose on 7/17/81 at which time he denied making serious threats to anyone and engaged in political rhetoric in conversation with the interviewing Agents.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -3

On 7/9/81 WFO advised that Thomas Watson, who served as Ambassador to Russia from 8/2/79 to 2/4/81, was formerly associated with IBM. Watson can be reached in Armonk, Westchester County, New York, at telephone number 914-765-7001.

LEAD

NEW ROCHELLE

AT ARMONK, NEW YORK: Provide Watson with a summary of captioned investigation and advise that he was mentioned (although not by name) by the subject.

- 2\* -

1971 October 26

# STUDY KISSINGER AND KNOW HIM WELL

Everyone should discover all they can about Henry A. Kissinger, who has never been elected by the people but is considered by some to be the ~~second-most~~ powerful man in the nation if not in the world. Patriots and concerned citizens should find out what they can, good, neutral, bad or very bad, to assist friends in evaluating Kissinger. It should be determined if he is indispensable to the nation, simply a non-entity in high places or a dangerous, power-seeking, behind-the-scenes dictator.

Heinz Alfred Kissinger (he changed his name to Henry after gaining asylum in the U.S. as a boy in 1938) is the son of Paula Stern and Louis Kissinger. He was born May 27, 1923, in Fuerth, Germany. His father was a teacher and student adviser at a girl's high school but Paula Stern has been called the real authority in the family. It was she who got the family out of Germany in 1938 to escape Hitler's anti-Jewish programs, according to Louis Kissinger. As a 15-year-old immigrant and a Jew, Kissinger decided he would have to work twice as hard to achieve his goals. He graduated with honors from George Washington High School in New York in 1943, with ambitions to become an accountant. He was drafted into the Army and because of his knowledge of the German language was promoted to sergeant in the counterintelligence field. At 22 he was the Military Government authority running a German community.

Kissinger grasped the opportunity to teach modern German history in an Army intelligence school and in 1946 was made a civilian employee teaching in the school. He was given an Army reserve commission as a captain. Without either a college degree or battlefield experience, a direct commission to captain is considered highly unusual.

After military service he attended Harvard on the G. I. Bill and received his B.A. in 1950. He had married Ann Fleischer in 1949 and she worked hard to help him through graduate school. Before receiving his master's degree he was appointed Executive Director of the International Seminar of the Harvard Summer School in 1951. He received his master of arts degree from Harvard in 1952 and a Ph.D. in 1954. His wife divorced him in 1964.

It was later revealed that Kissinger's foreign exchange student program which he headed at Harvard was subsidized by CIA funds secretly channeled through certain foundations. Some heavy influence enabled him to obtain such tax-paid aid and to move directly into positions of high influence and power in the Council on Foreign Relations and in both Democratic and Republican administrations.

Kissinger has been a consultant called upon by the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations and now he is President Nixon's chief White House aide in making foreign policy and national defense policies. Kissinger's early and longtime connections with the Council on Foreign Relations and the influence wielded by powerful men in the CFR during his younger days helps explain his access to high government posts no matter which party is in the White House or in control of Congress.

Without practical diplomatic experience or high-level military training, Kissinger began a meteoric career as a consultant on defense and foreign policy as well as psychological warfare and propaganda. By 1957 he had been able to have two books published relating to political power. The same year he began at the top in the academic world with his appointment to the Harvard faculty, starting as a lecturer in 1957, gaining an associate professorship in 1959 and becoming a full professor in 1962. At the same time, along with his CFR activities he served as director of a special studies project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Nelson Rockefeller took him on in 1963 as an adviser on military and foreign policy while campaigning for the Presidential nomination at the 1964 Republican convention.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-9-02 BY [redacted]

62-2038-26

|             |         |
|-------------|---------|
| SEARCHED    | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED  | FILED   |
| OCT 29 1971 |         |

b6 -1  
b7C -1

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3683

Kissinger is reported to have said, after Rockefeller lost the nomination to Nixon in Miami, that Nixon was not fit to be President. It would be interesting to know if Kissinger, therefore, voted for Hubert Humphrey. At any rate, when Nixon was elected (with 43.6% of the public's favorable vote, while Humphrey got 43.2% and George Wallace 13.2%), Kissinger accepted an invitation to meet with Nixon about an appointive job. Then Kissinger walked away with one of the top spots in the Nixon inner-circle at the White House, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He quickly earned a reputation as an empire-builder because of his energetic organization of his staff and its output.

Another ploy pulled by Kissinger angered other new Administration officials. He put out an involved questionnaire which tied up staffs for months, trying to find answers, while Kissinger moved ahead consolidating his power. Key members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives openly question Kissinger's obvious grasping for power. They complain about Kissinger making foreign policy and national defense policy without being subject to questioning by Congress, as are the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Cabinet officials, designated by the Constitution to advise the President and to administer the various departments of government, are subject to being quizzed by Congress, but Kissinger is not.

Speculation about Kissinger's motives provide cocktail-party conversation from New York to Hollywood to Washington, D.C. Some gossip labels him as easy prey for Hollywood starlets and sex symbols. He is a favorite subject of the gossip columnists on Broadway and in Hollywood, who like to link his name with Hollywood types when he is seen in public with well-known sex symbols. He has been receiving much attention in recent months in regard to his activities with numerous show business girls.

There is no doubting Kissinger's driving ambition, his seeking for behind-the-scenes power, and his glib persuasiveness with important people, as well as his ability for staying on the job long hours and working brilliantly to achieve his ends. In person he is less than an imposing figure, which probably aids him greatly in working his way into top positions because potential rivals fail to see him as a great threat to their standing. Before they realize his ability, he has taken over.

He seems to have somewhat the same effect on women, who don't expect much and are surprised to find him attentive, interesting and entertaining despite his lack of attractiveness. And there is quite a bit of publicity and public comment about his female friends, for those who are liking such attention from columnists and gossips.

Kissinger's public stand on foreign affairs and national defense matters change from time to time. In one of his early books he maintained that nuclear weapons could be used in tactical operations without their use spreading to strategic targets, such as cities. Later, he wrote that he had been wrong on that. His recognition of the need to act firmly in Cambodia and Laos, while extricating U.S. combat troops from Indochina, brought down the criticism of extremist doves and left-siders upon him. To the extremists, anything less than surrender to the communists is bad. Kissinger has not called for immediate surrender. Neither has he called for victory. He advocates limited, no-win wars, supposedly until the Communists get tired of waiting for us to surrender. In this he ignores the fact that the Russian communists fight us with other countries' armies and that no voice is allowed to speak against war in a communist country.

Parade magazine, with a circulation of 16,713,177, could be of interest and highly informative for those who seek other information about Kissinger, which is to be found in the Oct. 24, 1971, issue published in many newspapers around the nation, including the Dallas Times-Herald. The article is titled: "Henry Kissinger: President Nixon's Brainchild."

C. A. Dickey

b6 -1  
b7C -1

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3684




# THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD

## Editorials and Opinions

18-A\*\*\*\*

Tuesday, Oct. 26, 1971



—By BOB TAYLOR, Times Herald Staff Cartoonist

## HENRY A. KISSINGER

Born May 27, 1923, in Fuerth, Germany, Henry A. Kissinger is the son of Louis Kissinger and Paula Stern. He became a naturalized citizen in 1943. He was married to Ann Fleischer but was divorced. After military service in the Intelligence field he attended Harvard, receiving a bachelor of arts degree in 1950. On the basis of that and whatever other obscure reasons known to those who appointed him, Kissinger became Executive Director of the International Seminar of the Harvard Summer School in 1951. He received from Harvard a master of arts degree in 1952 and a Ph.D. in 1954.

Since graduating from Harvard, Kissinger has moved directly into positions of high power and influence in both Democratic and Republican administrations and in the Council on Foreign Relations. He has been a consultant for the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations and now he is President Nixon's chief White House aide in making foreign policy. Kissinger's early and longtime connections with the Council on Foreign Relations and the influence of powerful men in the CFR probably accounts for his access to high government posts no matter which party is in the White House.

Without practical diplomatic experience he began his career as a consultant on defense and foreign policy, in addition to propaganda and psychological warfare. As an advocate of limited, no-win wars he has had vast influence in both Democratic and Republican Administrations. He proposes that the U.S. should fight limited wars until the communists get tired of waiting for our people to surrender. He ignores the fact that the Russian communist dictatorship can fight these wars with other peoples' armies and that no voice is allowed to speak against war in a communist country.

Kissinger acquired considerable influence with some powerful people often considered as "conservatives," but not constructives, because of his glib recitations and writings. Many dove "intellectuals" consider him to be Richard Nixon's best appointment. Senator Jacob Javits, the far-left New York Republican, has said that Kissinger's appointment could be Nixon's most significant one.

Kissinger quickly earned a reputation as an empire-builder for his office after his appointment by Nixon because of his energetic organization of his staff and its output. Some members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives have openly questioned Kissinger's apparent grasping for power. They discount his denials and express their fear that his influence and activity will take away from Congressional prerogatives in foreign and military affairs by undercutting the regular cabinet members who are supposed to handle foreign and military activities.

Before his father migrated to the U.S. in 1938, Kissinger had used the first name, Heinz, but he shifted it to Henry while adapting to life in the U.S. Kissinger's father had been a high school teacher in Germany. The young Kissinger did well in high school in Manhattan. He went on active duty in the Army in 1943 where he grasped the opportunity to teach modern German history in an Army intelligence school in Germany as a sergeant. In 1946 he was made a civilian employee teaching in the school and given an Army reserve commission as a captain. Without either a college degree or battlefield experience, a direct commission to captain is considered highly unusual. Kissinger managed to get a government scholarship to Harvard and his influential career in government was soon launched. His foreign student exchange program at Harvard, it was later revealed, was subsidized by CIA funds secretly channeled through certain foundations.

In addition to his Council on Foreign Relations connections, Kissinger was director of a special studies project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. This was from 1956 until 1958. Nelson Rockefeller took him on in 1963 as an adviser on military and foreign policy while campaigning for the Presidential nomination. In 1965 Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge assigned Kissinger to make a study of Vietnam. Kissinger's secret flight to Peking, while supposedly on a round-the-world tour to friendly governments, is his latest action. Time will tell how his arrangement for the invitation from the Red Chinese government for President Nixon to visit Peking next spring will work out.

# Revolution

By George E. Sokolsky

TROTSKY was organizing the workers and soldiers to take over the provisional government in Petrograd. Two centers of activity occupied him. One was the Petrograd garrison, which was to mutiny against the authority of Kerensky. The other was the seizure of industrial plants by the workers.

One of the principal industrial institutions in Russia was the Putiloff munitions factory, a steel works. Here shop committees were organized and the workers instructed to take over management. Step by step, in fact, the workers reduced the authority of management in all industrial enterprises, not only in Petrograd but in every city in Russia.

Long before the Communist revolution transferred political power from Kerensky to Lenin the workers had destroyed all rights in private property in industrial and commercial enterprises. The labor unions were in possession, and they were taking orders from the Soviet of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers' Deputies at the Smolny Institute. Private property disappeared before the rights of human beings disappeared.

What was Kerensky doing during all this period? He was speaking of what he would do. He was seeking compromises. He was angling for a coalition of Socialist groups. He was secretly negotiating with conservatives and reactionaries. He was dreaming of great Napoleonic victories. He was orating of democracy. He was sleeping himself in international intrigue. He was, in fact, doing nothing at all.

He had created all the agencies for his own destruction, and they were now at work. He had sought to be popular at the expense of righteous public morals. He had catered to the sordid millions that he might listen to their cheers. He had abolished national discipline. He had played ducks and drakes with the law. But he dared not interfere with the forces of destruction. They marched forward unimpeded.

I attended meetings of the Constituent Assembly after Kerensky had disappeared. Here the representatives of the Russian people were gathered. The Bolsheviks were a tiny minority. Did they stand? Not at all. Lenin waved his hand to his secretary in the balcony and smiled—it was a gesture to show how little his mind was upon the tragic struggle for Russian freedom.

Then he came no more. No Bolshevik appeared. The representatives of the Russian people—like our Congress—they sat and waited.

One moment we heard a rumor that Lenin's dinner was prolonged. At another moment we heard that he was in the building—the Duma Building, I think it was.

Men stood in groups and spoke to one another. Not a person smiled. Then there were prolonged silences. Finally the president of the Constituent Assembly arose to speak his mind on behalf of the representatives of the Russian people. The assembly hall filled with tipples. One approached the dais. "Comrade, you have spoken enough," the soldier said. "Go home!"

The representatives of the Russian people were filled with consternation. Strong men wept. I remember my own emotions—my anguish in the presence of fatality. Chernoff tried to be heroic. The soldier stopped him. Workers were already marching in the streets.

The representatives of the Russian people dispersed. A minority had conquered Russia by organized minority pressure. They had seized the means of production and distribution. First they destroyed private property. Then they destroyed human rights. It was the end of Russia's chances for democracy.

What were intelligent, educated people doing? What were business men and bankers doing? At that moment each man was looking after himself. Some were seeking to get in under the tape. They would assist the Bolsheviks, maybe the Bolsheviks would let them live. Some were attempting to save a few effects. Some were even planning to corrupt the Bolsheviks as they had corrupted the Czarist regime and the Kerensky regime. Others were trying one compromise after another.

Some were speculating in the country's misfortunes. They were gambling on money exchange, gambling with bonds and stocks, gambling on raw materials for higher prices. Everywhere prices were rising and the value of the ruble was constantly declining.

Not a constructive word came from these people. No constructive idea. Even when the papers ceased to print for reference to them, because the editors and writers were organized in unions any they would permit the news and views to be printed as the Russian order and had they disobeyed, the printers would refuse to print the newspaper.

Once I saw a religious group march through the streets with icons and other holy images, and they were singing hymns of "Resurrection." But they were so few. The editors who were in waiting to be military officers, they attempted to make a stand. But the

great mass of Russia's intelligentsia, of Russia's economic and social middle class, were incapable of defense.

Every night the cafes chantants were filled with the bourgeoisie. They were still eating caviare and drinking champagne. The artistes sang humorous songs about Lenin and Trotsky, and the businessmen applauded with merriment. They would make money, they felt, no matter what kind of politician was in power.

In the end they had nothing. Their property, their human rights, even their lives were taken from them. I met many of their wives and daughters later in Harbin and Peking and Shanghai where they were forced to earn their livings by the only means left to them.

The Bolsheviks could not ultimately succeed, they had believed. They had many explanations for their views "The deeply mystical character of the Russian people" "The peasants will never permit their farms to be taken from them" "Starvation will drive the workers to their senses."

What is the use? All these explanations were just waves of wind. The organized minority had focussed its will on the seizure of property and government. The majority was engaged in every occupation but the defense of the rights of property and rights of man. The minority smashed the majority because only the minority knew what it wanted. The majority was destroyed because it could not believe that it had to organize and fight to live.

Yes, they woke up later. But it was too late. Their chance lay in government by law when Kerensky was in power. This chance they missed. Their tactical advantage was to resist every suggestion of compromise while they still possessed power, but they lost themselves in painful discussions concerning humane consideration, until humanity itself was crushed. Compromise destroyed their one weapon for resistance, the army.

Some business men and bankers and engineers and lawyers escaped to foreign countries. Many more were sent to prison camps. Even more were killed. Their smartness had deceived them.

I saw all this from July, in 1917, until January, in 1918, I saw this process and those who know human history only from books believe that it is possible to compromise upon essential principles of human rights. I have witnessed too many positions mixed in the melting pot of compromise; I have seen too many Pandora's boxes opened by the intriguing fingers of compromise.

There are no two sides to some questions. You cannot see a thief stealing your silver and cogitate upon the other side of the question. You dare not think of a kidnaper and say, "Perhaps kidnapping is, after all, not altogether wrong."

Yet men will view crimes equally severe and say, "Well, maybe there is another side to this question." Do you remember Miss Perkin's remarks on the possible legality of the sit-down? It is such stuff that blows up civilizations, even as the mad gas in Texas blew up a schoolhouse.

As I write of those days in Russia I think of all the seizures of property in this country. And of the compromises that are being made. The sit-downers in Chrysler write Governor Murphy that they elected him and he must serve their will. How often was it thrown up to Kerensky that he had been raised to power by soldiers and workers, and he must obey them! When the oath of office—when an oath sworn on a Bible can become a subject for individual interpretation—when public officials can ask themselves, "Must I serve the entire nation, or the pressure group that put me in power?"—then the nation is bound to fail.

Revolutions are successful when an organized minority discovers that the majority is split, is confused, is without vigilance. Then it is revolutionary tactics to confound and confuse the majority by side issues, by speeches on humane subjects, by beating the drum of progress and liberalism.

Almost like vaudevillians repeating the jokes of a decade and a century ago, the revolutionists and the compromisers repeat the slogans and the adages of all the centuries and of all countries. They play upon distress; they create emergencies, they ridicule fundamentals. And all sorts of people are taken in by these tricks and they bow to the golden calf of humane proposals. Only too late do they learn that this emphatic humanity is only a veneer, only a sham in the rise to power.

The minority stand upon the shoulders of those whom they fool only as long as they need protection. When they want to come to earth, they destroy the props that supported them. Do you know that there were even Jews in Germany who in Hitler's early days were just such props. Where are they now?

The American people do not yet realize that they are in the first stage of a revolution. Yet all experience with revolution shows that the seizure of private property by lawless bands before whom government stands impotent is the first major battle in the destruction of any government.

## HENRY KISSINGER—THE MAN

## HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 21, 1971

Mr RARICK Mr Speaker, so that my colleagues might know the thought and training of the one man who controls the policies of this Government—the one man who not only advises the President which course to follow, but also tells him what the alternatives are—and his utter disdain for the role of Congress in determining foreign policy, I insert the following article from the Washington Post of July 11, 1971, and a documented article from the Herald of Freedom for January 24, 1969, in the RECORD:

[From the Washington Post, July 11 1971]

HENRY KISSINGER NIXON'S METTERNICH

(By David Landau)

(The writer is managing editor of the Harvard Crimson, in which the following appeared as part of a series of three articles on the career of Henry A. Kissinger.)

"He was a roccoco figure, complete, finely carved, all surface, like an intricately cut prism. His face was delicate but without depth, his conversation brilliant but without ultimate seriousness. Equally at home in the salon and in the Cabinet, he was the *beau-ideal* of [an] aristocracy which justified itself not by its truth but by its existence. And if he never came to terms with the new age it was not because he failed to understand its seriousness but because he disdained it."

With these words, a Harvard thesis-writer named Henry Kissinger introduced Clemens Metternich, Austria's greatest foreign minister. Metternich was a man whom Kissinger emulated, whose diplomatic life he has sought to relive. And the comparison of the two is far from inapt.

As Richard Nixon's most influential adviser on foreign policy, Kissinger has embodied the role of the 19th-century balance-of-power diplomat. He is cunning, elusive and all-powerful in the sprawling sector of government which seeks to advise the President on national security matters. As Mr. Nixon's personal emissary to foreign dignitaries, to academia and—as "a high White House official"—to the press, he is vague and unpredictable. Yet he is the single authoritative carrier of national policy besides the President himself.

Like the Austrian minister who became his greatest political hero, Kissinger has used his position in government as a protective cloak to conceal his larger ambitions and purposes. Far from being the detached, objective arbiter of presidential decision-making, he has become a crucial mold and supporter of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy. Instead of merely holding the bureaucracy at comfortable arm's length, he has entangled it in a web of useless projects and studies, cleverly shifting an important locus of advisory power from the Cabinet departments to his own office. And as confidential adviser to the President, he never speaks for the

record cannot be made to testify before Congress and is identified with presidential policy only on a semi-public level.

#### A CONSTITUENCY OF ONE

Like the ministers who ruled post-Napoleonic Europe from the conference table at Vienna—and the Eastern Establishment figures who preceded him as policy-maker of a later age—Kissinger believes that legislative bodies, bureaucracies and run-of-the-mill citizenries all lack the training and temperament that are needed in the diplomatic field. He is only slightly less moved by the academics who parade down to Washington to peddle their ideas. And when one sets aside popular opinion, Congress, the bureaucracy and the academic community, there remains the President alone. The inescapable conclusion is that Henry Kissinger's only meaningful constituency is a constituency of one.

It might have seemed surprising that, only a month after his election, Mr. Nixon would have chosen one of his most vocal antagonists—the foreign policy adviser of his chief rival, Nelson Rockefeller—as a leading policy aide. But the two men had much more in common than anyone would have supposed.

To begin with, Mr. Nixon turned out not to be the partisan, suspect observer of the international scene whom Kissinger had so feared. Quite the contrary—Mr. Nixon was determined to take hold of the foreign policy machine and fashion his own commitment to world order, regardless of public and congressional opinion. In the past, decisions had been made in a chaotic, *ad hoc* atmosphere which lacked consistency and framework; the new President decided that such practice should cease.

For somewhat different reasons, Kissinger agreed that policy planning should be centered in the White House. For Kissinger, the balance-of-power diplomat, had long believed that world equilibrium was based on the constant threat of force, and that respect for the United States rested on the fear of its enormous military machine. At times, secret talks and well-placed overtures could avert military engagements that were not in the interest of the United States; at others, where an escalation to armed conflict seemed necessary, the decisions must be made and the orders carried out by a few top men who acted with the greatest of speed.

Such a policy of threat demanded a high degree of centralization—and the resulting Nixon-Kissinger policy structure was designed to circumvent those forces in government, such as Congress and the Cabinet bureaucrats, which were considered extraneous to that approach.

#### GUARDING CREDIBILITY

In addition, Kissinger realized that the policy of threat would be a failure if Mr. Nixon could not appear unfettered by others—inside Washington and out—who had claims on the President's conduct of foreign affairs. In as early a tract as "A World Restored," his 1954 Ph.D. thesis on Metternich and the restructuring of post-Napoleonic Europe, Kissinger had written that "the impetus of domestic policy is a direct social experience, but that of foreign policy is not actual, but potential experience—the threat of war—vicious statesmanship attempts to avoid being made explicit." In other words, popular opinion was little more than an encumbrance on those few who were capable of making decisions. For if the foreign diplomat were allowed to feel that the President's policy could be swayed by domestic upheavals, then the credibility of threat—the linchpin of the policy—would ultimately collapse.

Corollary to the policy of threat was the notion that the United States would keep its promises and fulfill its commitments no matter what the price. For the ultimate failure of diplomacy was to lose credibility, and

there was a feeling for the honor of a great power that went very deep in Kissinger. There was the idea that a faulted credibility in one area of the world would surely lead to disaster in another, because for Kissinger all the great troublespots of the world were lined up on a single continuum that connected the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. Should the Russians violate the ceasefire lines in the Mideast, then the President must be free to respond in Cambodia. And if the policy made no sense in cost-benefit analysis, at least it would proceed from strategic thinking which transcended the day-to-day pressures of political life.

#### WHITE HOUSE PREDOMINANCE

Kissinger felt that the presidency was the only office of government which could determine and execute foreign policy in the way it should properly be conducted. Congress was an impediment, its members, by and large, were not properly schooled in the hard-fought, intricate practice of diplomatic affairs and were more likely to respond to the uninformed concerns of their voters, to the shoddy tug-and-pull of the popular political process, than to the arduous twists and turns of great-power relationships. The bureaucracy, too, was an enemy; no imagination, no flair, no speed or adaptability, little grasp of the sacrifices and risks one must incur if the one were to maintain a flexible policy.

Kissinger, the balance-of-power diplomat, had long believed that world equilibrium was based on the constant threat of force, and that respect for the United States rested on the fear of its enormous military machine.

And as for popular opinion, Kissinger's interest lay not in how the votes would be cast today, but in how the executive structure would be affected by domestic reactions to the policy when that policy had finally run its course five or ten years later. His overwhelming concern was how well the White House could continue to function as the major force in foreign policy, whether popular opinion would one day rise up and destroy the presidency as an instrument of diplomatic relations. And when Kissinger finally agreed to go to work for the man he had scorned as a presidential candidate, it was only on the condition that the policymaking structure be geared to White House predominance.

In a series of meetings at the end of November, 1968, Mr. Nixon invited Kissinger to accept the post of foreign policy assistant and proposed a revival of the National Security Council. Set up under Truman after World War II to coordinate policy planning, the NSC system had long since fallen into obscurity, but Mr. Nixon viewed it as an instrument of restoring to the White House a critical measure of flexibility and control over policy decisions. More than anything else, he dreaded being handed a single policy recommendation which, more often than not, might be a compromise policy, an effort on the part of several differing agencies which had subdued their disagreements and presented the White House with a position it could then only accept or reject.

Underlying the revived NSC structure was the so-called "options" system, the recommendations of each agency would be solicited by the White House and then screened for the NSC and the President by Kissinger and his staff.

As the "options" man, Kissinger would be expected to give a fair, objective account of each alternative, as confidential adviser to the President, his strength would rest more on his personal relationship with Mr. Nixon than on his policymaking abilities—a relationship that would have been very difficult to predict. "I suppose what really was clear was that Henry Kissinger did not intend to become a man of partisan influence," Thomas Schelling, Kissinger's closest colleague on the Harvard faculty, said recently,

"I think he honestly thought that there was a more detached role for himself." So Kissinger had gone to Washington to whittle down the options and strengthen Mr. Nixon's hand, his own influence could be determined only by the chemistry of his relationship with the President.

#### A TOWERING FIGURE

But for astute observers, the news of Kissinger's supremacy in foreign policy was not long in coming. In December, 1968, he flew to Key Biscayne to present Mr. Nixon with a set of blueprints for the revised NSC system—and William P. Rogers, the new Secretary of State, was already out in the cold. No longer would it be as necessary for the Secretary to meet with the President on an informal basis, as Acheson and Dulles and Rusk before him had done, like all other Cabinet members who dealt in foreign policy, his ideas would no longer be brought directly to Mr. Nixon, but would have to pass first through a system which Kissinger administered. And when Rogers met with the President and his national security adviser, he was completely overshadowed, so outclassed by Kissinger that he would rarely see Mr. Nixon in Kissinger's presence any more. "He avoids his confrontations with Henry because he knows he'll make a fool out of him," one State Department official said recently.

Kissinger was a towering figure amid the rest of the Nixon appointees. None could compare to him in terms of sheer mental preparation for the job. And it is probable that Kissinger came into his job better prepared than either of his predecessors under Kennedy and Johnson, not to mention those whom Mr. Nixon had just appointed to other, less rigorous posts, the men who had won their jobs as political favors, not by sheer intellectual breadth.

Most of the others in Mr. Nixon's retinue were men of politics, men who could be restrained by adverse domestic feeling or be deterred from a policy that seemed to make no material sense. But Mr. Nixon—a President determined to behave in a presidential way—and Kissinger, the great-power diplomat, would brook no compromise. And Mr. Nixon's personal relationship with Kissinger, unfettered as it was by ulterior political motives, became deep and profound. Kissinger is the President's only post-1960 acquaintance to have become a member of his personal inner circle. He sees Mr. Nixon more frequently than do any of his other appointees. And as Mr. Nixon's confidante, Kissinger passes the crucial judgments on the very options that he and his staff have laid out.

#### BUREAUCRATIC COUP

But Kissinger's coup of the Cabinet departments was not as simple as that. It involved a devious circumvention of the bureaucracy through the skillful use of study memoranda and detailed, lengthy questionnaires. According to several men who were close associates of Kissinger at the time, Kissinger came to power determined not to rely on normal channels for information concerning each of the policy undertakings. And so he proceeded to encase the Cabinet departments in a series of useless policy studies which left them very much on the short end of decision-making.

Kissinger's first act as Mr. Nixon's adviser was to commission an options memorandum on the progress of the war in Vietnam; he began work on the study as early as December, 1968. In the months preceding the study, the military state of affairs in Indochina had been the subject of a raging controversy inside the various departments. The outgoing presidential advisers and the upper crust of Washington's foreign service were claiming that the National Liberation Front had grown significantly weaker since the Tet offensive the previous February, that the Communist military campaign would fold in a matter of months. But the lower echelon—

1967, to "spur trade with Reds." The article stated: "An alliance of family banking fortunes linking Wall Street and the Midwest is going to try to build economic bridges between the Free World and Communist Europe. The joint effort contemplated by I.B.E. and Tower is seen as combining the investment skills and resources of the Rockefellers and the special entre to Soviet bloc officialdom that Tower enjoys largely as a result of contacts cultivated over the last 15 years by Cyrus S. Eaton, Sr. The elder Eaton has been an outspoken advocate of closer ties between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He has backed his convictions by visiting Russia and entertaining high Soviet leaders including former Premier Khrushchev." Kissinger's "foreign policy" advice must have made Rockefeller feel that investments in Communist countries would not be too risky.

Men of science are not going to have complete control of the new "World of Disarmament," as there are other important people in the world . . . bankers, industrialists, diplomats. These people meet and plan in secret and are called the Bilderbergers. Henry Kissinger has attended at least one of their meetings. His name was on the list of participants at the Williamsburg, Va. Conference, which took place March 20, 21 and 22, 1964. The idea of the Bilderberg meetings originated in the early fifties. The first meeting that brought American and European "leading citizens" together took place under the chairmanship of Prince Bernhard at the Bilderberg Hotel in Oosterbeek, Holland, from May 29 to May 31, 1954. Although the Bilderbergers claim that they are not a "policy-making body" and that "no conclusions are reached," they surely do not bring important people from practically the four corners of the earth for nothing.

Another group of "unofficial" policymakers is the Council on Foreign Relations, with which Kissinger has long been affiliated. The CFR is believed by many to be the secret government of the United States. After a thorough investigation this organization was declared subversive by the American Legion of California in 1962.

Among the present or past members of the Council on Foreign Relations we find the following:

Alger Hiss, Ralph Bunche, Lauchlin Currie, Harry Dexter White, Herbert Matthews, Joseph Barnes, Cyrus Eaton, J. Robert Oppenheimer, John K. Fairbank and Arthur Goldberg, all of whom have had a record of close affiliation with Communists and some of whom were actually identified as Communists.

During the first week of December 1968 the International Association for Cultural Freedom conducted a five-day closed seminar at Princeton, N.J. Ninety individuals attended, among them Henry Kissinger who told those assembled "The doors to the White House will always be open to your ideas." Present to hear this kind invitation were Charles Hamilton, co-author with Stokely Carmichael of the book, "Black Power;" Andreas Papandreu, left-wing leader of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement, exiled from Greece due to his pro-Communist activities; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., McGeorge Bundy and George Ball, among others. Some of the participants were from Communist countries at this seminar financed by the Ford Foundation.

Henry Kissinger has been a friend and associate of John Kenneth Galbraith (who called the appointment of his friend "a good one"), Adam Yarmolinsky (expected to step into Kissinger's job at Harvard, who said "I will sleep better with Henry Kissinger in Washington."), Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. ("I think it is an excellent appointment") and Robert R. Bowie with whom he worked at the Harvard Center for International Affairs.

Kissinger has been described by a colleague as "impatiently arrogant" and his confidence in his own ability is evident from a comment reportedly made when Rockefeller sent one of his "position papers" to other advisers for comment: "Do you ask a housepainter to touch up a Picasso?" In his new position Dr. Kissinger intends to make some long-range plans for the United States as well as to completely reorganize and restructure the entire White House security planning machinery. This is a very important job to entrust to a man as acceptable to the Democratic left-wing Kennedy Administration as he seemingly is to the Republican moderate Nixon Administration. To what ends will he use the "brilliance" he wishes to conceal from the American people?



### LET REDS OPPOSE EACH OTHER

Most anything would seem to be better than endless meetings with communists in Paris, which everyone has found is getting us nowhere. There has always seemed to be a possible advantage to our country in having communists disagree with each other, so it has been difficult for some government officials who have discussed the subject to see why Red China and Red Russia have not been encouraged to do battle in their advancement of communism and who would lead it. Other diplomats have said they want to keep down any open breaks between the Chinese and Russians because trouble between Red China and Soviet Russia could bring on World War III.

President Nixon's proposed trip to Peking could be a matter of him carrying out a deal Henry A. Kissinger already has made. No communist government has ever proved itself to be very trustworthy about carrying out any agreements, but there could be advantages to the U.S. if this is clearly recognized and the opportunity used to disturb the communists' efforts to dominate the world.

Constructive statesmen and seasoned patriots could feel better about the events about to unfold if President Nixon were receiving close counsel from eminent men such as the generals trained by MacArthur. A great nation cannot continue long abandoning its allies in favor of its enemies. Whatever else comes of the Kissinger plan for China, it already is robbing the non-communist Nationalist Chinese government on Formosa of essential prestige. Chiang Kai-shek has remained a staunch ally and has been setting a top example for developing nations to avoid communism. Upsetting the communist timetable may save millions of lives. Throwing over allies can cause every friend to desert us. Surely no one imagines the communists will love us then. HLH

END

259 words

Beginning with President Truman, Kissinger has dictated U. S. Foreign policy for each President whether he was a Democrat or Republican.

### THE QUESTION OF KISSINGER

The announcement that Henry A. Kissinger had visited Peking and arranged for an invitation to President Nixon to visit the Red China capital has apparently stunned many observers around the world. The Kissinger record needs to be better understood and closely evaluated.

Kissinger has been handled with kid gloves by the national TV newsmen, despite his rather obscure qualifications for such a powerful position in a Republican administration. A few hawkish policies have failed to estrange him from the left-leaning opinion-molders. His background with the Council on Foreign Relations makes him acceptable to "liberal" pundits, despite an occasional statement to the effect that Russia is hostile to the U.S.

Shortly after finishing Harvard, where he got a Ph. D. in 1954, Kissinger was director for nuclear weapons and foreign policy in 1955 and 1956 for the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1956 until 1958 he was director of a special studies project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. He was an adviser to Nelson Rockefeller on military and foreign policy in 1963 during Rockefeller's unsuccessful drive for the Presidency.

Despite lack of practical experience he has served as a consultant for the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon administrations. He has become involved in the highest levels of policy making with the State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA, the National Security Council and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The public has a right to know much more about such a powerful and influential figure who did not become a naturalized citizen until 1943. HLH

END

258 words

# Chou Talks of Revolution, Progress

The Dallas Morning News  
**GENERAL NEWS**

Comics

Thursday, August 12, 1971 1 AA

By JAMES RESTON

PEKING — Chou En-lai, the premier of China, is an austere man with thick John L. Lewis eyebrows, cool and inquisitive dark brown eyes and white, expressive hands.

He greeted his visitors in the vast Pao Kien Hall at the Great Hall of the People on Tien-an-Men Square, across from the main gate to the forbidden city. In the formal part of our conversation, which took place Aug. 8, when he was discussing China's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and Taiwan, he talked very slowly, as if he were tired and maybe a little suspicious, but when we moved to dinner in another part of the room shortly after 10 p.m., he brightened up and talked on a wide range of subjects.

I first asked the premier whether he was an optimist or a pessimist, and he replied with a smile that he was an optimist because he was a Communist. He then talked about the United States and showed some interest in our race problem and in the American Chinese exports who had been so severely criticized during the era of Sen. Joseph McCarthy for their views on Chinese politics.

Chou En-lai said a friend of his just back from the United States had told him American blacks were making progress and he seemed pleased about this. He asked whether many of them worked in the government, and when he was told yes, that 84 per cent of the population of the District of Columbia was Negro, and many worked in the government, he observed that this was a good thing because you get used to them.

HE SAID HE HAD no old friend in the United States except Edgar Snow, but he inquired about John S. Service and John Carter Vincent, formerly of the State Department, and Orientalist Prof. John K. Fairbank of Harvard University, and Owen Lattimore, formerly of Johns Hopkins.

When I said many of these men had been cruelly criticized and that it would be a justice and a kindness if they were able to come back and see the country they had devoted their lives to studying, he replied that this was a good idea. "Take good wishes to them," he said. "If they want to visit China, we will welcome them."

The premier expressed some admiration for Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, U.S. commander in China in World War II, mainly because the latter had quarrelled with Chiang Kai-shek, but he was rather grudging in his thin praise for Gen. George C. Marshall, although he expressed a preference for him over Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer and Patrick J. Hurley, who also served the United



Chou En-lai, he calls himself an optimist.

States here during the post-war period.

At one point his mind jumped from Marshall to the Marshall Plan for reconstruction of Europe after World War II and he was particularly interested in what the plan had cost the United States and whether we got any of the money back.

THE PREMIER said the United States apparently had not learned in Vietnam the lessons of its failures in China. It was now trying a Vietnamization program of arming and supporting reactionary forces that did not have the backing of the people. But that, he observed, was precisely what we had tried in China—America had "a China-ization" program of supporting Chiang Kai-shek, who had 5 million men and plenty of U.S. arms.

That was where the Communists got their arms, he said, by destroying Chiang's millions and taking their U.S. weapons. There was a very interesting photograph, he recalled, which showed Mao Tse-tung entering Peking in an American jeep and reviewing whole rows of American guns and tanks.

The premier had taken time to read what I had written from China before the meeting, and he brought up, without offense, an observation I had made that China was an old civilization which seemed vigorous and young but was run by "old men."

THE REASON FOR this, he said, was that China's revolution had gone on

for 22 years and actually for 35 years before that from the founding of the Communist party. Accordingly, the Chinese leaders grew old in the struggle and didn't come to power until they were in their 50s.

The American revolution was quite different, he observed; it lasted only a few years, and the early American presidents were young. "Jefferson was a young man when he was president. You Americans were only three millions at the time of your revolution, yet were able to resist a colonial power of 30 million, so you depended on guerrilla warfare. It was you who started guerrilla warfare — George Washington started it," he remarked.

But China was thinking about the problem of succession and younger men, he said. China operated on the three-in-one combination, he said, explaining that all instruments of the government were now run by a combination of the old, the middle-aged and the young. President Nixon would see, when he came here, Chou En-lai said, that young and middle aged will join in the talks.

While the premier talked, an elaborate dinner was served.

IT WOULD BE misleading to say the meal was served in courses: it was a never-ending stream. First hors d'oeuvres of prawns, green beans, cold duck and chicken, and delicious morsels of fish. Then the first of three soup courses, this one oyster broth with tiny oysters the size of a quarter, and floating slices of cucumber, followed by a dish of shrimp balls, quails eggs, cabbage and sea slugs. There were small glasses of sweet red wine and an explosive kind of schnapps called Mao Tai, which Chou En-lai used to prop up a room, without swallowing a drop.

And about at this point he began talking about the Chinese revolution and Stalin.

I observed that parents owed their children a record of the years before a child has its own memory and asked whether the leaders of the Chinese revolution felt the same obligation. Had they kept personal records in the form of diaries or journals of their long political struggle?

"No," he replied. "None of us has kept a diary — not Mao, nor Lin Biao, nor I, and none of us wants to write our memoirs." Maybe, though, he continued, a history of China from the Opium War on should be prepared, and per-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-82 BY

b6 -1  
b7C -1



hope it would be a good idea to try to get the record down on tape. But, he added, "we're not quite accustomed to the tape recorder in China yet."

**THE PREMIER**, who in the formal part of the conversation, had criticized the Soviet Union, nevertheless expressed his admiration for Joseph Stalin. Looked at from certain points of view, he said, no doubt Stalin had his shortcomings, and even from a Chinese point of view he was not good for China at the Yalta conference with Roosevelt and Churchill, but from a world point of view there was much to be said for him.

"We consider him to be a great Marxist-Leninist," he said. "Also, you must admit he made great contributions to the world war. You must admit this."

Unfortunately, Chou En-lai added, Lenin had died early, and after his death, no one but Stalin could have held the Soviet Union together — no one. And without the 15 years of Soviet construction before the outbreak of World War II, it would have been impossible to defeat the Germans.

The premier, although the dinner had run through almost two hours and many courses, never let the conversation lull. His mind seemed to jump from one topic to another and as it was getting on toward midnight, suddenly began talking about the United States again.

**AMERICA HAS** its merits, he said. It was composed of peoples of all nations and this gave it an advantage of the gradual accumulation of the wisdom of different countries.

"You are also a big country," he said. "We both have about the same amount of land and room for development. Of course, you plead that your economic and political system is good, but let's not argue about that. You will not oppose progress, and if you are going to make progress, of course you must expect change. You will undoubtedly develop faster because of your industrialization," he added.

This turned his mind to the question of language which seemed to have a special fascination for him. He said English was now the second language in China, although the Chinese attached quite a lot of importance to French. There is a tendency in China now, he added, that he didn't quite approve of. Too little attention was being paid to the Russian language.

**PART OF THE** explanation of Chou En-lai's intense interest in language lies in the fact language reform in China from the time of World War I was one of the roots of Chinese political reform and revolution.

"We are giving the Chinese language simplified characters," the premier said. He was obviously intrigued by this question of comparative languages and the emergence of English as the language of diplomacy.

**HIS OBSERVATIONS** on men and the affairs of life were wide. Among other things he had this to say:

—On Chiang Kai-shek: He was, Chou En-lai said, very much acquainted with him. There was one point: even from the standpoint of the Americans, Chiang was a man who can stand up to American pressure, not like Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon. Chiang has a sense of national respect, but that is not the case with all the people around him. The CIA, Chou En-lai added, will know all about that.

—On birth control: It was not good for China to expand its population, now variously estimated to from 750 million to 850 million. China could not raise living standards with rapid population growth and it was not good for mothers. China was making progress on this problem, he said, but not everywhere in the country.

**SUDDENLY THE** quails eggs and sea slugs were gone and there were some mini-dumplings with meat, and of all things, the first time in our experience here, beautiful white expanses of bread and butter, which the premier consumed with delicate satisfaction.

In short, it was not exactly a TV dinner, and not a typical American interview either.

A few minutes after midnight, the premier gave the signal to disperse. He first sat us down to make a forgotten point about Korea and finally took us to the door, which could not have been more than a quarter of a mile away. It was quite a night.

#### GO SLOW WITH RED CHINA

A leading contender for the nomination for the Presidency of the United States recently stated that in his opinion Red China should be admitted to the United Nations this year. Other well-known political figures of the liberal and left groups are literally falling over themselves in their haste to push Red China for a prominent position among the family of nations.

Already we have had what is termed ping-pong diplomacy and the relaxation of restrictions on trade with the communists of mainland China. Few voices are being raised in alarm at what is going on, but, in the words of the late Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York, "Let's look at the record."

Will regard to Red China a look at the record might be sobering. Here are some things we find:

The communists took over in China by force—by revolution and aggression, just as they have taken over almost everywhere else. They have maintained themselves in power, as communists always do, by gorges, murders, oppression, oppression, and barbarism.

The Red Chinese committed aggression not only against the Chinese people but, in seeking to advance their stated goal of controlling all Asia, against India and Tibet.

The Red Chinese committed aggression against both Korea and the United States when their North Korean allies attacked South Korea. At that time the UN branded Red China as the aggressor.

The Red Chinese have supplied and supported North Vietnamese communists in their aggression against South Viet Nam. It is noteworthy that Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, who was praised by American newspapers for his friendship toward the American ping-pong team, had just a few days previously at Hanoi

denounced Americans as imperialists, and he informed the North Vietnamese that they had the complete support of Red China in their efforts to defeat the United States.

Red China has devoted its efforts to developing hydrogen weapons while its people live in terrible poverty, and the nation is even expected to be in a position to wield nuclear blackmail against its neighbors.

Recently, like other means, it used to further Red China's goals and intentions. While American newspapers needled the invasion in the United States ping-pong team to visit Red China, they barely noticed the announcement that Red China would not participate in the International Labor Union Federation because it believed Free China on Taiwan, its rejected membership in the world organization, almost simultaneously with the invitation to the Asian-African conference, Red China denounced the manipulation of U.S. imperialism.

Many Asian experts and analysts are frankly alarmed at the turn of events, at the manner in which American leadership seems impatient to embrace the leaders of Red China, as vicious and dangerous as they are.

The big question in the minds of a number of Asian experts is this: Will we make the same mistakes with regard to Red China that we have made in our dealings with Russia? Some even go so far as to state that Russia could never have reached its present position of power without the help of the West, particularly of the United States, almost every time the United States—its leadership impatient to achieve lasting friendship and peace—has cooperated and negotiated with communist Russia. These meetings have been followed by gains for Russia, either inside or outside its borders.

It is feared that we are embarking on a course with Red China which will have similar results in Asia. At times when international crises caused problems in Russia, we cooperated with the Red bosses by negotiating some concession or agreeing to some Red position which gave the Red leadership a propaganda lever with the people.

There is evidence that all is not well inside Red China, that Red leaders are causing great unrest among the tens of millions of people. It is also a fact that Chairman Mao has declared "The seizure of power by armed force, the overthrow of laws by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle holds good universally, for China and for all other countries."

There is a strong belief among some experts on international affairs that China is prepared to continue for 100 years or longer its attack against free nations everywhere, and that the leadership might even use nuclear warfare to accomplish its goals.

Red China, then, is an international outfit, committed to the task of dominating the world for communism. The communists are extremely patient, willing to move slowly to capitalize on American impatience.

We would do well to consider a statement by the Chinese philosopher Chuang-tzu, who said: "Do not seek quick results, nor look for small gains. Seek quick results and you will not achieve success, look for small gains and you will not accomplish big projects."

It is difficult to understand why our leaders endanger our nation by trying to do business with international outlaws and to go down, believe how much friends.



# The Herald of Freedom

For God  
And Country

OCTOBER 1, 1971

VOLUME XX NO. 5

b6 -1  
b7C -1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 1-1-00 BY

HENRY A. KISSINGER — — — REVISITED

Well-informed Washington sources, including some members of Congress, consider Presidential Adviser Henry A. Kissinger to be the second most important individual in the U.S. Government and have referred to it as the Kissinger-Nixon Administration.

Henry Alfred Kissinger, born at Fuerth, Germany May 27, 1923, has come a long way fast since his immigration to this country at the age of fifteen. The West German magazine DER SPIEGEL carried an article entitled "This German in the White House" in which it is stated that Kissinger's birth is recorded in the town hall at Fuerth as Alfred Heinz Kissinger, son of Paula Kissinger (nee Stern) and Louis Kissinger, address was Mathilden Strasse 23, Fuerth (which is in middle Franconia). At the time of Kissinger's appointment by President Nixon, French newspapers reported that his father had been a rabbi in Germany. DER SPIEGEL states that Louis Kissinger was principal of a state school for girls of the upper class. The Kissingers came to the U.S. in 1938 as Jewish refugees from the Nazis, Kissinger's father, although over 80 years old, now lives in Washington Heights, N.Y., and has been working as a bookkeeper. His mother has helped support the family by working incognito in Jewish households for bar mitzvahs and parties.

Kissinger was 15 years old when his family came to the U.S. After graduating from George Washington High School in Manhattan, he obtained an A.B. from Harvard in 1950, an MA in 1952 and Ph.D. in 1954. On February 6, 1949, he married Ann Fleischer and they had two children. The marriage ended in a divorce in 1964. Noel E. Parmentel, Jr., writing in the Village VOICE, March 18, 1971, stated: "When he (Kissinger) was married to Ann, who was a genuine human being, he couldn't stand it. After she literally slaved to send him through graduate school he almost turned her into a zombie with all that screaming and shouting. Just like the Gestapo. He was ashamed of her New York accent and always told her how she embarrassed him in front of 'important people.' It got so bad she was scared to even open her mouth. That house in Belmont was like 'Gaslight.'" Little wonder his wife divorced him.

Kissinger became a U.S. citizen in 1943 through service in the U.S. Army. In view of the fact that German had been Kissinger's native tongue, he became an interrogator in counter-intelligence. Later, although only a sergeant, he was put in charge of administering a German town. By 1946, because of his capabilities or connections, he was made a civilian employee at a salary of \$10,000 a year. While working for his Master's Degree at Harvard, Kissinger was made executive director of the Harvard International Seminar, a CIA-financed center which sponsors student exchange programs. By the time he received his Doctorate Degree in 1954, he was already serving as a consultant to a number of government agencies and teaching at Harvard. In 1955 Kissinger was appointed director of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy Studies for the Council on Foreign Relations, and also became a member of that organization. The following year he became director of special study projects for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. (having been appointed by Nelson Rockefeller) and served in that position for two years. Thereafter he continued teaching at Harvard but took time out during the 1961-62 period to be a consultant for the National Security Council and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He also served intermittently as a consultant to the State Department and worked closely with Walt W. Rostow in Washington.

One of Kissinger's students at the CIA-financed Harvard International Seminar was Uzi Narkiss who was a senior officer in the Israeli Army at the time and who visited Kissinger at the White House in 1969. Narkiss was the commanding general of the Israeli troops that took Jerusalem in 1967. According to LIFE magazine (September 5, 1969), Narkiss advised Kissinger that Israel will hold the Arab territories as long as it likes.

Confidential sources reported that Kissinger was considered a security risk but obtained his security clearance through President Nixon. Kissinger actually received his appointment as Presidential Adviser for National Security Affairs through the recommendation of Nelson Rockefeller and key people in the

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3694.

C.F.R. Professor Henry Paolucci, of St. John's University, wrote a study about Kissinger which appeared in the Congressional Record of August 4, 1971, a portion of which states: "Henry Kissinger, too, expressed as recently as 1965 the conviction that the time was at hand for a surrender of nationhood because 'institutions based on present concepts of national sovereignty are not enough.' The ultimate goal of a supranationalist world community, he wrote, 'will not come quickly; many intermediate stages must be traversed before it can be reached. It is not too early, however, to prepare ourselves for this step beyond the nation-state.'"

After Kissinger's appointment, he increased the staff of his assistants, consultants, and advisers until today he has 110 people working directly for him, including a number of individuals with dubious backgrounds. One of them is Helmut Sonnenfeldt who is very close to Kissinger and was formerly Chief of Soviet and Eastern Europe matters in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. During the Eisenhower Administration Sonnenfeldt had been the subject of an intensive FBI investigation regarding the giving of secret information to agents of a foreign power. Although it was reported that the FBI had an iron-clad case, William P. Rogers, who was the Attorney General, refused to prosecute Sonnenfeldt on the grounds that the State Department felt it would not be in the interest of the U.S. Government to have the information become public knowledge. Sonnenfeldt, acting as Kissinger's top assistant, accompanied President Nixon on his trip to Communist Rumania.

Kissinger arranged contracts with the Rand Corp. in California without knowledge of the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State. One contract had to do with what the Soviet reaction would be to U.S. atomic attack on Egypt. Another study was for the purpose of preparing a report on the "feasibility" of restoring political, economic, and cultural relations with Castro's Cuba. Kissinger encouraged persons working on Nelson Rockefeller's Latin-American Report in 1969 to press the view that U.S. should offer Cuba normal relations and trade. Kissinger also had a major role in getting the National Council of Churches to call for the U.S. to drop its quarantine of Cuba and re-establish diplomatic relations. Another study ordered by Kissinger was how the anti-Communist government of Brazil might be overthrown.

Kissinger has his own direct connections with the Communist government of North Vietnam. Paul Scott reported on November 12, 1969:

"Although it has been one of the best kept secrets of the Vietnam war, Kissinger has been deeply involved in secret talks with the North Vietnamese.

"Two mysterious Frenchmen have been Kissinger's go between with Hanoi. They are Raymond Aubrac and Professor Herbert Marcovich, friends of Wilfred Burchett, the Australian correspondent whom the Kremlin and Peking uses frequently for high-level intelligence and diplomatic operations." (Burchett is a known KGB Agent)

Aubrac has been director of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, was a close personal friend of Ho Chi Minh, and on his U.N. job found it easy to travel to Communist countries from which most Americans are barred. Aubrac had been introduced to Kissinger, then a Harvard professor, in 1967 by Marcovich, a professor at the University of Paris. Kissinger and Marcovich had met earlier at one of the Pugwash meetings organized by pro-Soviet millionaire Cyrus Eaton.

It was on Kissinger's recommendation that President Johnson made an offer to Hanoi to stop the bombing of North Vietnam if Hanoi would give assurances that it would not take advantage of the halt. Kissinger's channels reported that Hanoi would cooperate but they never did and American intelligence officers reported that Hanoi used the lull to rebuild its stock piles of arms and military supplies at advance bases in Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. . . . which resulted in the deaths of thousands of Americans.

President Nixon endeavored to have Kissinger negotiate the U.S. out of Vietnam but, as it turned out, Kissinger convinced President Nixon that the only way out was for him to unilaterally withdraw U.S. troops.

After the FBI had arrested on conspiracy charges a group affiliated with the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (the Berrigan Case), Kissinger actually entertained in the White House three of the co-conspirators arrested in the plot to kidnap him.

In 1971, prior to the Communist-inspired-and-directed demonstrations for May Day, Kissinger entertained some of the key leaders in the organization that controlled the demonstrations which were aimed at shutting down Washington, D.C. and which resulted in thousands of arrests.

A former employee of Kissinger told Noel E. Parmentel, Jr.: "He's (Kissinger) got us all buffaloed. He can (and will) lift your security, get you a foundation black ball, bong you at the colleges, put you in coventry. He's got spies in every department. He's running the Ministry of Fear. All his phones are tapped and he keeps long dossiers."

According to numerous newspaper and magazine articles, Kissinger had developed the reputation of being a ladies' man and has been dating a number of

women, including Women's Lib leader Gloria Steinem, who is national sponsor of the Committee to Defend the Black Panthers. After graduating from college, Gloria Steinem worked for the National Student Association, which was CIA-financed and which paid for American students to attend Communist youth festivals in Europe. According to NEWSWEEK of August 16, 1971, Gloria Steinem has had a close relationship also with Negro track star Rafer Johnson, movie director Mike Nichols, and they reported Cesar Chavez is proud to call her his friend.

The West German magazine QUICK created a sensation with the publications of secret telegrams of Rolf Pauls, West German Ambassador in Washington, to his home office which disclosed very unusual behind-the-scenes political conversations between West German State Secretary Egon Bahr and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger. Informed sources state that Henry Kissinger has been promoting the West German concessions to Moscow and Communist East Germany. In fact, a Washington source advised that when Henry Kissinger made his trip to Peking, China, he actually traveled on a West German passport.

One of Kissinger's special assistants who accompanied him on the trip to Red China is Richard Smyser, described by the WASHINGTON POST as Kissinger's Vietnam expert and former member of the Paris peace talks delegation. On January 2, 1971 Congressman John R. Rarick told his colleagues: "Mr. Speaker, it appears that the District of Columbia social event of the year was a trouserless orgy and was held by a member of the staff of Dr. Henry Kissinger, special assistant to President Nixon for national security affairs." A large number of Kissinger's national security affairs staff, other White House staffers and some employees from Capitol Hill and other branches of government attended the "trouserless orgy," during which underwear made from an American flag was revealed. Congressman Rarick remarked that it is little wonder our young people over the country "have become disillusioned with this so-called establishment, when such total disregard for decency and morality is flaunted by people who are related to as representative of our Government. If other members of the Paris peace talks delegation are of the same character as exhibitionist Richard Smyser, we can now begin to understand why even the Vietcong cannot communicate with them."

The withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam without the release of American prisoners of war is looked upon in this country, as well as abroad, as surrender to the enemy. However, the unilateral withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam is the fulfillment of Dr. Kissinger's plan. In the

January 1969 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS; the quarterly publication of the Council on Foreign Relations, an article by Dr. Henry Kissinger states his formula for ending the war in Vietnam which calls for a series of steps to bring about a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam and for a political settlement. Dr. Kissinger did not rule out a coalition government with Communist participation.

When the U.S. March for Victory in Vietnam was held last fall, it was expected that South Vietnam's Vice-president, Nguyen Cao Ky, would attend and speak at the rally which called for a military victory in South Vietnam. The New York TIMES of September 26, 1970 noted that Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on foreign policy, had scheduled a meeting in Paris with Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky to try to "persuade him not to attend the March for Victory rally here next week." The White House confirmed that Mr. Kissinger was flying to Paris and would meet with Mr. Ky, with the end result, of course, that Ky was pressured into not appearing at the patriotic rally.

Another of Henry Kissinger's secret activities was to obtain a \$100 million cut-back in the Defense Department's budget for intelligence-gathering operations. Veteran intelligence officials viewed this as a move by Kissinger to tighten his White House control over all intelligence operations. Since intelligence estimates are used as a key factor in the formation of American foreign policy, a tighter control of national intelligence operations would greatly increase Kissinger's already tremendous influence in the making of foreign policy.

In 1970 when the Soviet Embassy held a grand-scale celebration of Lenin's birthday, Henry Kissinger was designated as the Nixon Administration's representative for the Lenin birthday celebration, this designation reportedly being Kissinger's own idea.

Through the unusual media of the society section of the WASHINGTON POST of February 20, 1971, in a column written by Dorothy McCardle, we learn that it was Henry Kissinger who worked on President Nixon's State of the World message. So powerful has Henry Kissinger become at the White House that even the liberal editor of the HARVARD CRIMSON, David Landau, writing for the WASHINGTON POST of July 11, 1971 observed "Kissinger has used his position in government as a protective cloak to conceal his larger ambitions and purposes. Far from being detached, objective arbiter of presidential decision-making, he has become a crucial molder and supporter of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy. Instead of merely holding the bureaucracy at comfortable arm's length, he has entangled it in a web of useless projects and studies, cleverly shifting an important locus of

advisory power from the Cabinet departments to his own office." Mr. Landau also noted that, as a confidential adviser to the President, Kissinger has successfully claimed executive privilege when asked to testify on the record in congressional hearings.

Informed sources state that Henry A. Kissinger is not only a protege of Nelson A. Rockefeller, but has been an adviser to him for over 15 years. The original relationship goes back to Kissinger's student days at Harvard when he received a Rockefeller Fund Fellowship for political theory. Kissinger attended both the 1964 and 1968 Republican Conventions as a Rockefeller aide and is credited with having pushed the Republican platform towards a more dovish position on Vietnam. Kissinger was also associated with the Rockefellers in the special studies project in 1956-57 and then from 1958-59 when he was research secretary for a Council on Foreign Relations special discussion group, again on Rockefeller's recommendations.

Henry Kissinger's program for trade, cultural and diplomatic relations with Communist China (now embraced by Nixon), Kissinger's plan to restore relations with Cuba, his arranging for the President to visit Communist countries are all a part of a Rockefeller program to stimulate worldwide trade with Communist countries. In January 1967, Nelson Rockefeller and Cyrus Eaton, Jr., son of the sponsor of the Pugwash Conferences, joined forces to profit by trading with the Communists. The International Basic Economy Corp. (which was organized in 1947 under the principal direction of Nelson Rockefeller and is controlled by the Rockefeller Brothers) and Tower International Inc. (headed by Cyrus Eaton, Jr.) announced plans as revealed in the N.Y. TIMES of January 16, 1967 in an article entitled "Eaton Joins Rockefeller to Spur Trade with Reds." The TIMES noted that the joint effort of International Basic Economy Corp. and Tower International, Inc. is seen as combining the investment skills and resources of the Rockefellers and the special entree to Communist officialdom that Tower enjoys largely as a result of contacts cultivated over the last 15 years by Cyrus Eaton, Sr., always welcomed as a V.I.P. in Communist countries.

After his return from the secret meeting with Chou-En-Lai, Kissinger made a hurried and secret trip to London where reportedly he conferred with a mystery man named Victor Louis at the Soviet Embassy. Victor Louis, whose real name is Vitaly Yevgenyevich Lui, is a high ranking member of Soviet Intelligence who carries out secret diplomatic missions for the Soviet government with heads of state and key internationalists throughout the world. It was Victor Louis who arranged the sale of the Khrushchev Memoirs to LIFE magazine after their careful editing by the KGB. Louis, who is reportedly a millionaire, is so important that he resides in a three-story mansion located 15 miles outside of

Moscow with a swimming pool, pine wood sauna, private tennis court and garage which contains his five automobiles. His standard of living exceeds that of some of the most important members of the Soviet hierarchy. Although the secret meeting between KGB agent Victor Louis and Henry Kissinger was not reported by the world press, NEWSWEEK magazine on August 9, 1971 did report that Victor Louis has made application for an American visa and has put out private feelers for a meeting with Kissinger.

In addition to having been on the payroll of the Council on Foreign Relations and having been a long-time member of that organization, Henry Kissinger was accepted by the Bilderberg group and was permitted to attend at least one of their meetings. His name appeared on the list of participants at the Bilderberger Conference held at Williamsburg, Va. March 21-22, 1964. A number of other C.F.R. members are also connected with the Bilderberg group whose meetings are so secret that the American press does not even report them. The C.F.R. has had as active members Soviet agents Alger Hiss, Lauchlin Currie and Harry Dexter White; Herbert Matthews, who assisted Castro to power; Joseph Fels Barnes, identified as a Communist, who wrote Eisenhower's "Crusade in Europe" for him; Cyrus Eaton, pro-Soviet multi-millionaire; identified Communist John K. Fairbank, whose advice on Chinese Communist affairs is now being sought by U.S. officials. Another interesting member of the subversive C.F.R. is George A. Lincoln, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, an executive agency which has jurisdiction and control of the carrying out of the executive orders issued by President Nixon when he declared a state of national emergency "for economic reasons" and then announced his wage and price freeze. This 90-day "freeze" is but "Phase I" of bigger but unfortunately not better things to come, a transitional period while the dictatorial powers now being assumed by the President and his top "adviser" Kissinger are being more carefully worked out.

Informed sources in Washington are of the opinion that, although he is a known security risk and obviously working against the interests of our country, Henry Kissinger is so firmly entrenched in his position that even President Nixon is unable to remove him. Perhaps we should call it the Kissinger Administration.

Extra copies 50c, 5 for \$1, 100 for \$10

**THE HERALD OF FREEDOM AND METROPOLITAN  
REVIEW**

is published every other Friday by the HERALD of  
FREEDOM - P. O. BOX 3 - Zarephath, N. J. 08890  
Subscription \$10.00 per year. \$6.00 for 6 months  
Frank A. Capell, Ed. & Publisher - Tel: (201) 469-2088  
Office: Zarephath, N.J.

Entered as Second Class Matter at  
U.S. Post Office, Zarephath, N.J. 08890

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 23-cv-10741

Total Deleted Page(s) = 18  
Page 3 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 4 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 5 ~ b6 - -1, 4; b7C - -1, 4;  
Page 7 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 8 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 9 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 10 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 11 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 12 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 13 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 14 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 15 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 16 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 17 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 18 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 19 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 20 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 21 ~ Referral/Consult;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX





FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 23-cv-10741

Total Deleted Page(s) = 2  
Page 3 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 4 ~ Referral/Consult;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 3/3/75

[redacted] was telephonically contacted and advised of the official identity of the interviewing agent with whom he recognized having spoken with in the past. He thereafter furnished the following information:

He stated that at approximately 7:15 to 7:20 PM on March 1, 1975, he had received a telephone call from an unknown individual whose voice he recognized as having heard previously. [redacted] stated that after the caller determined it was [redacted] with whom he was speaking, he furnished the following information to [redacted] which is recorded at this point as close to being verbatim as [redacted] could recall at this time:

"I want to inform you and other Klansmen that an attempt is to be made on the Jewish son-of-a-bitch, Henry Kissinger, due to the remarks he made today concerning renegotiation with Communist Cuba. I want to let you know that a member of the Baton Rouge group is going to attempt to assassinate Henry Kissinger".

[redacted] stated that he did not want to have any part of it, said he thanked him for passing the information on. He stated he asked who the caller was but said the caller did not want to furnish his name. [redacted] stated he did not know why the caller wanted to tell him about this matter and did not think it was to wise to advise anyone of such a serious threat.

[redacted] stated that prior to calling the FBI, he called [redacted] (Phonetic) of the Houston Post, who [redacted] believes is affiliated with the Associated Press, and also called [redacted] (Phonetic) of the Houston Chronicle. [redacted] said he also attempted to contact [redacted] and he attempted to contact [redacted] however, never succeeded in the latter two calls but did state he talked with [redacted] mother. He then stated he thought he should advise the FBI and did so at approximately 7:50 PM.

Interviewed on 3/1/75 at Houston, TexasFile # HO 89-105by SA [redacted]Date dictated 3/3/75

HO 89-

[ ] said the call appeared to be a local call and not long distance. [ ] said that the Baton Rouge group would be [ ] Klan group, the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and therefore, [ ] was asked if he knew of any of [ ] members that may be in the [ ] area to which [ ] advised he did not. He stated he only knew of one individual in the [ ] area that was associated with [ ] and that was [ ]. He said the membership of any Klan group associated with the group would be purely an assumption on his part.

b6 -2  
b7C -2

He stated the caller at no time mentioned [ ] name.

b6 -2  
b7C -2

[ ] was called back later on that same evening and asked to furnish verbatim account of the telephone call again at which time he furnished basically the same information recorded herein, however, changed certain verbage in his statement and admitted that this was all a general account of what the caller had told him inasmuch as he could not recall the exact words the caller used. During the second conversation, [ ] said the caller said, "I want to let you know a member of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of the Baton Rouge group is going to attempt to assassinate Henry Kissinger".

b6 -2  
b7C -2

[ ] stated that there is a strong possibility that the caller may not even be a Klan member at all and could very well be a Socialist Workers Party member, or for that matter any individual who knows [ ] phone number.

b6 -2  
b7C -2

[ ] stated the caller had a clear voice, no stuttering, with a normal southern accent, and sounded like the individual would have been in his 20s. He stated he felt he could recognize the voice if he heard it again and would testify in this matter if necessary.

b6 -2  
b7C -2

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 4/11/75

[redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at Bill Bennett's Restaurant at which time he furnished the following information:

[redacted] stated he did not want to be interviewed at his home as his wife was not favorable with his activities, nor did he want to be interviewed at his employment nor the FBI office.

He could furnish no pertinent information regarding the telephone call he had received relating to a threat to HENRY KISSINGER's life. He only stated that he was convinced now that the caller was a prankster. He estimated the age of the caller to be in his early 20's.

[redacted] said that to his knowledge no one else associated with Klan activities knew anything about the matter.

Interviewed on 4/10/75 at Houston, TexasFile # HO 89-105 - 3by SA [redacted]Date dictated 4/11/75

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : SAC, HOUSTON 89-105) (C)

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : SA [REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1


SUBJECT: UNSUB,  
MEMBER OF KNIGHTS OF THE KKK,  
BATON ROUGE, LA.;  
THREAT TO ASSASSINATE DR. HENRY KISSINGER,  
SECRETARY OF STATE, DURING VISIT TO HOUSTON, TEXAS  
MARCH 1, 1975  
AFO; EXTREMIST MATTER - KLAN

[REDACTED] reinterviewed re this matter  
on 4/10/75 without gaining any pertinent information other  
than his belief that original call to him was by a prankster.

b6 -2  
b7C -2

[REDACTED] stated that he knew of no other klansmen  
that had any knowledge re this matter.

b6 -2  
b7C -2



|               |         |
|---------------|---------|
| SEARCHED      | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED    |         |
| APR 11 1975   |         |
| FBI - HOUSTON |         |

89-105-4

b6 -1  
b7C -1

|                      |   |     |     |      |
|----------------------|---|-----|-----|------|
| ✓ DESTROY            | 4 | MO. | 178 | YRS. |
| (5 YRS. - AUXILIARY) |   |     |     |      |
| (10 YRS. - CO)       |   |     |     |      |
| RETAIN - *SEE        |   |     |     |      |
| JUSTIFICATION HEREON |   |     |     |      |

b6 -1  
b7C -1



5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3722

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 23-cv-10741

Total Deleted Page(s) = 141

Page 3 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 4 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 5 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 6 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 7 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 8 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 9 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 10 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 11 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 12 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 13 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 14 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 15 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 16 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 17 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 23 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7D - -5;  
Page 26 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 28 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 30 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 32 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 34 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 37 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 40 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 43 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 45 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 46 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 47 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 50 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 52 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 54 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 55 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 56 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 57 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 58 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 59 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 60 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 61 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 62 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 63 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 64 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 65 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 66 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 67 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 68 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 69 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 70 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 71 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 72 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 73 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 74 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 75 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 76 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 77 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 78 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 79 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 80 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 81 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 82 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 83 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 84 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 85 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 86 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 87 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 88 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 89 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 92 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;  
Page 94 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7E - -4;

Page 110 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 111 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 112 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 113 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 114 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 115 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 116 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 117 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 118 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 119 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 120 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 121 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 122 ~ b6 - -3, 4; b7C - -3, 4;  
Page 123 ~ b6 - -3, 4; b7C - -3, 4;  
Page 124 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 125 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 126 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 127 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 128 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 131 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 132 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 133 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 152 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7D - -5;  
Page 153 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7D - -5;  
Page 154 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7D - -5;  
Page 155 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7D - -5;  
Page 156 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4; b7D - -5;  
Page 161 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 162 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 163 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 164 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 165 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 166 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 173 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 174 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 175 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 176 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 181 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 182 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 183 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 184 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 197 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 198 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 199 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 200 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 201 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 202 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 204 ~ b6 - -4; b7C - -4;  
Page 205 ~ b6 - -1, 4; b7C - -1, 4;  
Page 206 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 207 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 208 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 209 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 210 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 211 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 212 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 213 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 214 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 215 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 216 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 217 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 218 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 219 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 220 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 221 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 252 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 257 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 258 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 259 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 260 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 262 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 263 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 264 ~ Referral/Consult;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

b6 -4  
b7C -4

(Title)

William Casey-Victim et al.

(File No.)

SF 89B-279

| Item | Date Filed | Disposition  |
|------|------------|--|
| 1A0  | 2/6/81     | 1 copy of cassette tape re: 6/15/81 W.S. 4 (1) cc mpt sent                                     |
| 2    | 3/4/81     | 1 cell re: w/sec 9 3/3/81 739838 chf   |
| 3    | 3/4/81     | 1 cell re: w/sec 9 3/3/81  |
| 4    | 3/4/81     | 1 cell re: w/sec 9-3/3/81  |
| 5    | 3/4/81     | 1 cell re: w/sec 9-3/3/81  |
| 6    | 5-8-81     | Credit Bureau info re: 3/6/81  |
| 7    | 5-8-81     | 1 cell photo re: 3/6/81  |
| 8    | 5-8-81     | 1 cell photo re: 3/6/81  |
| 9    | 5-8-81     | 1 cell photo re: 3/6/81  |
| 10   | 2/2/82     | 4-8x10 prints (2 ea) of 2 separate frames from strip neg. taken as a result of surveillance on |
| 11   | "          | 1 copy of CA DLA   |
| 12   | "          | 3x5 prints of 15 different frames of strip neg. taken on 2/5/81                                |
| 13   | "          | strip prints of surveillance covering meet of  |
| 14   | "          | 1 roll of neg. of meeting between  |

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5b6 -1  
b7C -1

Encl. #1

FBI(23-091074)-3738



1cc ind + sent LA  
Pg # 739838

Field File No. SF 89B-294  
OO and File No. LA 89B-~~294~~ 543  
Date Received 2/2/81

From [REDACTED]  
(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)  
[REDACTED]  
(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)  
[REDACTED]  
(CITY AND STATE)

b6 -1  
b7C -1

By [REDACTED]  
(NAME OF SPECIAL AGENT)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No  
Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No


## Description

1 Copy of cassette tape  
re [REDACTED] on 1/15/81.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

89B-294-1A (1)

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5



SF 89B-594-1A(1)

Field File No. 89B-543

OO and File No. \_\_\_\_\_

Date Received 2-18-81

From DMU

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

SHCTO, CAL.

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

By 

To Be Returned ☐ Yes


Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

☒ No

Description:

Copies of CDC #5



w/ser 9

89B-294-1A-L2

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

1489B-543

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3743

b6 -1

b7C -1

89B-394-1A-(2)

Field File No. 89B - 294  
OO and File No. 89B - 543  
Date Received 3/3/81  
From DMV  
(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)  
Sac. Cal

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes      Receipt Given ☐ Yes  
☒ No                                      ☒ No

Description

1. cell re

w/ser 9

89B - 294-1A - (3)

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -4  
b7C -4

Field File No. 89B-294  
OO and File No. 89B-543  
Date Received 3/3/81  
From DMU  
(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)  
Sae, Ca  
(CITY AND STATE)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes Receipt Given ☐ Yes  
☒ No ☒ No

Description:

1 cell re

w/ser 9

89B-294-1A-(4)

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -4  
b7C -4

Field File No. 89B - 294

OO and File No. 89B - 543

Date Received 3/3/81

From OMV  
(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

Sae, Ca  
(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)  
(CITY AND STATE)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

☒ No

Description:

1 call re:

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -4  
b7C -4

89B - 294 - (A) - (5)

Field File No. 89B-294OO and File No. 5FDate Received 3-6-81

From \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

By \_\_\_\_\_

To Be Returned ☐ Yes      Receipt Given ☐ Yes☒ No      ☒ No☐ Yes      Grand Jury Material-  
☒ No      Disseminate Only  
Pursuant to Rules  
6(e), Federal Rules  
of Criminal Procedure

Description:

*Credit Bureau  
info of*

89B-294-1A-(6)

b6 -1  
b7C -1b6 -4  
b7C -4



Field File No. 89B-294

OO and File No. SF

Date Received 3-6-81

From \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

By \_\_\_\_\_

To Be Returned ☐ Yes  
☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes  
☒ No

☐ Yes  
☒ No

Grand Jury Material-  
Disseminate Only  
Pursuant to Rules  
6(e), Federal Rules  
of Criminal Procedure

Description:

*1 photo*



~~for return~~

89B-294-1A-(7)

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -4  
b7C -4

b6 -1,4

b7C -1,4

b7E -4

*John*



FBI (



754

89B - 274 - 1A - (7)

Field File No. 89B-294

OO and File No. 3/6/81

Date Received 3/6/81

From \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

By \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF SPECIAL AGENT)


To Be Returned ☐ Yes  
☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes  
☒ No

☐ Yes  
☒ No

Grand Jury Material-  
 Disseminate Only  
 Pursuant to Rules  
 6(e), Federal Rules  
 of Criminal Procedure

Description:

*1 cal photo*  


*1 photo*

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

b6 -4  
 b7C -4

89B-294-1A-(8)

b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4  
b7E -4

0741)-3757

89B - 394 - 114 - (8)

Field File No. 89B-294OO and File No. 57-5Date Received 5-5

From \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)


(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

By \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF SPECIAL AGENT)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes☒ No☐ Yes☒ NoGrand Jury Material-  
Disseminate Only  
Pursuant to Rules  
6(e), Federal Rules  
of Criminal Procedure


Description:

b6 -1  
b7C -1b6 -4  
b7C -4

89B-294-1A-(9)

*Don Rose*  
*FBI*  
*1976*

b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4  
b7E -4



BI

0

196-299-1A-C9

Field File No. 89-B-294

OO and File No. \_\_\_\_\_

Date Received 5-8-81

From \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

By \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF SPECIAL AGENT)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes☒ No☐ Yes☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes☒ NoGrand Jury Material-  
Disseminate Only  
Pursuant to Rules  
6(e), Federal Rules  
of Criminal Procedure

## Description:

4 8X10 Prints (2 each)  
of two separate frames  
from strip negatives  
taken as a result of  
surveillance

89B-294-1A (2)

b6 -1  
b7C -1

C-9

89B-294-1A(10)

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3763



C  
7

89B-294-1A(10)

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3767

Field File No. 89B-284

OO and File No. \_\_\_\_\_

Date Received 5/7/81From DDI

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

Sa (ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR) Calif

By \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF SPECIAL AGENT)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes☒ No☐ Yes☒ NoGrand Jury Material-  
Disseminate Only  
Pursuant to Rules  
6(e), Federal Rules  
of Criminal Procedure

## Description:

1 copy of Calif  
DL # \_\_\_\_\_

in name of \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_


89B-284A(1)

b6 -1  
b7C -1b6 -4  
b7C -4

FBI

San Jose


att



b6 -4

b7C -4

b7E -4



698-204-100

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3770

( ) - 2 8 FBI (23-cv-10741)-3772

of 7/13/23 11:41:41 AM (50)

20  
FBI (23-cv-10741)-3809

190 274-1A(2)

Field File No. 87B-294

OO and File No. \_\_\_\_\_

Date Received 5-8-81

From \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

By \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF SPECIAL AGENT)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes☒ No☐ Yes☒ NoGrand Jury Material-  
Disseminate Only  
Pursuant to Rules  
6(e), Federal Rules  
of Criminal Procedure

## Description:

strip prints of  
surveillance  
covering meet of

87B-294-10(3)

b6 -1  
b7C -1b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5





b6 -1  
b7C -1

3



Field File No. 89B-294

OO and File No. \_\_\_\_\_

Date Received 5-8-81

From \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

By \_\_\_\_\_

(NAME OF SPECIAL AGENT)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes Receipt Given ☐ Yes☒ No☒ No☐ Yes☒ NoGrand Jury Material-  
Disseminate Only  
Pursuant to Rules  
6(e), Federal Rules  
of Criminal Procedure

## Description:

1- roll of negatives  
of meeting between

89B-294-1A(4)

b6 -1  
b7C -1b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☒ Teletype☐ Facsimile☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate☒ Priority☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET☐ SECRET☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ UNCLAS ~~E F T O~~☒ UNCLAS

Date

Jan. 26, 1981

FM SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294)(10)(RUC)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (PRIORITY)

LOS ANGELES (PRIORITY)

BT

UNCLAS

[REDACTED] WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM; HENRY KISSINGER - VICTIM;  
DAVID ROCKEFELLER - VICTIM, CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR INJURE AN  
OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES (CIO), OO: LOS ANGELES (B).

RE LA TT TO DIRECTOR, JANUARY 22, 1981.

INQUIRIES UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, SAN FRANCISCO POLICE  
DEPARTMENT, SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND MONTEREY COUNTY SHERIFF'S

OFFICE DETERMINED THAT [REDACTED] WHITE MALE, BORN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] POUNDS, [REDACTED] CALIFORNIA DRIVER'S

LICENSE [REDACTED] ADDRESS OF [REDACTED]  
CALIFORNIA, TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED] LISTED TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AT ADDRESS OF [REDACTED] CALIFORNIA.

b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4

b6 -3, 4  
b7C -3, 4

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Transmitted

#3  
(Number)135/P  
(Time)

Pe

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980

50/5402  
89B-294-2 (10741)-3816

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS ~~E F T O~~  
☐ UNCLAS

Date \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE TWO

SF 89B-294

U N C L A S

[REDACTED] WHITE MALE, BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA DRIVER'S LICENSE [REDACTED]

ADDRESS [REDACTED] CALIFORNIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA, LISTED TO ABOVE). PREVIOUS ADDRESS OF

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA, [REDACTED]

(UNLISTED). IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT [REDACTED] IS LISTED TO

[REDACTED] AND IS UTILIZED AS A BUSINESS ADDRESS FOR

EXECUTIVE DEFENSE AND/OR CORPORATE DEFENSE. SAN JOSE POLICE

DEPARTMENT PROVIDED THE POST OFFICE BOX INFORMATION AND ADDITIONAL

TELEPHONE NUMBER OF [REDACTED] THIS NUMBER IN THE REVERSE

DIRECTORY IS LISTED TO [REDACTED] AND

FOR INFORMATION LA, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BY MONTEREY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ON

[REDACTED] AT TIME OF ARREST, [REDACTED] HAD IN

THEIR POSSESSION A THOMPSON SUBMACHINE GUN, SAWED OFF SHOTGUN, FOUR

.45 CALIBER AUTOMATICS, AND ONE 9MM AUTOMATIC. SUBJECT ARRESTED

UNDER [REDACTED] SHERIFF'S OFFICE REPORT NUMBER [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4b6 -4  
b7C -4b6 -4  
b7C -4

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ Per \_\_\_\_\_

(Number) (Time)

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1988-307-750/5402

FBI (23-CV-10741)-3817

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS ~~EFTO~~  
☐ UNCLAS

Date \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE THREE

SF 89B-294

U N C L A S

SUBJECTS DRIVING 1970 CHEVY NOVA, CALIFORNIA LICENSE [REDACTED]

REGISTERED TO [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED]

DESCRIBED AS WHITE MALE BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADDRESS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA.

ON [REDACTED] SUBJECTS WENT TO TRIAL, MONTEREY,  
 CALIFORNIA. [REDACTED] FOUND GUILTY OF POSSESSION OF LOADED WEAPON  
 AND CONCEALING WEAPON IN VEHICLE. OTHER COUNTS DISMISSED. SUBJECT  
 [REDACTED] WENT TO JURY TRIAL AND ON JANUARY 23, 1981, CASE WENT  
 TO JURY AND <sup>Guilty</sup> VERDICT ~~NOT~~ RETURNED ~~AS OF~~ THIS DATE. MONTEREY COUNTY  
 SHERIFF'S OFFICE ADVISED DOUBTFUL THAT EITHER SUBJECT WILL RECEIVE  
 JAIL TIME. *Sentencing set for 2/18/81*

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY MONTEREY COUNTY SHERIFF'S  
 OFFICE INDICATE THAT [REDACTED] AT TIME OF PRELIMINARY  
 HEARING CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SHERIFF'S OFFICE ALSO ADVISED THAT SUBJECT

[REDACTED] WELL KNOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE, SANDINO,  
 [REDACTED]b6 -4  
b7C -4b6 -4  
b7C -4b6 -4  
b7C -4

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ Per \_\_\_\_\_

(Number) (Time)

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980 307-750/5402

FBI (23-CV-10741)-3818

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS ~~E F T O~~  
☐ UNCLAS

Date \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE FOUR

SF 89B0294

U N C L A S

LEADS FOR LAS VEGAS BEING LEFT TO DISCRETION OF LOS ANGELES.  
ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

BT

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ Per \_\_\_\_\_

(Number) (Time)

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1989-307-750/5402

FBI (23-CV-10741)-3819

SFO397 0262140

PP HQ LA

DE SF 0803

P 262140 JAN 81


FM SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294)(13)(PUC)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (PRIORITY)

LOS ANGELES (PRIORITY)

BT

UNCLAS



[REDACTED] WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM; HENRY KISSINGER - VICTIM;  
DAVID ROCKEFELLER - VICTIM; CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR INJURE AN  
OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES (CIO), OO: LOS ANGELES (B).

b6 -4  
b7C -4

RE LA TT TO DIRECTOR, JANUARY 22, 1981.

INQUIRIES UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, SAN FRANCISCO POLICE  
DEPARTMENT, SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND MONTEREY COUNTY SHERIFF'S  
OFFICE DETERMINED THAT [REDACTED] WHITE MALE, BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA DRIVER'S  
LICENSE [REDACTED] ADDRESS OF [REDACTED]  
CALIFORNIA, TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED] LISTED TO [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] AT ADDRESS OF [REDACTED] CALIFORNIA.

b6 -3, 4  
b7C -3, 4

BRAND (C)  
GPO (C)  
H (C)  
W (C)



b6 -1  
b7C -1

PAGE TWO

SF 89B-294

U N C L A S

[REDACTED] WHITE MALE, BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA DRIVER'S LICENSE [REDACTED]

ADDRESS [REDACTED] CALIFORNIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA, LISTED TO ABOVE). PREVIOUS ADDRESS OF

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA, [REDACTED]

(UNLISTED). IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT [REDACTED] IS LISTED TO

[REDACTED] AND IS UTILIZED AS A BUSINESS ADDRESS FOR

EXECUTIVE DEFENSE AND/OR CORPORATE DEFENSE. SAN JOSE POLICE

DEPARTMENT PROVIDED THE POST OFFICE BOX INFORMATION AND ADDITIONAL

TELEPHONE NUMBER OF [REDACTED] THIS NUMBER IN THE REVERSE

DIRECTORY IS LISTED TO [REDACTED] AND

FOR INFORMATION LA, [REDACTED]

WAS ARRESTED WITH

[REDACTED] BY MONTEREY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ON

APRIL 16, 1987. AT TIME OF ARREST, [REDACTED] HAD IN

THEIR POSSESSION A THOMPSON SUBMACHINE GUN, SAWED OFF SHOTGUN, FOUR

.45 CALIBER AUTOMATICS, AND ONE S&W AUTOMATIC. SUBJECT ARRESTED

UNDER [REDACTED] SHERIFF'S OFFICE REPORT NUMBER [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4

b6 -4  
b7C -4

b6 -4  
b7C -4

PAGE THREE

SF 290-294

U N C L A S

SUBJECTS DRIVING 1976 CHEVY NOVA, CALIFORNIA LICENSE [REDACTED]

REGISTERED TO [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED]

DESCRIBED AS WHITE MALE BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADDRESS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

ON JANUARY 19, 1981, SUBJECTS WENT TO TRIAL, MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA. [REDACTED] FOUND GUILTY OF POSSESSION OF LOADED WEAPON AND CONCEALING WEAPON IN VEHICLE. OTHER COUNTS DISMISSED. SUBJECT [REDACTED] WENT TO JURY TRIAL AND ON JANUARY 23, 1981, CASE WENT TO JURY AND A GUILTY VERDICT WAS RETURNED THIS DATE. MONTEREY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ADVISED COUNTEIL THAT EITHER SUBJECT WILL RECEIVE JAIL TIME. SENTENCING SET FOR FEBRUARY 12, 1981.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY MONTEREY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE INDICATE THAT [REDACTED] AT TIME OF PRELIMINARY HEARING CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN AND [REDACTED] SHERIFF'S OFFICE ALSO ADVISED THAT SUBJECT [REDACTED] WELL KNOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE, SANDINO, [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4



PAGE FOUR

SF 89B0294

U N C L A S

LEADS FOR LAS VEGAS BEING LEFT TO DISCRETION OF LOS ANGELES.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

BT

SF0337 0252133

PP HQ LA

DE SF 0252

P 212140 JAN 31

FM SAN FRANCISCO (SDB-134) (101800)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (PRIORITY)

LOS ANGELES (PRIORITY)

BT

UNCLAS

|                   |         |
|-------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED          | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED        | FILED   |
| JAN 21 1981       |         |
| FBI-SAN FRANCISCO |         |

[REDACTED] WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM; HENRY KISSINGER - VICTIM;  
DAVID ROCKEFELLER - VICTIM, CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR INJURE AN  
OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES (CID), OR LOS ANGELES (S).

RE LA TT TO DIRECTOR, JANUARY 21, 1981.

INQUIRED OF THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, SAN FRANCISCO POLICE  
DEPARTMENT, SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND MONTEREY COUNTY SHERIFF'S  
OFFICE DETERMINED THAT [REDACTED] WHITE MALE, BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA DRIVER'S  
LICENSE [REDACTED] ADDRESS OF [REDACTED]  
CALIFORNIA, TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED] LISTED TO [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] AT ADDRESS OF [REDACTED] CALIFORNIA.

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED



b6 -4  
b7C -4

b6 -3, 4  
b7C -3, 4

b6 -1  
b7C -1

895-294

— — — — —

Page 10

\_\_\_\_\_

Page 10 of 10

b6 -4  
b7C -4

PAGE THREE

SF 89B-294

U N C L A S

SUBJECTS DRIVING 1978 CHEVY NOVA, CALIFORNIA LICENSE [REDACTED]

REGISTERED TO [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED]

DESCRIBED AS WHITE MALE BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADDRESS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CALIFORNIA.

ON JANUARY 19, 1981, SUBJECTS WENT TO TRIAL, MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA, [REDACTED] FOUND GUILTY OF POSSESSION OF LOADED WEAPONS AND CONCEALING WEAPON IN VEHICLE. OTHER COUNTS DISMISSED. SUBJECT [REDACTED] WENT TO JURY TRIAL AND ON JANUARY 23, 1981, CASE WENT TO JURY AND A GUILTY VERDICT WAS RETURNED THIS DATE. MONTEREY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ADVISED DOUBTFUL THAT EITHER SUBJECT WILL RECEIVE JAIL TIME. SENTENCING SET FOR FEBRUARY 18, 1981.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY MONTEREY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE INDICATE THAT [REDACTED] AT TIME OF PRELIMINARY HEARING CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SHERIFF'S OFFICE ALSO ADVISED THAT SUBJECT [REDACTED] WILL KNOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE, BANDING, [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4b6 -4  
b7C -4b6 -4  
b7C -4

PAGE FOUR

OF 8912334

LEADS FOR LAS VEGAS BEING LEFT TO DISCRETION OF LSP

ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

BT

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ AIRTEL

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS ~~EFTO~~  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 1/23/81

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
 ATTN: PERSONAL CRIMES UNIT

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543) (P) (3)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM;  
 HENRY KISSINGER - VICTIM;  
 DAVID ROCKEFELLER - VICTIM;  
 CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR INJURE  
 AN OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES (CIO)  
 OO: Los Angeles

Re Los Angeles teletype to the Bureau, et al,  
 dated 1/22/81.

Enclosed for the Bureau and receiving offices  
 is one copy each of a cassette tape allegedly reflecting  
 a telephone conversation initiated by [REDACTED]  
 to [REDACTED] on 1/15/81.

Investigation continuing at Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] AND ASSOCIATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED  
ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

- 3 - Bureau (Enc. 1)  
 2 - Sacramento (Enc. 1)  
 2 - San Francisco (Enc. 1)  
 2 - Los Angeles

(9)

SEARCHED  
 SERIALIZED

IN FRANCISCO

*Core rule - review  
 top of lead value -  
 89B-294-4  
 d m m p e a y / s o*

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980-305-7

FBI (2)

b6 -4  
 b7C -4

b6 -4  
 b7C -4

b6 -4  
 b7C -4

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ AIRTEL

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS ~~EFTO~~  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 1/23/81

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
 ATTN: PERSONAL CRIMES UNIT

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543) (P) (3)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM;  
 HENRY KISSINGER - VICTIM;  
 DAVID ROCKEFELLER - VICTIM;  
 CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR INJURE  
 AN OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES (CIO)  
 OO: Los Angeles

Re Los Angeles teletype to the Bureau, et al,  
 dated 1/22/81.

Enclosed for the Bureau and receiving offices  
 is one copy each of a cassette tape allegedly reflecting  
 a telephone conversation initiated by [REDACTED]  
 to [REDACTED] on 1/15/81.

Investigation continuing at Los Angeles.

[REDACTED] AND ASSOCIATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED  
ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

- 3 - Bureau (Enc. 1)  
 2 - Sacramento (Enc. 1)  
 ② - San Francisco (Enc. 1)  
 2 - Los Angeles

(9)

|                   |            |         |            |
|-------------------|------------|---------|------------|
| SEARCHED          | [REDACTED] | INDEXED | [REDACTED] |
| SERIALIZED        | [REDACTED] | FILED   | [REDACTED] |
| FEB 02 1981       |            |         |            |
| FBI-SAN FRANCISCO |            |         |            |

Approved

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

b6 -1

b7C -1

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980-305-750/5402

FBI (23-CV-10741)-3848

89B-294-4

File - Serial Charge Out  
FD-5 (Rev. 6-17-70)

File 89B-294 Class.            Case No.            Last Serial            Date             
☐ Pending ☐ Closed  
Serial No. 8 Description of Serial original 302 Date Charged 3/4/81  
                      2/12/81 b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

                      for initials b6 -1  
Employee            b7C -1

RECHARGE

Date           

To            From           

Initials of Clerk {             
            
           } Date {             
            
           }

Date charged           

Employee           

Location



## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 2/12/81

1

[redacted] was interviewed at the Los Angeles Office of the FBI as a result of prior arrangements made with SA [redacted] then provided the following information freely and voluntarily regarding an individual named [redacted] allegedly residing in the San Jose, California, area:

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] stated that he is currently [redacted]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

Investigation on 2/6/81 at Los Angeles, California File # Los Angeles 89B-543

by SA [redacted]

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
FILEDDate dictated 2/9/81

MAR 5 1981

b6 -1  
b7C -1

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI (25-CV-10741)-3853

89B-294-8

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 2/24/81

TO: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294) (10)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543) (C-1)

RE:

WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM  
 ET AL  
 CIO  
 OO: Los Angeles

Re Los Angeles teletype to the Bureau, et al,  
 dated 2/9/81.

Enclosed for San Francisco is the original and  
 one (1) copy of an FD-302 of [redacted] dated 2/6/81  
 at Los Angeles, and copies of California Drivers Licenses  
 of [redacted]

SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

② - San Francisco (Enc. ☐  
 2 - Los Angeles

(4)

See 1A (2-5)

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED

INDEXED

MAR 03 1981

FBI-SAN FRANCISCO

b6 -4  
 b7C -4

b6 -4  
 b7C -4  
 b7D -5

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_  
(Number)

(Time)

Per \_\_\_\_\_

89B-294 - 7 FBI (23-cv-10741)-3859

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☒ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☒ UNCLAS

Date 2/24/81

TO: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294)(10)

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543)(C-1)

RE:

WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM  
 ET AL  
 CIO  
 00: Los Angeles

b6 -1, 4  
 b7C -1, 4

Re Los Angeles teletype to the Bureau, et al,  
 dated 2/9/81.

Enclosed for San Francisco is the original and  
 one (1) copy of an FD-302 of [redacted] dated 2/6/81  
 at Los Angeles, and copies of California Drivers Licenses  
 of [redacted]

b6 -4, 5  
 b7C -4, 5

SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

2 - San Francisco (Enc. 6)  
 2 - Los Angeles

(4)

See 1A(2-5)

|                   |         |
|-------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED          | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED        | FILED   |
| MAR 03 1981       |         |
| FBI-SAN FRANCISCO |         |

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_

(Number)

(Time)

Per \_\_\_\_\_

89B-294-9 FBI (22)cv-10741)-3860

# Memorandum



To : SAC SF (89B 294) (P) Date 3/19/81

From : SUPV. [redacted]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4

Subject : [redacted] WILLIAM CASHY -  
VICTIM; JET AL;  
C/O  
OO: Los Angeles.

Re: LA Teletype to The Bureau dtd 3/17/81

ON 3/19/81 SUPV [redacted] BUREAU  
HQ, PERSONAL CRIMES SECTION TELEPHONICALLY  
ADVISED <sup>EMERGENCY</sup> AUTHORITY HAD BEEN GRANTED FOR  
THE USE OF ELECTRONIC BODY RECORDER IN THE  
ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER BY WAYNE R.  
GILBERT, SECTION CHIEF PERSONAL CRIMES  
SECTION.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SUPV [redacted] REQUESTED A TELETYPE BE  
SENT TO HIM CONFIRMING THIS CONVERSATION.


b6 -1  
b7C -1

②-89B 294

1- ELSUR CLERK (66-6726)

1- SUPV #9

1- [redacted] COORDINATOR



89B -294 -12

Memorandum



To : SAC SF (89B 294) (P) Date 3/19/81

From : SUPV. [redacted]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4

Subject : [redacted]

WILLIAM CASHY -

VICTIM; et/AL;  
CIO  
OO: Los Angeles.

Re: LA Teletype to The Bureau: "tel 3/19/81

ON 3/19/81 SUPV [redacted] BUREAU  
HQ, PERSONAL CRIMES SECTION TELEPHONICALLY  
ADVISED AUTHORITY HAD BEEN GRANTED FOR  
THE USE OF ELECTRONIC BODY RECORDER IN THE  
ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER BY WAYNE R.  
GILBERT, SECTION CHIEF PERSONAL CRIMES  
SECTION.


b6 -1  
b7C -1

SUPV [redacted] REQUESTED A TELETYPE BE  
SENT TO HIM CONFIRMING THIS CONVERSATION.

b6 -1  
b7C -1

②-89B 294

- 1- ELSUR CLERK (66-6726)
- 1- SUPV #9
- 1- Technical COORDINATION



89B - 294 - 12

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☒ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☒ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☒ UNCLAS

Date

3/19/81

FM SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294) (P) (SJRA)

TO DIRECTOR (PRIORITY)

[REDACTED]  
NEW YORK (PRIORITY)[REDACTED]  
LOS ANGELES (89B-543) (C-1) (PRIORITY)[REDACTED]  
SACRAMENTO (89B-225) (PRIORITY)[REDACTED]  
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (PRIORITY)

BT

UNCLAS

ATTENTION: ROOM 5096

[REDACTED] WILLIAM CASEY-VICTIM; ETAL; CIO; OO: LOS  
 ANGELES.

RE LOS ANGELES TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, ETAL, DATED MARCH  
 19, 1981.

THIS IS TO CONFIRM THE TELEPHONIC CONVERSATION, WHICH  
 TOOK PLACE ON MARCH 19, 1981 BETWEEN SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]  
 BUREAU HEADQUARTERS AND SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] OF THE SAN  
 JOSE RESIDENT AGENCY. SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT THE

SEARCHED  
 SERIALIZED  
 INDEXED  
 FILED

(2)

Approved: [REDACTED]

Transmitted

(Number)

#4

(Time)

10:10

Per [REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1

89B-294-13

FBI (23-CV-10741)-3869

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE TWO

SF (89B-294)

UNCLAS

EMERGENCY AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN THE  
ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER HAD BEEN GRANTED BY SECTION CHIEF WAYNE  
R. GILBERT OF THE PERSONAL CRIMES SECTION.

LEADS: SAN FRANCISCO AT SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA: WILL  
COORDINATE WITH THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION THE MEETING DISCUSSED  
IN THE ABOVE REFERENCED TELETYPE.

BT

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_  
(Number) (Time)

Per \_\_\_\_\_

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3870

SF0931 0782101

PP HQ NY LA SC WF

DE SF 004

P 192050 MAR 81

FM SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294) (P) (SJRA)

TO DIRECTOR (PRIORITY)

NEW YORK (PRIORITY)

LOS ANGELES (89B-543) (C-L) (PRIORITY)

SACRAMENTO (89B-225) (PRIORITY)

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (PRIORITY)

BT

UNCLAS

ATTENTION: ROOM 5096

[REDACTED] WILLIAM CASEY-VICTIM; ETAL; CIO; OO: LOS  
ANGELES.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

RE LOS ANGELES TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, ETAL, DATED MARCH  
19, 1981.

THIS IS TO CONFIRM THE TELEPHONIC CONVERSATION, WHICH  
TOOK PLACE ON MARCH 19, 1981 BETWEEN SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]  
BUREAU HEADQUARTERS AND SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] OF THE SAN  
JOSE RESIDENT AGENCY. SUPERVISOR [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT THE

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED

SEARCHED INDEXED  
SERIALIZED FILED

MAR 20 1981

RE-SAN FRANCISCO

b6 -1  
b7C -1

(23-cv-10741)-3871

89B-294-13



PAGE TWO

SF (89B-294)

UNCLAS

EMERGENCY AUTHORITY FOR THE USE OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN THE  
ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER HAD BEEN GRANTED BY SECTION CHIEF WAYNE  
R. GILBERT OF THE PERSONAL CRIMES SECTION.

LEADS: SAN FRANCISCO AT SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA: WILL  
COORDINATE WITH THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION THE MEETING DISCUSSED  
IN THE ABOVE REFERENCED TELETYPE.

BT

# Memorandum



To : Associate Director  
Office of Enforcement Operations

Date March 26, 1981

From : Director, FBI

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4

Subject: [REDACTED]  
WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM;  
ET AL.;  
CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE  
OR INJURE AN OFFICER

Attached is one copy each of two communications which furnish information concerning a current investigation. Exigent circumstances precluded a request for authorization in advance to utilize an electronic device to monitor and/or record private conversations with the consent of a party.

Under the provisions of Part III(B) of the Attorney General's Memorandum of September 22, 1980, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies entitled, "Monitoring Private Conversations with the Consent of a Party," emergency monitoring was instituted under the authorization of an appropriate official of the FBI.

Monitoring of this conversation was authorized in the best interest of law enforcement in that it was expected to provide corroborative evidence and to protect the individual utilizing the equipment.

Further monitoring is expected in this matter and it is requested that your office approve the use of this equipment for a period of 30 days beginning the date on which you grant approval.

Enclosures (2)

SEARCHED INDEXED  
SERIALIZED FILED

APR 2 11 07 AM '81

FBI-SAN FRANCISCO

89B-294-17

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Airtel

3/31/81

Director, FBI

SAC, Los Angeles

[REDACTED]  
WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM;  
ET AL,;  
CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR INJURE AN OFFICER  
OO: LOS ANGELES

b6 -4  
b7C -4

ReButelcal to San Jose Resident Agency, San Francisco  
Division, 3/18/81.

This is to confirm reButelcal wherein you were informed,  
of Bureau authority to utilize a body transmitter and/or recording  
device [REDACTED] Attached for your  
information is a copy of Bureau letter to the Associate Director,  
Office of Enforcement Operations, dated 3/26/81 which was approved  
by Philip Wilens, Director, Office of Enforcement Operations,  
effective 3/30/81 for a period of 30 days.

b7E -9

Advise FBIHQ of results obtained by use of this investiga-  
tive technique by indicating whether the body recorder:

1. Aided in directing course of investigation
2. Obtained direct evidence
3. Was used - no information of value obtained
4. Furnished lead material
5. Gave protection to Agent or person wearing recorder
6. Was not used

Enclosure

① - SAC, San Francisco (Enclosure) (Information)

b6 -1  
b7C -1

SEARCHED  
SERIAL

APR 2 11 01 AM '81

FBI SAN FRANCISCO

b6 -1  
b7C -1

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3882

89B-294-18

Airtel to SAC, Los Angeles

Re:

b6 -4  
b7C -4

In addition, you should insure that all persons identified as having been monitored, are suitably included in the field office and FBIHQ ELSUR indices, commensurate with existing instructions as outlined in Bureau airtels to all offices dated April 12, 1977, June 8, 1977, and October 21, 1977, entitled "Microphone and Telephone Surveillances." Strict administrative controls must be established to insure these requirements are met.

# Memorandum



To : SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543) (C-1)

Date 4/9/81

From : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294) (RUC) (SJBA)

Subject :

WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM;  
ET AL  
CIO  
OO: LA

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4

Re LA teletype, 3/24/81.

No further investigation is contemplated at San Jose, California.

Accordingly, this case has been placed in an RUC status.

CAUTION: CONSIDER ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

2 - Los Angeles  
① - San Francisco

(3)

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED

b6 -1  
b7C -1

89B - 294 - 21

89B-294-23

|                   |  |         |  |
|-------------------|--|---------|--|
| SEARCHED          |  | INDEXED |  |
| SERIALIZED        |  | FILED   |  |
| APR 29 1981       |  |         |  |
| FBI-SAN FRANCISCO |  |         |  |
|                   |  |         |  |

b6 -1  
b7B -1

LA0017 125230Z

PP HQ SF NY SC WF

DE LA

P 062300Z MAY 81

FM LOS ANGELES (89B-243)(C-1)(P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294) PRIORITY

NEW YORK ROUTINE

SACRAMENTO ROUTINE

WASHINGTON FIELD ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

ATTN: SAN JOSE SA, SA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM; ET AL; CIO:

CO: LOS ANGELES.

RE LOS ANGELES TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, ET AL, MAY 4,

1981.

FOR INFORMATION RECIPIENTS, [REDACTED]

THE INFORMANT IN CAPTIONED MATTER, IS CURRENTLY RESIDING

[REDACTED]

FACSIMILE COPY SENT

Date: 5/7/81 To: San Jose SA

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

b6 -1  
b7C -1

MAY 6 1981

89B-243-26

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3910

PAGE TWO (LA 89B-543) UNCLAS

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

SAN JOSE SHOULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR RECEIPT  
OF [REDACTED] AND TO MONITOR MEETING WITH [REDACTED]  
FRIDAY AFTERNOON.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

BT

#

SSSSSSSSSS



UNCLAS 17 126838Z

PP HQ SF NY SC WF

DE LA

P 062300Z MAY 81

FM LOS ANGELES (87-343)(C-1)(P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

SAN FRANCISCO (87-294) PRIORITY

NEW YORK ROUTINE

SACRAMENTO ROUTINE

WASHINGTON FIELD ROUTINE

BT

UNCLAS

ATTN: SAG JOSE RA, SA [REDACTED]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4

[REDACTED] WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM; ET AL; CIG;

OO: LOS ANGELES.

RE LOS ANGELES TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, ET AL, MAY 4,  
1981.

FOR INFORMATION RECIPIENTS, [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

THE INFORMANT IN CAPTIONED MATTER, IS CURRENTLY RESIDING

[REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1

|                     |            |         |            |
|---------------------|------------|---------|------------|
| SEARCHED            | [REDACTED] | INDEXED | [REDACTED] |
| SERIALIZED          | [REDACTED] | FILED   | [REDACTED] |
| MAY 9 1981          |            |         |            |
| FBI - SAN FRANCISCO |            |         |            |
| [REDACTED]          |            |         |            |

PAGE TWO (LA 89B-943) UNCLAS

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

SAN JOSE SHOULD MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR RECEIPT  
OF [REDACTED] AND TO MONITOR MEETING WITH [REDACTED]  
FRIDAY AFTERNOON.

BT

SSSSSSSSSS

b6 -1  
b7C -1

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☒ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☒ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☒ UNCLAS

Date 5/11/81

FM SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294) (P) (SQD 10)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (PRIORITY)

[REDACTED] LOS ANGELES (89B-543) (PRIORITY)

BT

U N C L A S

ATTENTION LOS ANGELES DIVISION, SA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM; ET AL; CIO; OO: LA

RE LA TEL TO THE DIRECTOR, DATED MAY 6, 1981.

FOR INFORMATION OF RECEIVING OFFICES, [REDACTED] ARRIVED  
AS SCHEDULED IN [REDACTED]  
MET AT THE AIRPORT BY BUREAU AGENT AND TRANSPORTED TO THE OFFICES  
OF THE SAN JOSE RESIDENT AGENCY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] FROM THE SAN JOSE RESIDENT  
AGENCY TO THE RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] AND ARRANGED FOR A MEETING  
BETWEEN [REDACTED]

SEARCHED \_\_\_\_\_  
SERIALIZED \_\_\_\_\_  
INDEXED \_\_\_\_\_  
FILED \_\_\_\_\_

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Approved: [REDACTED]

Transmitted [REDACTED]

(Number)

11:40  
(Time)

Per [REDACTED]

89B - 294 - 27  
FBI (23-cv-10741)-3914

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE TWO

SF 89B-294

U N C L A S

AIRPORT, MAY 8, 1981. [REDACTED] EXECUTED A FORM FD-472 AND THE

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5  
b7E -9

AT APPROXIMATELY [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

THE [REDACTED] HAD A CONVERSATION WHICH WAS RECORDED AND MONITORED  
BY AGENTS OF THE FBI. THE CONVERSATION LASTED APPROXIMATELY AN

[REDACTED] AND A VARIETY OF TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED. THOSE  
TOPICS INCLUDED [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED] THOSE IDEAS INCLUDED

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_

(Number)

(Time)

Per \_\_\_\_\_

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date \_\_\_\_\_

SPAGE THREE

SF 89B-294

U N C L A S

THE KILLING OR ELIMINATION OF SEVERAL POLITICAL OFFICIALS,  
INCLUDING DAVID ROCKEFELLER, PAUL VOLKER, AND HENRY KISSINGER.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN \_\_\_\_\_

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

THERE MAY BE FUTURE MEETINGS IN THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AREA  
AT AN UNDETERMINED TIME AND LOCATION, BUT THAT WILL BE DETERMINED  
IN THE FUTURE.

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_  
(Number) (Time)

Per \_\_\_\_\_

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3916

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ \_\_\_\_\_

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE FOUR

SF 89B-294

U N C L A S

AFTER OVERHEARING THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED] THERE IS NO DOUBT IN THE MIND OF THE WRITER THAT [REDACTED] HOLDS SOME PRETTY EXTREME POLITICAL VIEWS; HOWEVER, IT IS ALSO THE OPINION OF THE WRITER THAT [REDACTED] DID NOT ENGAGE IN ANY ACTIVITY THAT WOULD BE IN VIOLAION OF APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW AT THIS TIME. IT IS FURTHER THE OPINION OF THE WRITER THAT [REDACTED] DEFINITELY COULD BE A POTENTIAL DANGER TO ONE OR MORE OF THESE POLITICAL FIGURES THAT HE HAPPENS TO DISAGREE WITH IF HE WERE EVER PROVIDED WITH A PROPER SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO ENABLE HIM TO CARRY OUT ANY OF HIS IDEAS.

THE CONVERSATION [REDACTED] WAS MONITORED BY BU AGENTS AND ALSO WAS RECORDED. THE RESULTTS OF THAT CONVERSATION WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN. [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED] WERE ALSO PHOTOGRAPHED TOGETHER AND COPIES OF THOSE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE PROVIDED TO THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN.

IT IS THE OPINION OF THE WRITER THAT [REDACTED] WAS COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE AND DID EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO ASSIST THE FBI ON THIS PARTICULAR OCCASION.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

BT

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_

(Number)

(Time)

Per \_\_\_\_\_

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3917

SF0413 1311840Z

PP HQ LA

DE SF 002

P 0111840Z MAY 81

FM SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294)(P)(SQD 10)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (PRIORITY)

LOS ANGELES (89B-543)(PRIORITY)

BT

U N C L A S

ATTENTION LOS ANGELES DIVISION, SA [REDACTED]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4

[REDACTED] WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM; ET AL; CIO; OO: LA

RE LA TEL TO THE DIRECTOR, DATED MAY 6, 1981.

FOR INFORMATION OF RECEIVING OFFICES [REDACTED] ARRIVED

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5  
b7E -9

AS SCHEDULED IN [REDACTED] WAS

MET AT THE AIRPORT BY BUREAU AGENT AND TRANSPORTED TO THE OFFICES  
OF THE SAN JOSE RESIDENT AGENCY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] FROM THE SAN JOSE RESIDENT  
AGENCY TO THE RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] AND ARRANGED FOR A MEETING  
BETWEEN [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

SSKA

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED

b6 -1  
b7C -1

89B-294-27  
FBI (23-cv-10741)-3918

PAGE TWO

SF 89B-294

U N C L A S

AIRPORT, MAY 8, 1981. [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5  
b7E -9

[REDACTED] WAS THEN TRANSPORTED BACK TO THE SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL  
AIRPORT AFTER [REDACTED]

AT APPROXIMATELY 2:00 PM, PACIFIC DAYLIGHT TIME, [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED] AT A CAFE INSIDE THE SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL AIRPORT.  
THE [REDACTED] HAD A CONVERSATION WHICH WAS RECORDED AND MONITORED  
BY AGENTS OF THE FBI. THE CONVERSATION LASTED APPROXIMATELY AN  
HOUR AND TEN MINUTES AND A VARIETY OF TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED. THOSE  
TOPICS INCLUDED [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED] THOSE IDEAS INCLUDED




SPAGE THREE

SF 89B-294

U N C L A S

THE KILLING OR ELIMINATION OF SEVERAL POLITICAL OFFICIALS,  
INCLUDING DAVID ROCKEFELLER, PAUL VOLKER, AND HENRY KISSINGER.



b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN



b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5



THERE MAY BE FUTURE MEETINGS IN THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AREA  
AT AN UNDETERMINED TIME AND LOCATION, BUT THAT WILL BE DETERMINED  
IN THE FUTURE.

PAGE FOUR

SF 89B-294

U N C'L A S

AFTER OVERHEARING THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED] THERE IS NO DOUBT IN THE MIND OF THE WRITER THAT [REDACTED]

HOLDS SOME PRETTY EXTREME POLITICAL VIEWS; HOWEVER, IT IS ALSO THE OPINION OF THE WRITER THAT [REDACTED] DID NOT ENGAGE IN ANY ACTIVITY THAT WOULD BE IN VIOLAION OF APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW AT THIS TIME. IT IS FURTHER THE OPINION OF THE WRITER THAT [REDACTED] DEFINITELY COULD BE A POTENTIAL DANGER TO ONE OR MORE OF THESE POLITICAL FIGURES THAT HE HAPPENS TO DISAGREE WITH IF HE WERE EVER PROVIDED WITH A PROPER SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO ENABLE HIM TO CARRY OUT ANY OF HIS IDEAS.

THE CONVERSATION [REDACTED] WAS MONITORED BY BU AGENTS AND ALSO WAS RECORDED. THE RESULSTS OF THAT CONVERSATION WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN. [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED] WERE ALSO PHOTOGRAPHED TOGETHER AND COPIES OF THOSE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE PROVIDED TO THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN.

IT IS THE OPINION OF THE WRITER THAT [REDACTED] WAS COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE AND DID EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO ASSIST THE FBI ON THIS PARTICULAR OCCASION.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

BT

orig + lcc mde sent LA 6/8/81

b6 -1  
b7C -1

|                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED            | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED          | FILED   |
| MAY 13 1981         |         |
| FBI - SAN FRANCISCO |         |

89B-294-28

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 5/12/81

On May 8, 1981, a physical surveillance was conducted by SA's [redacted] and [redacted] at the San Jose Municipal Airport of a meeting between [redacted]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7D -5

This surveillance, which was conducted with the [redacted] was recorded on a surveillance log maintained by SA [redacted]. This surveillance log will be maintained in the 1A Section of the file.

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7D -5

Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-28  
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 5/11/81

b6 -1  
b7C -1

Orig + lcc md + sent LA 6/8/81

b6 -1  
b7C -1

|                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED            | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED          | FILED   |
| MAY 13 1981         |         |
| FBI - SAN FRANCISCO |         |

89B-294-29

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 5/13/81

On May 8, 1981, SA [ ] drove an FBI van to the San Jose Airport where SA [ ] observed [ ] enter a silver Lincoln Continental in front of the Air California entrance to the airport lobby; said Continental was driven by a white male adult identified as one [ ] SA [ ] followed the vehicle as it entered the main parking area of the airport and parked. SA [ ] observed [ ] leave the Continental and walk towards the airport lobby. SA [ ] was in a position to listen to transmissions over the radio, said transmissions resulting from a body transmitter which had previously been placed on [ ]. Approximately one hour later, [ ] were observed walking from the airport lobby towards the Continental, and after a short conversation between the two outside the vehicle, [ ] was observed to get into the vehicle and drive away. [ ] was observed returning towards the airport lobby. At this point, the surveillance was terminated.

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7D -5Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-29by SA [ ] Date dictated 5/12/81b6 -1  
b7C -1

Orig + lcc md + sent LA 6/8/81

b6 -1  
b7C -1

|                   |         |
|-------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED          | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED        | FILED   |
| MAY 18 1981       |         |
| FBI SAN FRANCISCO |         |

89B-294-30

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/13/81

SA's [redacted] monitored and recorded a conversation between [redacted] United States Department of Justice, approval was obtained to utilize a body recorder and transmitter [redacted]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7D -5  
b7E -9

As a result of placing the aforementioned devices upon [redacted] one recording of a conversation between [redacted]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7D -5  
b7E -9

The conversation took place at the San Jose Municipal Airport and lasted for approximately [redacted]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5  
b7E -4

A summary of the conversation [redacted]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-30

by SA's [redacted] Date dictated 5/12/81

b6 -1  
b7C -1

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI/DOJ

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3927



b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] discussed specific political figures, including David Rockefeller, John Volker, and Henry Kissinger. [redacted] indicated that he believed that all three of those individuals were primarily responsible for many of the problems experienced by this country. At one point, he stated that they should be killed, but he did not indicate a willingness to do so himself. He furthermore, did not discuss specifically who should kill any of those individuals or when it should be done. He also indicated at one point that he did not have any available money that would enable him to hire anyone to do anything.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

The conversation terminated in an open-ended type fashion. No definite plans were made for any specific dates or times when future meetings [redacted] would occur, but it was agreed that they would stay in contact.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

Orig + lcc md + sent LA 6/8/81

b6 -1  
b7C -1

|                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED            | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED          | FILED   |
| MAY 13 1981         |         |
| FBI - SAN FRANCISCO |         |

89B-294-31

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/13/81

SAs [redacted] met [redacted]  
[redacted]  
b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

After meeting [redacted]  
[redacted]  
b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

While at the San Jose Resident Agency, SA [redacted] instructed  
[redacted]  
b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

While at the San Jose Resident Agency, [redacted]  
[redacted]  
b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

SA [redacted]  
[redacted]  
b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7D -16

At approximately 1:45 PM, [redacted]  
[redacted]  
b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

[redacted]  
At approximately 1:47 PM, SAs [redacted] and SSRA [redacted]  
[redacted]  
b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294-31  
by SA [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 5/13/81  
b6 -1  
b7C -1

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI/DOJ

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3930

SF 89B-294

[REDACTED]

At approximately 2:02 PM, SA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6 -1, 4  
b7C -1, 4  
b7E -16

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ AIRTEL

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 5/13/81

TO: SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543)  
 FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294) (P) (SJRA)  
 SUBJECT: [REDACTED]  
 WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM;  
 ET AL  
 CIO  
 OO: LA

b6 -4  
 b7C -4

Enclosed for Los Angeles are the following:

1. A tape recording of a telephone conversation between [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
 b7C -4  
 b7D -5

2. A tape recording of a conversation between [REDACTED]

3. A tape recording of a conversation between [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
 b7C -4  
 b7D -5

4. A surveillance log.

5. A form FD-472 executed by [REDACTED]

b6 -1, 4  
 b7C -1, 4  
 b7D -5

6. A form FD-473 executed by [REDACTED]

The above described items are being sent by registered mail directly from the San Jose RA to the attention of SA [REDACTED] in the Los Angeles Division.

3 - Los Angeles (Encs. 6)  
 (1 - Package) (RM)  
 ② - San Francisco

(5)

*Enclosures sent  
 5-14-81, registered mail  
 #16626, unexhibited*

SEARCHED  
 SERIALIZED  
 INDEXED  
 FILED

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ (Number) (Time) Per \_\_\_\_\_

89B-294-32  
 FBI (23-cv-10741)-3932

SF 89B-294



b6 -1  
b7C -1

FD-302s and photographs will be forwarded to Los Angeles under separate cover at a later time.

CAUTION: CONSIDER ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☐ AIRTEL

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 5/13/81

TO: SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543)  
 FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294) (P) (SJRA)  
 SUBJECT:   
 WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM;  
 ET AL  
 CIO  
 OO: LA

b6 -4  
 b7C -4

Enclosed for Los Angeles are the following:

1. A tape recording of a telephone conversation between
2. A tape recording of a conversation between
3. A tape recording of a conversation between
4. A surveillance log.
5. A form FD-472 executed by
6. A form FD-473 executed by

b6 -4  
 b7C -4  
 b7D -5

b6 -4  
 b7C -4  
 b7D -5

b6 -1, 4  
 b7C -1, 4  
 b7D -5

The above described items are being sent by registered mail directly from the San Jose RA to the attention of SA   in the Los Angeles Division.

3 - Los Angeles (Encs. 6)  
 (1 - Package) (RM)  
 ② - San Francisco

(5)

*Enclosures sent  
 5-14-81 registered  
 mail # 160206  
 unexhibited*

SEARCHED  
 SERIALIZED  
 INDEXED  
 FILED


b6 -1  
 b7C -1

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ (Number) \_\_\_\_\_ (Time) Per \_\_\_\_\_

89B-294-32

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3934

SF 89B-294



b6 -1  
b7C -1

FD-302s and photographs will be forwarded to Los Angeles under separate cover at a later time.

CAUTION: CONSIDER ARMED AND DANGEROUS.



FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 5/27/81

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
 FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543) (C-1) (P)  
 RE: [REDACTED]

b6 -1, 4  
 b7C -1, 4

WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM,  
 ET AL;  
 CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE  
 OR INJURE AN OFFICER  
 OF THE UNITED STATES;  
 OO: Los Angeles

Re Bureau airtels to Los Angeles, [REDACTED]


b7D -5  
 b7E -4

For information of the Bureau, emergency authority to utilize a body transmitter and/or recording device on the person of the informant in this case was initially requested by Los Angeles on 3/18/81, as a meeting was scheduled between the informant and the subject on 3/23/81. However, this meeting did not materialize and was postponed until 5/8/81, when the informant met with the subject in San Jose, California, at which time the informant wore an electronic transmitter and recorder.

As a result of the utilization of electronic monitoring equipment, direct evidence was obtained, information received aided in directing the course of investigation, and wearing the equipment provided protection to the informant who wore the transmitter and the recorder.

3 - Bureau  
 ② - San Francisco (89B-294)  
 2 - Los Angeles

(7)



b6 -1  
 b7C -1

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ (Number) (Time) Per \_\_\_\_\_

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3936

89B-294 - 33

LA 89B-543

ELSUR information is being submitted via  
separate communication.

SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED  
ARMED AND DANGEROUS

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel




## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 5/27/81

TO:  DIRECTOR, FBI  
 FROM:  SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543) (C-1) (P)  
 RE: 

b6 -1, 4  
 b7C -1, 4

WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM,  
 ET AL;  
 CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE  
 OR INJURE AN OFFICER  
 OF THE UNITED STATES;  
 OO: Los Angeles

 Re Bureau airtels to Los Angeles, 



b7D -5  
 b7E -4

For information of the Bureau, emergency authority to utilize a body transmitter and/or recording device on the person of the informant in this case was initially requested by Los Angeles on 3/18/81, as a meeting was scheduled between the informant and the subject on 3/23/81. However, this meeting did not materialize and was postponed until 5/8/81, when the informant met with the subject in San Jose, California, at which time the informant wore an electronic transmitter and recorder.

As a result of the utilization of electronic monitoring equipment, direct evidence was obtained, information received aided in directing the course of investigation, and wearing the equipment provided protection to the informant who wore the transmitter and the recorder.

- 3 - Bureau  
 ② - San Francisco (89B-294)  
 2 - Los Angeles

  
 (7)

|                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| SEARCHED            |  |
| SERIALIZED          |  |
| JUN 12 1981         |   |
| FBI - SAN FRANCISCO |   |
| SSIA                |   |

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

89B-294-33

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ (Number) (Time) Per \_\_\_\_\_

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3938

LA 89B-543

ELSUR information is being submitted via  
separate communication.

SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED  
ARMED AND DANGEROUS

Orig + lcc mdt sent LA 6/8/81

b6 -1  
b7C -1

|                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED            | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED          | FILED   |
| JUL 7 1981          |         |
| FBI - SAN FRANCISCO |         |

89B - 294 - 35

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 5/20/81

At approximately 2:06PM at the San Jose, California

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5  
b7E -4Investigation on 5/8/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294by SA [redacted] Date dictated 5/8/81b6 -1  
b7C -1

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3942

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ AIRTEL

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 6/1/81

TO: SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543)  
 FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (89B-294) (KUC) (SJRA)  
 SUBJECT:   
 WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM;  
 ET AL;  
 CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR INJURE  
 AN OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES (CIO)  
 OO: LA

b6 -4  
 b7C -4

Re Los Angeles teletype to the Bureau dated 5/4/81.

Enclosed for Los Angeles is the original and one copy of five FD-302's reflecting investigation conducted at San Jose, California on . Also enclosed for Los Angeles are two 8 X 10 glossy photographs and twenty eight 3 X 5 glossy prints, all of which were printed from the film which had been exposed during a surveillance conducted by Bureau Agents on  San Jose, California.

b7D -5  
 b7E -4

As Los Angeles Division is aware Bureau Agents covered

b6 -4  
 b7C -4  
 b7D -5

It should be noted that

b6 -4  
 b7C -4  
 b7D -5

2 - Los Angeles (Encs.40)  
 1 - San Francisco

SEARCHED  
 SERIALIZED  
 INDEXED  
 FILED

6/8/81

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

see serials 28, 29, 30 + 31

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ (Number) (Time)

Per \_\_\_\_\_

89B-294-36

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3943

SF 89B-294

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7E -4

It should also be noted that Bureau Agents saw the

A check of the California Department of Motor Vehicle records via the California Law Enforcement telecommunications system revealed that California license [redacted] is registered

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7E -4

A further check of the records of the California Department of Motor Vehicle revealed that [redacted] holds a valid California driver's license number [redacted] is described as:

Race

Sex

Date of Birth

Height

Weight

Hair

Eyes

b6 -4  
b7C -4

Inasmuch as all requested investigation has been conducted and reported this matter is being considered RUC.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS

2\*

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3944



FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS E F T O  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 5/26/81

TO DIRECTOR, FBI  
 FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES (66-6689) (C-1) (P)  
 SUBJECT: ELSUR

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

Enclosed for the Bureau are two (2) Elsur cards regarding the following individuals:



b6 -4  
 b7C -4  
 b7D -5

For information of the Bureau, the overhears were obtained as a result of the use of a body transmitter and a recording device.

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 2)  
 ① - San Francisco (89B-294) (Info)  
 3 - Los Angeles  
 1 - 89B-543

b6 -1  
 b7C -1

(6)

SEARCHED \_\_\_\_\_  
 SERIALIZED \_\_\_\_\_  
 JUN 12 1981  
 FBI - SAN FRANCISCO

89B-294-38

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ (Number) (Time) Per \_\_\_\_\_

X AIRTEL

7/2/81

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI  
ATTN: SSA [REDACTED]

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (66-672C) (P) (SQ. 9)

SUBJECT: ELSUR;  
[REDACTED]  
WILLIAM CASEY - VICTIM  
ET AL  
CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR INJURE  
AN OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES (CIO)  
OO:LA

b6 -1  
b7C -1

b6 -4  
b7C -4

Re Bureau airtel to Albany, 6/8/77.

Enclosed for the Bureau and Los Angeles, are  
2 Consensual Monitoring index cards for inclusion in the  
electronic surveillance special indices. The enclosed  
cards pertain to the following individuals:

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

2- Bureau (encl. 2)  
1- Los Angeles (encl. 2) 89B-543  
2- San Francisco

1- 66-672C

1- 89B-294

*encls. sent 7/2/81*

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED

b6 -1  
b7C -1

89B-294 - 41

SEARCHED [ ] INDEXED [ ]  
SERIALIZED [ ] FILED [ ]  
JUL 28 1981  
FBI - SAN FRANCISCO

b6 -1  
b7C -1

89B-294-42

SEARCHED INDEXED  
SERIALIZED FILED  
JUL 28 1981  
FBI - SAN FRANCISCO

b6 -1  
b7C -1

89B-294-43

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 7/20/81

[redacted] appeared at the Office of the San Jose, California FBI Resident Agency and furnished the following voluntary information after being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents:

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[redacted] indicated that he did not advocate the violent overthrow of the United States Government by force or any other illegal means. He also stated that he did not associate with or want anything to do with any type of a militant group. He stated that he had never conspired to assassinate or eradicate Henry Kissinger, Paul Volker, William Casey or any other politician that he might not agree with. At this point in time [redacted] made an inquiry as to who William Casey is and he was informed that Casey is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. [redacted] indicated that he could not recall ever having discussed Casey with anyone.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[redacted] indicated that he had strong political feelings and became very emotional when discussing the way that the government is operating. He further stated that he could understand how someone might misconstrue his intentions.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[redacted] stated that he would never engage in any paramilitary clandestine, or illegal activities and if any illegal acts came to his attention he would immediately report them to the appropriate authorities.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[redacted]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] indicated that the California Coastal Commission was not one of his favorite bureaucratic agencies. He denied that he ever considered bombing that organization or doing any other act that would be illegal. He stated that he was against all bureaucratic agencies that were engaged in the acquisition or management of private land.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

Investigation on 7/17/81 at San Jose, California File # SF 89B-294

b6 -1  
b7C -1by SASDate dictated 7/20/81

SF 89B-294

[REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[REDACTED] also stated that he strongly disagreed with the way the country is currently being run but that he would never do anything illegal in an effort to change it. He stated that however, bad the country might presently be any type of anarchy or terrorism would be worse.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[REDACTED] stated that he had never engaged in any illegal activities and that he did not plan to do so in the future.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED] stated that he served in the United States Army between [REDACTED] He stated that he served in Viet Nam and received the Silver Star during that period of time.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

The following descriptive data was obtained through observation and interview:

Name  
Sex  
Race  
Date of birth  
Height  
Weight  
Hair  
Eyes  
Education  
  
Employment  
  
Permanent address  
  
Temporary address  
  
Arrest record  
Military service

[REDACTED]  
Male  
Caucasian

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[REDACTED]

SF 89B-294

[REDACTED]

b6 -1  
b7C -1

[REDACTED] concluded by saying that he would oppose the politicians that he thinks are performing their jobs poorly or corruptly in every legal way possible. He further stated that he would work and use whatever monetary resources he had to defeat these individuals and bring about a change in the United States Government.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[REDACTED] indicated that he considered himself a loyal American and a good citizen.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[REDACTED] then went on to state that he was totally against all acts of violence and terrorism. He specifically mentioned at this time the situation in Iran, El Salvador, and Nicaragua and cited them as an example of terrorism that he did not personally agree with.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[REDACTED]

b6 -4  
b7C -4

[REDACTED] concluded by stating that he would always be available to assist the FBI in anyway that he could.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

FBI

## TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype  
☐ Facsimile  
☒ Airtel

## PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate  
☐ Priority  
☐ Routine

## CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET  
☐ SECRET  
☐ CONFIDENTIAL  
☐ UNCLAS ~~EFTO~~  
☐ UNCLAS

Date 7/22/81

TO DIRECTOR, FBI  
 FROM SAC, LOS ANGELES (89B-543)(C-1)(P)  
 RE   
 WILLIAM CASEY -  
 VICTIM;  
 ET AL  
 CONSPIRACY TO IMPEDE OR  
 INJURE AN OFFICER OF  
 THE UNITED STATES  
 OO: Los Angeles


b6 -1  
 b7C -1

b6 -4  
 b7C -4

Re Los Angeles teletype to the Bureau, et al, dated 5/6/81.

For the information of New Rochelle, Los Angeles has been conducting an investigation since January, 1981 of captioned subject who has made threats towards several prominent figures including Henry Kissinger, David Rockefeller, William Casey and Paul Volcker. Investigation, however, has failed to substantiate the original allegations, and the U.S. Attorney in the Central District of California (CDC), Los Angeles, and in the Northern District of California, San Jose, California, have declined prosecution of the subject for possible violations of

2 - Bureau  
 2 - New Rochelle  
 1 - New York (Info)  
 1 - San Francisco (89B-294)(Info)  
 1 - WFO (89B-294)(Info)  
 2 - Los Angeles



b6 -1  
 b7C -1

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_ Transmitted \_\_\_\_\_ (Number) \_\_\_\_\_ (Time) Per \_\_\_\_\_

89B-294-45



LA 89B-543

the AFO or related CIO statutes.

[redacted] is described as a white, male, date of birth [redacted] currently [redacted] residing in [redacted] California.

b6 -4  
b7C -4

During a meeting with the informant in this case on [redacted]

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

[redacted] was interviewed by BuAgents at San Jose on 7/17/81 at which time he denied making serious threats to anyone and engaged in political rhetoric in conversation with the interviewing Agents.

On 7/9/81 WFO advised that Thomas Watson, who served as Ambassador to Russia from 8/2/79 to 2/4/81, was formerly associated with IBM. Watson can be reached in Armonk, Westchester County, New York, at telephone number 914-765-7001.

LEAD

NEW ROCHELLE

AT ARMONK, NEW YORK: Provide Watson with a summary of captioned investigation and advise that he was mentioned (although not by name) by the subject.

(P1)

|                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED            | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED          | FILED   |
| AUG 27 1984         |         |
| FBI - SAN FRANCISCO |         |

b6 -1  
b7C -1

89B-294-46

NR058 WA CODE

624PM NITEL 5/2/73 JXS

TO ALL SACS

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR IP

TRAVEL OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER TO SOVIET UNION 5/3-10/73,  
INFORMATION CONCERNING (CI-1).

U.S. SECRET SERVICE WHICH HAS PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
DR. HENRY KISSINGER DURING HIS TRIP HAS REQUESTED THAT ALL  
APPROPRIATE BUREAU FIELD OFFICES BE ALERT TO THIS RESPONSIBILITY  
AND IF ANY INFORMATION IS DEVELOPED THAT IT BE IMMEDIATELY  
FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU BY TELEPHONE.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

ABOVE INFORMATION IS CLASSIFIED ~~"CONFIDENTIAL."~~

END

FBI HONOLULU WMA 12 25 PM

*del agents  
notified  
KJH*

*per 62-824-1*  
*KJH*  
*A*  
*M. C. Carthy*  
*del sources and  
agents.*

|            |         |
|------------|---------|
| SEARCHED   | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED | FILED   |
| MAY 2 1973 |         |

*T 5/10*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : SAC, HONOLULU (62-824) (C)

DATE: 5/24/73


FROM : SA E. FRANCIS MCCARTHY

SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF DR. HENRY  
KISSINGER TO SOVIET UNION  
5/3-10/73  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

ReButel dated 5/2/73.

In accordance with instructions set forth in reButel, all Agents were notified of the proposed travel of Dr. HENRY KISSINGER, and instructed to notify and alert appropriate sources.

No information having been obtained by any Honolulu sources regarding the travel of Dr. KISSINGER, no communications to the Bureau were necessitated and this case should be placed in closed status.



① - Honolulu

EFM:djh

(1) djh

Som



5010-108-01

FILE STRIPPED PER MRR

DATE 10/10/73 BY gbm

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3964

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : SAC New York

DATE: 12-16-74

FROM : [redacted]

b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4

SUBJECT: [redacted]

ET AL. V. Henry A. Kissinger,

ET AL.,

Civil Action No 1187-73 (D.D.C.)

Buded 12-17-74

Re Butel <sup>airtel</sup> 12/10/74

Case opened for investigation as set forth in  
Bu airtel. Sub A file opened to handle this and  
kept in June Unit.

Closing teletype  
submitted 12/17/74

62-15039-1  
[redacted] 12/16/74  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
SUPV

3 [redacted] 12/74

62-15039-1

|             |         |
|-------------|---------|
| SEARCHED    | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED  | FILED   |
| DEC 17 1974 |         |
| NEW YORK    |         |

[redacted]


b6 -1  
b7C -1



5010-110

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3965

FILE REVIEWED  
DATE 8-7-90  
INITIALS 

b6 -1  
b7C -1

ON JULY TWENTY SIXTH, A SOURCE WHO HAS NOT BEEN

INFORMATION CONCERNING

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -4

ON JULY TWENTY EIGHTH, A SOURCE WHO HAS NOT BEEN  
A SUSPICIOUS NUMBER OF TIMES TO ASCERTAIN HIS RELIABILITY

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

PA., TELEPHONE

HE MADE STATEMENTS THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE  
OF PENNSYLVANIA: GONOR WILSON THOMP, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR  
HARRY WILSON, AND THE ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PA., SHERIFF.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

SOURCE SAID THAT ACCORDING TO HIS ACQUAINTANCE,

SOURCE STATED THAT HE CANNOT VOUCH FOR THE VERACITY  
THE ABOVE INFORMATION AND DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSIDERED  
FURTHER REGARDING THIS MATTER.  
END PAGE ONE

b6 -6  
b7C -6

*Tracy, P.A.  
Down, Ohio 7  
Deputy P.S.  
Commissioner Lt. Col. [redacted]  
Advised 8:30p  
Attended to nothing any  
Gov. Callahan, 6:40p  
7:40p, 7:45p at  
Home and other  
negative  
Walker*

62-5260-1

SEARCHED INDEXED  
SERIALIZED FILED  
JUL 31 1971  
FBI - ALBANY

*Metcalf*

“...and the people of the world are not yet ready to accept the fact that the world is a single community.”

“...and the people of the world are not yet ready to accept the fact that the world is a single community.”

15 JUL 1976

Pittsburgh, Pa., Sept. 10.—The

~~WIKESY PROXY VITE~~

RESPONSIBLE CITIZEN, 4/30/00

ONCE OCCASION, SUPPORT ONLY. ~~INFORMATION~~ INVOLVED IN THE INTERVIEW.

WIDM ALLEGANY COUNTY SHERIFFS UNITIES #121281

TO POSSESS ONE OF HIS TRUCKS

NY CORDES OF THE PITTSBURGH OFFICE CONTAINS NO INFORMATION

10519491.0 403

ALL INFORMATION HAS BEEN FURNISHED TO SECRET SERVICE.

AND ALCOHOLIC TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS DIVISION, BOTH PITTSBURGH

PA., & PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, CARNEGIE, PA. AND CO, ALLEGHENY

CC. "MIDDLE" ISLAND. 90 236412AMT.

2019-03-19

2004 2004 OF 18

09 000 000

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

b6 -3,4  
b7C -3,4  
b7D -5

b6 -2  
b7C -2  
b7D -5



BEST COPY AVAILABLE



b6 -3,4  
b7C -3,4  
b7D -5

EDWARD R. SNAPES

NO

CC

FBI PHILA

NR 014 ON PLAT  
 014 ON PLAT 1-21-71 US  
 TO DIRECTOR  
 PHILADELPHIA  
 FROM PITTSBURGH (100-1-71) 2P

[REDACTED] INFORMATION CONTAINING

b6 -4  
 b7C -4

ON JULY THIRTY INSTANT, A SOURCE WHO HAS NOT BEEN CONTACTED  
 A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF TIMES TO ASCERTAIN HIS RELIABILITY,  
 ADVISED THAT ACCORDING TO AN ACQUAINTANCE OF HIS, WHOSE HE  
 REFUSED TO IDENTIFY, [REDACTED]

b6 -4  
 b7C -4  
 b7D -5

[REDACTED] PA., TELEPHONE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND MADE STATEMENTS THREATENING THE LIVES  
 OF PENNSYLVANIA GOVERNOR GILTON CHAPPE, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR  
 MERVY FISHER, AND THE ALLEGANY COUNTY, PA., SHERIFF.

b6 -4  
 b7C -4  
 b7D -5

SOURCE SAID THAT ACCORDING TO HIS ACQUAINTANCE, [REDACTED]

SOURCE STATED THAT HE CANNOT VOUCH FOR THE VERACITY OF  
 THE ABOVE INFORMATION AND DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONTACTED  
 FURTHER REGARDING THIS MATTER.

END PAGE ONE

62-5264-1

|                    |         |
|--------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED           | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED         | FILED   |
| JUL 30 1971        |         |
| FBI - PHILADELPHIA |         |

PAGE TWO

OF THE SAME DATE, CHIEF OF POLICE FRANK GRAY, NEWVILLE  
ISLAND PD, ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] RESIDES AT THE AFORESAID ADDRESS  
AND IS EMPLOYED AS A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] PITTSBURGH. HE SAID THAT [REDACTED] HAS NO  
ARREST RECORD WITH HIS DEPARTMENT AND IS CONSIDERED A  
RESPONSIBLE CITIZEN, ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] HAS A BAD TEMPER AND ON  
ONE OCCASION, PURPORTINGLY BECAME INVOLVED IN AN ALTERCATION  
WITH ALLEGHENY COUNTY ARREST OFFICERS WHEN THEY ATTEMPTED  
TO REPOSSESS ONE OF HIS TRUCKS.

b6 -4  
b7C -4  
b7D -5

RECORDS OF THE PITTSBURGH OFFICE CONTAIN NO INFORMATION  
IDENTIFIABLE WITH [REDACTED]

b6 -3,4  
b7C -3,4  
b7D -5

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN FURNISHED TO DETECTIVE [REDACTED],  
AND ALLEGHENY COUNTY, AND VICTIMS DIVISION, BOTH PITTSBURGH,  
PA.; PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, HARRISBURG, PA. AND SO, ALLEGHENY  
CO., NEWVILLE ISLAND PD COORDINATOR.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

ABOVE SOURCE IS [REDACTED]

b6 -2  
b7C -2  
b7D -5

END PAGE TWO

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

NOT TYPED

[REDACTED]

b6 -3.4  
b7C -3.4  
b7D -5

[REDACTED]

PLEASE ADVISE APPROPRIATE PERSONS IN OFFICE

OF GOVERNMENT STAFF.

END

BT

01/27/14

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : SAC (62-5264) (C)

FROM : SA WILBUR S. METCALF

SUBJECT:   
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DATE: 8/4/71

b6 -4  
b7C -4

Re Pittsburgh teletype to Bureau 7/30/71.

At Harrisburg, Pa.

On 8/4/71, contents of retel were furnished to SHANE CREAMER, Attorney General of Pennsylvania.

62-5264-2

|                    |         |
|--------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED           | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED         | FILED   |
| AUG 5 - 1971       |         |
| FBI - PHILADELPHIA |         |



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3973

NR058 WA CODE

6:26 PM NITEL 5/2/73 JXS

TO ALL SACS

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR IP

FILE REVIEWED  
DATE 8/7/92  
INITIALS  

b6 -1  
b7C -1

TRAVEL OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER TO SOVIET UNION 5/3-10/73,  
INFORMATION CONCERNING (CI-1)

U.S. SECRET SERVICE WHICH HAS PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
DR. HENRY KISSINGER DURING HIS TRIP HAS REQUESTED THAT ALL  
APPROPRIATE BUREAU FIELD OFFICES BE ALERT TO THIS RESPONSIBILITY  
AND IF ANY INFORMATION IS DEVELOPED THAT IT BE IMMEDIATELY  
FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU BY TELEPHONE.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

ABOVE INFORMATION IS CLASSIFIED "CONFIDENTIAL."

END

*File stopped  
5/8/73*

*S-2  
B*

*Ab Syn Ed  
5/2/73  
JXS*

*62-5485-1*

|                    |         |
|--------------------|---------|
| SEARCHED           | INDEXED |
| SERIALIZED         | FILED   |
| MAY 02 1973        |         |
| FBI - PHILADELPHIA |         |

*DEAD*

FBI (23-cv-10741)-3974

01-08773

310

b6 -1  
b7C -1

RECEIVED  
MAY 14 1981  
FBI

May 4, 2001

FBI Investigator  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
J. Edgar Hoover Building  
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20535-0001

Dear FBI Investigator,

Recently Harper's magazine ran an expose of Henry Kissinger in its February and March issue. The articles (enclosed) explains in detail how this former Secretary of State representative is implicated in various criminal activities before and during his tenure in the Nixon administration. This follows documents recently made public and obtained by the Freedom of Information Act.

I believe this suspect is worthy of indictment based on his participation in illegal activities, starting with disposing of Salvador Allende in Chile's 1968 election. It should also be acknowledged that Kissinger's machinations in Indochina to advance his own political career have directly or indirectly resulted in countless Laotian and Cambodian civilian deaths from intensified bombing campaigns. Harper's magazine puts the estimate at close to a million.

When the FBI puts a mug shot of Kissinger on its front page instead of a two-bit coin scam crook (James Conley), then I know the FBI has a purposeful mission, acts independently and deserves my hard earned tax dollars.


I have enclosed copies of the Harper's article to make your investigations into the mega-murderer easier. I have personally paid for the copies as well as the postage.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature]

[Redacted address]

☐



b6 -2  
b7C -2

62C-110-107723-22800


ACK. 7/6/01

[Redacted box]

[Redacted box]

[Redacted box]

b6 -1, 2  
b7C -1, 2



"New Beach, Golden Valley County, North Dakota, 1906," by Macmillan MacKenzie. A new book of MacKenzie's photographs, *Abandonment West*, will be published this summer by the Apian Historical Society Press.

chamber. A mile, maybe two miles, to the rear.

"Listen," Murphy said quietly. "Don't that sound nice?" That was the word, Nice. Round and shiny. Murphy's face was relaxed now. His lips were two black parallel lines, marking the place where the mouth closed when Murphy made it firm. Between the lines the skin was pink and moist; and those inner lips, Cramer had noticed, were the only part of a face that always stayed clean. Except the eyes.

"My brother and me used to pull the bells every Sunday at home," Murphy said. "When we was kids, I mean. Used to get half a dollar apiece for it. Son of a bitch, if that don't sound just the same."

Listening, they sat smiling shyly at each other. Church bells on misty mornings were things you forgot sometimes, like teenage clime cups and women's hands. When you remembered them you smiled shyly, mostly because you didn't know what else to do.

"Must be back in that town we came through yesterday," Cramer said. "Terous funny they'd be ringing church bells there."

Murphy said it did seem funny, and then it happened. The eyes got big, and when the voice came it was small, intense, not Murphy's voice or all "Reckon the war's over?"

Something fluttered down Cramer's spine. "By God, Murphy. By God, it makes sense. It makes sense, all right."

"Damned if it don't," Murphy said, and they paped at each other, staring to grin, wanting to laugh and shout, to get out and run.

"Son of a bitch," Murphy said.

Cramer bowed his own voice, high and babbling: "That could be why the artillery stopped."

"Could it be this case? Could it happen this

way? Would the message come down from headquarters? Would Battalion get it from Regiment? Would Franchet, the platoon runner, come stumbling out across the plowed field with the news? Franchet, waving his podgy arm and screaming, 'Hey, you guys! Come on back! It's all over! It's all over, you guys!' Cramer. Cramer. But why not?

"By God, Murphy, do you think so?"

"Watch for horses," Murphy said. "They might show some."

"Yeah, that's an idea, they might show some."

They could see nothing, least nothing except the faint, silver uncertainty of the bells. Remember this. Remember every second of it. Remember Murphy's face and the hole and the camouflages and the mist. Keep it all.

Watch for horses.

Remember the date. March something. No April. April something. 1945. What did they say the other day? Day before yesterday? Maybe told you the date then. He said, "When do you know, this is God..."

Cramer swallowed, then looked at Murphy quickly. "Wait a minute wait a minute. We're wrong." He watched Murphy's smile grow huge as he told him. "Meyers. Remember when Meyers said about Good Friday? This is Easter Sunday, Murphy."

Murphy eased himself back against the side of the hole. "Oh yeah," he said. "Oh yeah, some. That's right."

Cramer swallowed again and said, "From civilians probably going to church back there."

Murphy's face came together in a single black line, and he was quiet for a while. Then, snuffing his cigarette in the dirt, he said, "Son of a bitch, Easter Sunday."

# THE CASE AGAINST HENRY KISSINGER

PART ONE

The making of a war criminal  
By Christopher Hitchens

THE 1968 ELECTION  
INDOCHINA • CHILE

It will become clear, and may as well be noted at the outset, that this is written by a political opponent of Henry Kissinger. Nonetheless, I have found myself continually amazed at how much hostile and discreditable material I have felt compelled to omit. I am concerned only with those Kissingerian offenses that might or should form the basis of a legal prosecution: for war crimes, for crimes against humanity, and for offenses against common or customary or international law, including conspiracy to commit murder, kidnapping, and extortion.

Thus, I might have mentioned Kissinger's recruitment and betrayal of the Iraqi Kurds, who were likely encouraged by him to take up arms against Saddam Hussein in 1972-73, and who were then abandoned to extermination on their hillside when Saddam Hussein made a diplomatic deal with the Ghetto of Iran, and who were deliberately left to as well as abandoned. The conclusions of the report by Congressman Chris Pike still make shocking reading and reveal on Kissinger's part a callous indifference to human life and human rights. But they fall into the category of deplorable traits, dark and do not seem to have violated any known law.

In the same way, Kissinger's endorsement of political and military and diplomatic cover for apartheid in South Africa presents us with a morally repulsive record and includes the appalling consequences of the destabilization of Angola. Again, though, one is looking at a so-called period of Cold War and imperial history, and an exercise of irresponsible power, rather than an episode of organized crime. Additionally, one must take into account the institutional nature of this policy, which ought to outline have been followed under any administration, national security adviser, or secretary of state.

Similar reservations can be held about Kissinger's chairmanship of the Presidential Commission on Central America in the early 1980s, which was called by Oliver North, and which white-washed death-squad activities on the isthmus. Or about the political protection provided by Kissinger, while in office, for the Bokhari dynasty in Iran and its machinery of torture and repression. The list, it is sobering to say, could be prosecuted very much further. But it will not do to blame the whole caboodle merely and cynicism of deicide on one man. (Cynicism only one gets on increasing gluttony, as when Kissinger urged President Ford not to receive the inconvenient Alexander Solzhenitsyn, all the while posing as Communism's most daring and principled foe.)




SOUTH VIETNAMESE  
HUMAN VICTIM, 1967

Christopher Hitchens, formerly Washington editor of Harper's Magazine, is the author of books on the Cuban crisis, Kissinger, Palestine, and the Anglo-American relationship. He is a regular columnist for Vanity Fair and The Nation.



No. I have confined myself to the identifiable crimes that can and should be placed on a proper bill of indictment, whether the actions taken were in line with general "policy" or not. These include, in this installment, the deliberate mass killing of civilian populations in Indochina and the personal suborning and planning of murder of a senior constitutional officer in a democratic nation—Chile—with which the United States was not at war. In a second installment we will see that this criminal habit of mind extends to Bangladesh, Cyprus, East Timor, and even to Washington, D.C.

Some of these allegations can be constructed only prima facie, since Mr. Kissinger—in what may also amount to a deliberate and premeditated obstruction of justice—has caused large amounts of evidence to be withheld or possibly destroyed. We now, however, enter upon the age when the defense of "sovereign immunity" for state crimes has been held to be void. As I demonstrate below, Kissinger has understood this decisive change even if many of his critics have not. The House of Lords' ruling in *London*, on the international relevance of General Augusto Pinochet's crimes, added to the ghastly verdict of the Spanish magistracy and the verdicts of the International Tribunal at The Hague, has destroyed the shield that immunized crimes committed under the justification of *raison d'état*. There is now no reason why a warrant for the tri-



al of Kissinger may not be issued in any one of a number of jurisdictions and no reason why he may not be compelled to answer it. Indeed, as I write, there are a number of jurisdictions where the law is no longer beginning to catch up with the evidence. And we have before us in any case the Nuremberg precedent, by which the United States solemnly undertook to be bound.

A federal grand jury will soon issue a double or triple offense to justice. First, it will violate the essential and now unassailable principle that not even the most powerful are above the law. Second, it will suggest that prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity are reserved for losers, or for minor despots in minimally recognizable countries. This in turn will lead to the policy calculations of what could have been a viable process and to the possible suspicion of double standards.

Many if not most of Kissinger's partners in politics, from Greece to Chile to Argentina to Indochina, are now in jail or awaiting trial. His own

loose impunity is rank; it smells to heaven. If it is allowed to persist then we shall shamefully vindicate the ancient philosopher Anacharsis, who maintained that laws were like colichecks—strong enough to detain only the weak and too weak to hold the strong. In the name of innumerable victims known and unknown, it is time for justice to take a hand.

#### REGARDING HENRY

**O**n December 2, 1998, Michael Korda was being interviewed on camera in his office at Simon & Schuster. As one of the reigning magnates of New York publishing, he had edited and "produced" the work of authors as various as Tennessee Williams, Richard Nixon, Joan Crawford, and Joe Bonomo. On this particular day, he was talking about the life and thoughts of Cheri, whose portrait adorned the wall behind him. And then the telephone rang and there was a message to call "Doc" Henry Kissinger as soon as possible. A polymath like Korda knows—what with the exigencies of publishing in these vertiginous days—how to switch in an instant between Cheri and high matters. The camera kept running, and recorded the following scene for a tape that I possess:

Asking his secretary to get the number (779-7019—the digits of Kissinger Associates), Korda goes dully, to general hogtied in the office, that it "should be 1-800-CAMBODIA . . . 1-800-KOMB-CAMBODIA." After a pause of nicely calibrated duration (no senior editor likes to be put on hold while he's reaching company, especially media company) it's "Henry—Hi, how are you? . . . You're getting all the publicity you could want in the New York Times but not the kind you want . . . I also think it's very, very dubious for the administration to simply say yes, they'll release those papers . . . no . . . no, absolutely . . . no . . . no . . . well, hmmm, yeah. We did it until quite recently, frankly, and he did protest? . . . Well, I don't think there's any question about that, as uncomfortable as it may be . . . Henry, this is totally outrageous . . . yeah . . . also the publication. This is a Spanish judge appealing to an English court about a Chilean head of state. So it's, it's . . . Also, Spain has no national jurisdiction over events in Chile anyway, so that makes absolutely no sense . . . Well, that's probably true . . . if you would. I think that would be by far and away the best . . . Right, yeah, no, I think it's exactly what you should do, and I don't think it should be long, and I think it should end with your father's letter. I think it's a very important document . . . Yes, but I think the letter is wonderful, and central to the entire book. Can you let me read the Lebanon chapter over the weekend?" At this point the conversation ends, with some jocular chatter.



HENRY KISSINGER, 1995

tions by Korda about his upcoming autobiography "a totally negative procedure."

By means of the same tiny internal camera, or its female equivalent, one could deduce not a little about the world of Henry Kissinger from this microcosmic exchange. The first and most important is this: sitting in his office at Kissinger Associates, with its tendrils of business and consultancy stretching from Brussels to Beijing, and enmeshed by innumerable other distractions and demands, he still listens when he hears of the arrest of a dictator. Sympathetic the conversation with Korda may be, but it's clear that the keyword is "jurisdiction." What had the New York Times been reporting that fine morning? On December 2, 1998, its front page carried the following report from Tim Weiner, the paper's national-security correspondent in Washington. Under the headline "U.S. Will Release Files on Chilean Under Pinochet," he wrote:

Whether born a politician and diplomatic confidante to a rich man, the United States decided risky to liberate some secret documents on the killings and human torment during the reign of Augusto Pinochet in Chile . . .

The decision to release such documents is the first sign that the United States will cooperate in the

case against General Pinochet. Clinton Administration officials said they believed the benefits of openness in human rights cases outweighed the risks to national security in disclosure. But the decision could open "a can of worms," in the words of a former Central Intelligence Agency official stationed in Chile, exposing the depths of the knowledge that the United States had about crimes charged against the Pinochet Government . . .

While some European governments already have accepted looking the former dictator in the eye, United States officials have seemed largely silent, reflecting deep ambivalence. The Spanish court's probe, which does not involve and release access to human rights files, and comes near the implication for American leaders who might someday also be accused of foreign offenses. Butler added.

Precisely as Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, who served as his national security adviser and Secretary of State, approved a right-wing coup in Chile in the early 1970s, previously declassified documents show.

The many of the secrets of the United States during the 1970s, and much of what American leaders and intelligence services did in liaison with the Pinochet Government after it seized power, as well as under the veil of national security. The secret files on the Pinochet regime are held by the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council,

the National Archives, the Presidential libraries of Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter, and other Government agencies. According to Justice Department records, these files contain a history of human rights abuses and international terrorism.

• In 1975 State Department diplomats in Chile prevented the Pinochet regime's record of killing and torture, filing dissent to American foreign policy with their superiors in Washington.

• The C.I.A. has files on assassinations by the regime and the Chilean secret police. The intelligence agency also has records on Chile's attempts to establish an international right-wing covert action squad.



THE SIGNING OF THE PARIS PEACE ACCORD, 1973

• The Ford Library contains many of Mr. Kissinger's secret files on Chile, which have never been made public. Though a secretary, Mr. Kissinger declined a request for an interview today.

One must credit Kissinger with grasping what so many other people did not: that if the Pinochet precedent became established, then he himself was in some danger. The United States believes that it alone punishes and isolates war criminals and "international terrorists"; nothing in its political or journalistic culture yet allows for the thought that it might be harboring and sheltering such a senior one. Yet the thought had very obliquely surfaced in Weiner's story, and Kissinger was a worried man when he called his editor that day to discuss the escalating volume of his memoirs (eventually published under the anonymity of Bill and Selma's pseudonym, *Years of Rosewood*), which was still in progress.

"Harboring and sheltering," though, are understatements for the involvement of Henry Kissinger's circumstances. His advice is sought, or \$10,000 is proffered, by mafiosos of business and academics and policymakers. His major newspaper columns are solicited by the Los Angeles Times and appear as if asked in the Wash-

ington Post. His first volume of memoirs was in part written, and also edited, by Harold Evans, who with Tina Brown is among the many hosts and hostesses who solicit Kissinger's company, or perhaps one should say society, for their New York soirées. At different times, he has been a consultant to ABC News and CBS, his most successful diplomacy, indeed, has probably been conducted with the media (and his single greatest achievement has been to get almost everybody to call him "Doctor"). Owined on by Ted Koppel, sought out by reporters and despots with "image" problems or "failures of communication," and given respectful attention by presidential candidates and those whose task it is to "mold" their global vision, this man wants for little in the pathetic universe that the "self-esteem" industry exists to serve. Of whom else would Norman Pollitzer write, in a hunched-knee exclamation to the second volume of Kissinger's memoirs, *Years of Upson-off*:

What we have here is writing of the very highest order. It is writing that is equally at ease in passionate and abstract analysis that can shape a narrative as skillfully as it can paint a scene; that can achieve marvels of compression while moving at an expansive and leisurely pace. It is writing that can still without waste or falsity of more from the public beholding a book about great historical events in the human mind than is often achieved by an ordinary sense of human proportion.

A crime who can make like that, as you once described by one of my moral tutors, could never do alone. Nor need his subjects. Except that, every now and then, the recipients (and donor) of so much sympathy feel a tremor of anxiety. He leaves the well-furnished table and wanders to the bathroom. Is it perhaps another disclosure on a newly released Nixon tape? Some army news from Afghanistan pretending the fall or imprisonment of another patron (and perhaps the escape of an awkward document or two)? The secret or indictment of a notorious assassin, the expiry of the statute of secrecy for some obscure cabinet page in a foreign embassy? Any one of these can instantly spoil his day. As we see from the *Koda* tape, Kissinger reacts upon the morning paper with the assurance of tranquility. Because he knows what others can only suspect, or guess at. And he is a prisoner of the knowledge, as to some extent, are we.

Notice the likable way in which Michael Korda demonstrates his benevolent intentions with the Cambodia job. Everybody "knows" after all, that Kissinger inflicted terror and misery and even death on that country, and great wrong to the United States Constitution in the same "case." Everybody also "knows" that other cabalists and mafiosos can lay claim to the same melancholy and harmful distinction in Cambodia, with incre-

mented or "collateral" damage to American democracy keeping pace. Yet the judge man standing in black tie at the Vogue party is not, surely, the man who ordered and supervised the destruction of civilian populations, the assassination of inconvenient politicians, the kidnapping and disappearance of soldiers and journalists and clerics who got in his way. Oh, but he is. He's exactly the same man. And that may be among the most nauseating reflections of all. Kissinger is not invited and feared because of his exquisite manners or his mordant wit (his comments are in any case understated, and his wit consists of a quiver of bemused and secondhand irony). No, he is sought after because his presence supplies a focus, the aesthetic much of law and metaphysical power. There's a slight guilty nervousness on the edge of Korda's gaze about the indescribable sufferings of Indochina. And I've noticed, time and again, standing at the back of the audience during Kissinger speeches, that laughter of the nervous, uneasy kind is the sort of laughter he likes to provoke. In exonerating this debate, he flaunts not the "apologetic" of power (position of his plagiarized term used) but the pomography.

#### OBSCURE REHEARSAL: THE SECRET OF '68

There exists, within the political class of Washington, D.C., an open secret that is too momentous and too noted to tell. Although it is well known to academic historians, senior reporters, former Cabinet members, and ex-diplomats, it has never been summarized all at one time in any one place. The reason for this is, in my view, paradoxical. The open secret is in the possession of both major political parties, and it directly implicates the past starcraft of at least three former presidencies. Thus, its full disclosure would be in the interest of no particular faction. Its truth is therefore the guarantee of its obscenity; it has been Fox's "published letter" across the very side that signifies hypocrisy.

Here is the secret in plain words. In the fall of 1968, Richard Nixon and some of his associates and underlings set out to sabotage the peace negotiations on Vietnam. The means they chose were simple: they privately assured the South Vietnamese military rulers that so long as the Republican regime would offer them a better deal than would a Democratic one. In this way, they endeavored to lead the rulers themselves and the client strategy of Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey. The tactic "worked," in that the South Vietnamese soon withdrew from the talks on the eve of the election, thereby destroying the peace initiative on which the Democrats had based their campaign. In another way, it did not "work," be-

cause four years later the Nixon Administration tried to conclude the war on the same terms that had been on offer in Paris. The reason for the dead silence that still surrounds the question is that to those intervening years came 25,000 American and unacknowledged number of Vietnamese, Camb-

THE DOCTOR AT THE VOGUE PARTY. NOT SURELY THE MAN WHO DESTROYED CIVILIAN POPULATIONS

odian, and Laotian lost their lives. Last demand, that is to say, even more poignantly than had those slain up to that point. The impact of those four years on Indochinese society, and on American democracy, is beyond recuperation. The chief beneficiary of the covert action, and of the subsequent slaughter, was Henry Kissinger.

Can I then hear the guardians of Kissinger, stripping their blunted quills to clinch this as a "conspiracy theory"? I happily accept the challenge. Let us take, first, the Diaries of that renowned conspirator (and theorist of conspiracy) H. H. Haldeman, published in May 1975. I choose to start with them for two reasons, first, because on the logical inference of "evidence against motives" it is improbable that Mr. Haldeman would supply evidence of his knowledge of a crime, unless he was (posthumously) telling the truth. Second, because it is possible to trace back each of his entries to its origin in other checked, confirmed sources.

In January 1973, the Nixon-Kissinger Administration—a which Haldeman took the minutes—was heavily engaged on two fronts. In Paris again, Henry Kissinger was endeavoring to negotiate "peace with honor" in Vietnam. In Washington, D.C., the web of evidence against the Watergate buggers and buggers was beginning to tighten. On January 8, 1973, Haldeman records:

John Dean called to report on the Watergate trials, saying that if we can make it any way to hold evidence that our transportation plane was bugged in '68, he thinks that we could use this as a lever to get some going in these Congress to go back and examine '68 as well as '73, and drive out the old.

Three days later, on January 11, 1973, Haldeman wrote from Nixon ("the P") to the *Chairman* and his staff:

On the Watergate question, he wanted me to call in Attorney General John Mitchell and have him find out on 11/11/73 if it is true that in 1968 if the new school the bugging was in 1968 as well as the 1973, and then if it is true, then we should consider it as well as the evidence and get it sorted, which would get us the evidence we need. He also thinks I ought to come with George Christian if possible.

Johnson's former press secretary, who working with Democrats for Nixon, got left to use his influence to run off the FBI investigation with California, Hubert, and so on. Later in the day, he decided that wasn't much of a good idea, and told me not to do it, which I immediately didn't do.

On the same day, Haldeman reports Henry Kissinger calling excitedly from Paris, saying "he'll do the signing in Paris rather than Hanoi, which is the key thing." He speaks also of getting South Vietnam's President Thieu to "go along." On the following day:

The Paris we look on the Washington thing today, making the point that I should talk to Connally about the Johnson bugging process to get his judgment as to how to handle it. He mentions if we don't let it just have Andrew go in and see Hubert. The problem is going at this is how he'd react, and we need to find out from [Clark] DeLoach who did it, and then run it by deLoach on him. I talked to Mitchell on the phone on this subject and he said DeLoach had told him he was up to date on the thing because he had a call from [Clark] DeLoach. A few reports were making me inquisitive in the last week or so, and I got very hot and called DeLoach and said to him that if the Nixon people are going to play with this, that he would rely on fact-based information—nothing at all, saying that our side was asking for certain things to be done. By our side, I assume he means the Nixon campaign/organization. DeLoach took this as a direct threat from Johnson. . . . As he recalls it, bugging was requested on the phone, he was asked

down, and all they did was check the phone calls, and get a tap on the Oregon Lady Bell. Anna Chennault.

This bureaucratic prose may be hard to read, but it needs no cipher to decode itself. Under intense pressure about the bugging of the Watergate building, Nixon instructed his chief of staff, Haldeman, and his FBI counsel, Clark DeLoach, to conduct the bugging to which his own campaign had been subjected in 1968. He also demanded that former president Johnson, through former senior Democrats like Texas governor John Connally, to gauge what his reaction to the disclosure might be. The aim was to show that "everybody does it." (By another bipartisan paradox, in Washington the slogan "they all do it" is used as a slogan for the defense rather than, as one might hope, for the prosecution.)

However, a problem presents itself at once: how to mount the 1968 bugging without at the same time revealing what that bugging had been

about. Hence the second thoughts ("won't such a good idea . . ."). In his own first introduction to *The Holloman Diaries*, Nixon's biographer Ambrose Stephen Ambrose characterizes the 1973 approach to Lyndon Johnson as "progressive black-mail," designed in great haste to pressure to close down a congressional inquiry. But he also suggests that Johnson, himself no pushover, had some black-and-white notion of his own. As President Ambrose phrases it, the Nixon had been vetted by the National Security Council, and the backdoor deletion cited above is "the only place in the book where an example is given of a deletion by the NSC during the Carter Administration." Eight days later Nixon was inaugurated for his second term. Ambrose plays: "Ten days later Johnson died of a heart attack. What Johnson had on Nixon's lips we will never know."

The professor's conclusion here is a rapidly constructed. There is a well-understood principle known as "Mutual Assured Destruction," whereby both sides possess more than enough material with which to annihilate the other. The answer to the question of what the Johnson Administration "had" on Nixon is a relatively easy one. It was given in a book entitled *Caveat to the President*, published in 1991. Its author was Clark Clifford, the quintessential blue-chip Washington insider, who was assisted in the writing by Richard Holbrooke, the former assistant secretary of state and current ambassador to the United Nations. In 1988, Clark Clifford was secretary of defense and Richard Holbrooke was a member of the American negotiating team at the Vietnam peace talks in Paris.

From his seat in the *Foran*, Clifford had been able to read the intelligence transcripts that picked up and recorded what he terms a "secret personal channel" between President Thieu in Saigon and the Nixon campaign. The chief intelligence officer of the American and one John Mitchell, then Nixon's campaign manager and subsequently attorney general (and subsequently Prisoner Number 14171-151 in the Maxwell Air Force Base prison camp). He was severely accused by Madame Anna Chennault, known to all as the "Dragon Lady." A fierce veteran of the Taiwan lobby, and all-purpose right-wing intriguer, she was a social and political force in the Washington of her day and would one day have her own biography.

Clifford describes a private meeting at which he, President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and National Security Adviser Walt Rostow were present. Nocturnal to a man, they kept Vice President Humphrey out of the loop. But, harkish as they were, they were appalled at the evidence of Nixon's treachery. They nonetheless decided not to go public with what they knew. Clifford says that it is not because the disclosure would have ruined the Paris talks altogether. He could have

said that it would have caused a crisis of confidence in American institutions. There are some things that the voters can't be trusted to know. And even though the bugging had been legal, it might not have looked like fair play. (The *Logan Act* forbids this use American from conducting private diplomacy with a foreign power.)

In the event, Nixon pulled out of the negotiations anyway, ending them just three days before the election. Clifford is in no doubt of the advice that he did so.

The activities of the Nixon team seem to be beyond the reach of probable political reaction. It constituted direct involvement in the activities of the executive branch and the responsibilities of the Chief Executive, the only branch with authority to represent on behalf of the nation. The activities of the Nixon campaign constituted a grave, even potentially illegal, interference in the security affairs of the nation by private individuals.

Perhaps more of the slight loathesomeness of his haughty pose, and perhaps a little ashamed of keeping the secret for his members rather than sharing it with the electorate, Clifford adds in a footnote:

It should be remembered that the public was considerably more innocent in such matters in the days before the Watergate hearings and the 1975 Senate investigation of the CIA.

Perhaps the public was indeed more innocent, if only because of the greater reluctance of whistleblowers like Clifford, who thought there were some things too precious to be made known. He claims now that he was in favor either of convincing Nixon privately with the information and forcing him to desist, or else of making it public. Perhaps this was indeed his view.

A Nixon whistleblower of investigative reporting has brought us several updates on this appalling episode. And so has the very guarded memoir of Richard Nixon himself. More than one "back channel" was required for the Republican destruction of the Paris peace talks. Nixon had to be seen communicating between Nixon and the South Vietnamese, as we have seen. But there also had to be an informant inside the incumbent administration's camp, a source of hints and tips and early warnings of official intentions. That informant was Henry Kissinger. In his own account, *Memories of Richard Nixon*, the disgraced elder statesman tells us that, in mid-September 1968, he received private word of a planned bombing halt. In other words, the Johnson Administration would, for the sake of the negotiations, consider suspending its usual bomb-bombardment of North

Vietnam. This most useful advance intelligence, Nixon tells us, came "through a highly essential channel." It was more useful than that he acknowledged. Kissinger had until then been a devoted partizan of Nelson Rockefeller, the model of the wealthy prince of liberal Republicanism. His outrage for the peace and the policies of



Richard Nixon was outraged, indeed. President Johnson's Paris negotiations, led by Averell Harriman, endeavored Kissinger to be almost one of themselves. He had made himself helpful, as Rockefeller's chief foreign policy adviser, by supplying friends and intermediaries with their own concerns in Hanoi. "Henry was the only person outside of the government we were authorized to discuss the negotiations with," Richard Holbrooke told Walter Isaacson. "We trusted him. It isn't stretching the truth to say that the Nixon campaign had a secret source within the U.S. negotiator's team."

So the likelihood of a bombing halt, wrote Nixon, "came into me and surprised me." He added: "I told Haldeman that Mitchell should continue to liaison with Kissinger and that we should show our desire to keep his role completely confidential." It is impossible that Nixon was unaware of his campaign manager's parallel role in collaborating with a foreign power. Thus began what was effectively a domestic covert operation, directed simultaneously at thwarting the talks and embarrassing the Hubert Humphrey campaign.

Later in the month, on September 26 to be precise, and as recorded by Nixon in his memoirs, Kissinger called again. He said that he had just returned from Paris, where he had picked up word that something big was afoot regarding Vietnam. He related that if I had anything to say about Vietnam during the following week, I should

PHOTOGRAPH BY GUY AROCH  
SEPTEMBER 1972

strategy were kept together. As far back as July, Niemi had met quietly in New York with the South Vietnamese ambassador, Bu Hien. The contacts had been arranged by Anna Cherniack, a beguiling ex-South Vietnamese officer in Washington, and surveillance of the "Dragon Lady" showed how the match operated. An intercepted cable from Niemi to President Thieu on the fateful day of October 23 had him saying: "Many Republican friends have contacted me and en-

### A NOTE ON THE "48 COMMITTEE"

[illegible]

conquered in a bloodless way. They were alarmed by gross reports as to the effect that you had already softened your position." The wiretapping in attendance went to see Charles Deland, known as "Tack" to his associates, who was J. Edgar Hoover's first deputy officer in the White House. We met him, you may recall, in H. R. Haldenough's house.

In 1989 the senior Anthony Summers was finally able to gain access to the closed FBI file of intercepts of the Nixon campaign, which he published in his 2000 book, *The Assassination of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon*. He was able to interview Aaron Chermakoff. These revelations were furnished him with what is vulgarly termed a "back channel" in the 1960s conspiracy. By the end of October 1968, John Mitchell had become so nervous about official surveillance that he ceased taking calls from Chermakoff and President Johnson, on a confidential call to the three candidates, Nixon, Humphrey, and Wallace (allegedly to brief them on the bombing halt), had strongly implied that he knew about the covert efforts to secure his Vietnam diplomacy. This call created more panic in Nixon's inner circle and caused Mitchell to telephone Chermakoff at the Shinnick Park Hotel. He then asked her to call him back on a more secure line. "Aaaa," he told her, "I'm speaking on behalf of Mr. Nixon. It's very important that our Vietnamese friends understand our Repellition position, and I hope you make that clear to them. ...Do you think they really have decided not to go to Paris?"

The reproduced FBI original documents show what happened next. On September 2, 1988, the agency reported:

[illegible]

Nixon's missing sister, Spitz Agnew, had been consoling in Albuquerque, New Mexico, that day, and subsequent inquiries quickly revealed that he and another member of his staff (the one principally concerned with Vietnam) had talked over in each with the Chiemanh man.

The beauty of having Kinsinger looking into one side and Anna Chertoukh and John Mitchell conducting a private lounge on the other was this: It enabled Nixon to avoid being drawn into the argument over a bombing halt. And it further enabled him to suggest that it was the

Democrats who were playing politics with the issue. On October 25, in New York, for good measure and needed waste of circulating an immediate while purporting to discuss it. CHL's Executive diplomacy to add, "I am also told that this spout of activity is a cynical, last-minute attempt by President Johnson to subvert the candidates of his minority. This I do not believe."

Kissinger himself showed a striking affinity to  
 people both ends against the middle. In the last  
 session of 1968, on Martin's Visegrad, he had  
 offered Nelson Rockefeller's files on Nixon to  
 Professor Samuel Huntington, a close adviser to  
 Herbert Thompson. But when Huntington's col-  
 league and friend Clayton Koppelman tried to  
 get him to make good on the offer, Kissinger be-  
 came shy. "I've hated Nix-on for years," he told  
 Koppelman, but the time wasn't quite ripe for the  
 handover. Indeed, it was a very close-matched  
 running in the end on the difference of a few  
 hundred thousand votes, and many hundred  
 others before that the final difference was made  
 when Johnson ordered a bombing halt on Decem-  
 ber 31 and the South Vietnamese made him look  
 like a fool by burning the peace talks two days  
 later. Had things gone the other way, of course,  
 Kissinger was now-certainly for a senior job in  
 a Lufthansa administration.

With slight differences of emphasis, the large pieces of this story appear in Haidenware's works as cited and in Clifford's comment. These are significantly reworked in President Johnson's autobiography, *The Vantage Point*, and to a lesser reflection on Jackson by William Bondy (one of the architects of the war) written rather trivially *The Tangled Web*, then in members of the corps, among them John Winnow in his history of 1968. Seymour Mersh in his study of Kissinger, and Walter Isaacson, *Eisen of Time*, magazine, in his admirable but critical biography, have produced almost comment versions of the same original episode. The only mention of it that is completely and unashamedly, in any literary or historical standard, appears in the memoirs of Henry Kissinger himself. The version has this

Several letters mentioned... some self-generated...  
rephrased one for example, I took the questions that  
I would answer specific questions on foreign policy,  
but that I could not offer general advice or value-  
our suggestions. This was the same response I made  
in a lecture from the Philosophy dept.

This notwithstanding, even the self-serving message of the man who, having won the 1966 election by these techniques, came back as his very first opponent, Henry Kissinger, in national security selection. One might not want to affirmate a majority competition between the two men, but when he made this choice Richard Nixon had only one, hardly and awkwardly, not Henry.



Kissinger in person. He clearly knows his audience of the men's abilities from more persuasive experience than that "One factor that had most convinced me of Kissinger's credibility," wrote Nixon later in his own delicious prose, "was the length to which he went to protect his secrecy."

That ghastly secret is now out. In the January 1969 issue of the Establishment house organ *Foreign Affairs*, published a few days after his appointment as Nixon's right-hand man, there appeared Henry Kissinger's own evaluation of the Vietnam negotiations. On every point of substance, he agreed with the line taken in Paris by the Johnson-Humphrey negotiators. One has to pause for an instant to comprehend the enormity of this. Kissinger had helped elect a man who had supposedly promised the South Vietnamese junta a better deal than they could get from the Democrats. The Saigon au-



thorities then acted, as Bourke madly confirms, as if they did indeed have a deal. This meant, in the words of a later Nixon slogan, "Four More Years." But four more years of an unwinable and unmerciful and murderous war, which was to spread before it burned out, and was to end on the same terms and conditions as had been on the table in the fall of 1958.

This was what it took to promote Henry Kissinger. To promote him from a mediocre and opportunistic academic to an international potentate. The signature qualities were there from the inaugural moment: the secretiveness and the duplicity, the power worship and the absence of scruple, the empty trading of old neo-friends for new neo-friends. And the distinctive efforts were also present: the uncommitted and expendable

nonpartisan official and unofficial lying about the war; the heavy and pompous pseudo-indignation when unattractive questions were asked. Kissinger's global career started as it meant to go. It debauched the American republic and American democracy, and it loved a fabulous toll of casualties on weak and more vulnerable societies.

#### THE CRIME OF WAR, AND BOMBING FOR VOTES

Even while crippled to an extent by these realities, one must cover his eyes of that element of the cynical that surrounded Henry Kissinger. Facing a visit to Vietnam in the middle 1960s, when many neo-sectarian opportunists were still convinced that the war was worth fighting and could be won, the young Henry reserved judgment on the first point he developed considerable private doubts on the second. He had given as far as to involve himself with an initiative that extended to direct personal contact with Hanoi. He became friendly with two Frenchmen who had a direct line to the Communist leadership in North Vietnam's capital, Hanoi. Robert Ashton, a French civil servant who was a friend of Ho Chi Minh, and Herbert Marcovitch, a French microbiologist, began a series of trips to North Vietnam. On their return, they located Kissinger in Paris. He in his turn portrayed the administration in high-level conversations in Washington, relaying the actual or potential negotiating positions of North Van Dong and other Communist spokesmen to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. (In the result, the relentless bombing of the North made any "leaky bakke" impossible. In particular, the now forgotten American destruction of the Paul Doumer Bridge outraged the Vietnamese side.)

This scrupulous indiscretion, which ultimately helped enable his double act in 1969, allowed Kissinger to enthrone Governor Rockefeller and to propose, by violent means, a home debate with America's chief rival. In his first major address as a candidate for the Republican nomination in 1968, Rockefeller spoke eloquently of how "in a subtle triangle with Communist China and the Soviet Union, we can ultimately improve our relations with each other and the will for peace of both." *Hollis added*

This fireworks display of a later Kissinger strategy might appear at first reading to illustrate resistance. But Governor Rockefeller had no more reason than Vice President Humphrey to suppose that his ambitious staffer would defect to the Nixon camp, taking and postponing this same debate in order later to take credit for a debated sinners' act.

More fully speaking, Kissinger wanted the message

of some greater rapprochement to the state was as he wanted the concept of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam as something negotiable on his own terms. There was a time to begin support of it and a time to denounce it as unworkable and treacherous. And there was a time to take credit for it. Some of those who "battered rocks" in Indochina may lay a claim to that notoriety and weak defense. Some who even heard the rocks may now tell us that they were acting sincerely at the time. But Kissinger cannot avoid himself of this debt. He always knew what he was doing, and he produced upon a second round of protracted warfare having fruitfully helped to destroy an alternative that he always understood was possible. This increases the gravity of the charge against him. It also prepares us for his impudently and retrospective defense against this charge: that his unwise dependence eventually led to "peace." When he announced that "peace is at hand" in October 1972, he made a beautiful and false claim that could have been made in 1968. And when he claimed credit for subsequent cooperation contacts, he was announcing the result of a secret and cunning diplomacy that had originally been proposed in an open and democratic way. In the meantime, he had illegally circumvented and shadowed American citizens and public servants whose intelligence about the war, and about constitutional authority, were mild compared with those of McNamara, Hubert, and Marcovitch. In establishing what happens and the means, we can say that in Kissinger's case he was fully aware of, and is entirely accountable for, his own actions.

Upon taking office as Richard Nixon's aide in the winter of 1969, a new Kissinger track in the political landscape led to two aspects. He had to conduct a rationale of "credibility" for past action in an already devastated Vietnamese situation, and he had to second his principal's wish that he form part of a "wall" between the Nixon White House and the Department of State. The term "two tracks" was later to become commonplace. Kissinger's position on both tracks, of simultaneous violence abroad and flagrant illegality at home, was decided from the start. He does not seem to have lacked relish for either commitment, and hopes finally that this was not the first warning of the "schizophrenia."

President Johnson's "bombing halt" had not lasted long by any standard, even if one tentatively that its original conciliatory purpose had been so widely understood. Averell Harriman, who had been LBJ's chief negotiator in Paris, later testified at Congress that the North Vietnamese had withdrawn 80 percent of their forces from the northern two provinces of South Vietnam, in October and November 1968. In negotiating with

the opponents of which the "halt" might have formed a part. In the same event, however, this withdrawal could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, or even as a "light at the end of the tunnel."

The historical record of the Indochina war is voluminous, and the searching controversy in it is so. This does not, however, prevent the full power of a confusion (there). Once the war had been emotionally and ideologically personified, more exorbitant methods were required to fight it and more fantastic excuses had to be fabricated to justify it. Let us take two more such cases in which the civilian population was deliberately and indiscriminately killed, in which the customary laws of war and humanity were violated, and in which conscious lies had to be told in order to conceal these facts and others.

#### WHAT CONVINCED NIXON OF HENRY'S CREDIBILITY: "THE LENGTH TO WHICH HE WENT TO PROTECT HIS SECRECY"

The first such case is an example of what Vietnam might have been spared had not the 1968 Paris peace talks been subverted. In December 1968, during the "transition" period between the Johnson and Nixon administrations, the United States military command turned to what General Lucien Abbot termed "total war" against the "insurrection" of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front insurgency. The chief exhibit in this campaign was a six-month clearance of the province of Kien Hoa. The code name for the sweep was Operation "Spooky Express."

It might, in some circles of thought, be remotely conceivable that such tactics could be justified under the international laws and charters governing the sovereign rights of self-defense. But no nation capable of deploying the overwhelming and annihilating force described below would be likely to find itself on the defensive. And it would be less of all likely to find itself on the defensive in its own soil. So the Nixon-Kissinger Administration was not, except in an unusual sense, fighting for survival. The unusual sense in which its survival was at stake was not, yet again, in the stark posthumous testimony of H. H. Holloman, from his report to Nixon's side he describes a Kissingerian moment on December 15, 1970:

Throughout time and the space covered by the general thinking about Vietnam and the Paris peace plan for two years, which I later told me he does not know, he thinks that any political act you would be serious about because the whole reaction to it could set in well before the 12-hour deadline. Between, instead of a normal ending down and then a policy right at the end of 71 so that if you had made before they tell me how to effect the decision.

One could hardly wish for it to be more plainly put than that. (And put, furthermore, by one of Nixon's chief persons with no wish to discredit the reelection.) But in point of fact, Kissinger himself seems to almost as much to his own first volume of memoirs, *The White House Years*. The context is a meeting with General de Gaulle, in which the old warrior demanded to know by what right the Nixon Administration subjected Indochina to devastating bombardment. In his own account, Kissinger replies that "a sudden withdrawal might give us a credibility problem." (When asked "where?" Kissinger hastily proposed the Middle East.) It is important to bear in mind that the future flattery of Brezhnev and Mac was in no real position to claim that he made war in Indochina to thwart either. He certainly did not dare try such a callow excuse on Char-

## WE WERE NOT MEANT TO KNOW THAT THE U.S. WAS IN VIETNAM AS EARLY AS 1959 OR AS LATE AS 1975

le de Gaulle. And indeed, the proponent of secret deals with China was in no very strong position to claim that he was combating Communism in general. No, it all came down to "credibility" and to the spring of face. It is known that 25,763 Americans, 109,230 South Vietnamese, and 496,260 North Vietnamese servicemen lost their lives in Indochina between the day that Nixon and Kissinger took office and the day in 1975 that they withdrew American forces and accepted the logic of 1968. Must the families of these citizens confront the fact that the chief "fears" at risk were those of Nixon and Kissinger?

Thus the colloquially titled "Johnson bombing" of North Vietnam, continued after the election had been won, must be counted as a war crime by any standard. The bombing was not conducted for anything that could be described as "military reasons" but for twofold political ones. The first of these was domestic: a show of strength to extremists in Congress and a means of putting the Democratic Party on the defensive. The second was to persuade South Vietnamese leaders such as President Thieu—whose intransigence had been encouraged by Kissinger in the first place—that their objections to American withdrawal were too nervous. This, again, was the mortgage on the initial secret payment of 1968.

When the irreparable collapse occurred in Cambodia and Vietnam, in April and May 1975, the cost was infinitely higher than it would have been seven years previously. These seven years ended as they had begun—with a display of bravado and deceit. On May 12, 1975, in the immediate aftermath of the Phnom Penh seizure of power,

Comfouan warboats destined an American merchant vessel named the *Mayaguez*. The ship was stopped in international waters claimed by Cambodia and then taken to the Cambodian island of Koh Tang. In spite of reports that the crew had been released, Kissinger pressed for an immediate face-saving and "credibility"-enhancing strike. He persuaded President Gerald Ford, the quoted and understanding successor to his deposed former boss, to send in the Marines and the Air Force. Out of a Marine force of 130, 18 were killed and 50 were wounded. Twenty-two Air Force men died in a crash. The United States used a 15,000-ton bomb on the island, the most powerful parachute device that it possessed. Nobody has the figures for Cambodian deaths. The casualties were pointless, because the ship's capture of the *Mayaguez* was to show on Koh Tang, having been released some hours earlier. A subsequent congressional inquiry found that Kissinger could have known of this by learning to Cambodian broadcasting or by paying attention to a third-party government that had been negotiating a deal for the restitution of the crew and the ship. It was not as if any Cambodians doubted, by that month of 1975, the willingness of the U.S. government to employ deadly force.

In Washington, D.C., there is a famous and hollowed memorial to the American dead of the Vietnam War. Known as the "Vietnam Veterans Memorial," it bears a name that is slightly misleading. I was present for the extremely affecting moment of its dedication in 1982 and noticed that the list of nearly 60,000 names is inscribed in the wall not by alphabet but by date. The first few names appear in 1959 and the last few in 1975. The more historically minded visitors can sometimes be heard to say that they didn't know the United States was engaged in Vietnam as early as or as late as that. Nor was the public supposed to know. The first names are of the covert operatives, sent in by Colonel Edward Lansdale without congressional approval to support French colonialism. The last names are of those thrown away in the *Mayaguez* fiasco. It took Henry Kissinger to ensure that a war of attrition, which he had helped to provoke, should end so furiously and ignominiously as it had begun.

## A SAMPLE OF CASES: KISSINGER'S WAR CRIMES IN INDOCHINA

Some statements are too blunt for everyday, consensual discourse. In national "debate," it is the unthoughtful pelt that are customarily gathered from the stream and used as projectiles. They leave less of a scar, even when they hit. Occasionally, however, a single hard-edged remark will inflict a deep and jagged wound.

It is so easy that it must be mentioned at once. In January 1971 there was a considered statement from General Taylor, who had been chief U.S. prosecuting counsel at the Nuremberg trials, flouting the legal and moral basis of those hearings, and also the Tokyo trials of Japanese war criminals and the Manila trial of Emperor Hirohito's chief instigator, General Yamashita Tomemura. Taylor said that if the standards of Nuremberg and Manila were applied evenly, and applied to the American statesmen and businessmen who designed the war in Vietnam, then "there would be a very strong possibility that they would come to the same end [Yamashita] did." It is not every day that a senior American soldier and jurist delivers the opinion that a large portion of his country's political class should probably be beheaded and bludgeoned and dropped through a trapdoor at the end of a rope.

In his book *Nuremberg and Vietnam*, General Taylor also anticipated one of the possible objections to this legal and moral conclusion. It might be argued for the defense, he said, that these arraigned did not really know what they were doing in other words, that they had achieved the lesser results but from the highest and most innocent motives. The notion of Indochina as some House of Darkness "gameboard" of ignorant men has been widely propagated, then and since, in order to make such a sophism appear plausible. Taylor had no patience with such a view. American military and intelligence and economic and political tents had been in Vietnam, he wrote, for much too long to attribute anything they did "to lack of information." It might have been possible for soldiers and diplomats to pose as innocents until the middle of the 1960s, but after that time, and especially after the My Lai massacre of March 16, 1968, when serving veterans reported major atrocities to their superior officers, nobody could reasonably claim to have been uninformed, and of those who could, the least believable would be those who—far from the confusion of battle—stood and discussed and approved the punitive reports of the war that were delivered to Washington.

General Taylor's book was being written while many of the most reprehensible events of the Indochina war were still taking place, or still to come. He was unaware of the intensity and extent of, for example, the bombing of Laos and Cambodia, though was known about the conduct of the war, however, and about the extreme matrix of legal and criminal responsibility for him to arrive at some indefatigable conclusions. The



First of those witnessed the particular obligation of the United States to be aware of, and to respect, the Nuremberg principles:

Military courts and tribunals have customarily rendered their judgments stark and unspiced, and by representing the reasons for their decisions. The Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments, in contrast, were all based on extensive evidence detailing the evidence and considering the factual and legal issues, in the fashion of appellate tribunals generally. Nevertheless, every day they were part of a broader reality, and it was reflected the legal and moral dimensions of the war, the marks of which commonly mark the progress of multi-trial tribunals. But the process was performed in a way seldom achieved in military courts, and the records and judgments in these trials provided a model, needed foundation for a corpus of judge-made international penal law. The results of the trials commanded themselves to the newly formed United Nations, and in Dec. 11, 1946, the General Assembly adopted a resolution affirming "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."

However history may ultimately consider and so

REUTERS PHOTOGRAPH  
CITY OF HOUEI, SOUTH  
VIETNAM, AFTER  
BOMBING BY AIR FORCE  
COMBATANTS, 1968

consciousness of the war crime trials, one thing is indisputable. As their conclusion, the United States Government must legally, politically and morally be committed to the principles stated in the charges and judgments of the tribunals. The President of the United States, on the recommendations of the Departments of State, War and Justice, approved the war crime program. Thirty or more American judges, drawn from the appellate benches of the states from Massachusetts to Oregon, and Minnesota to Georgia, conducted the later Nuremberg trials and wrote the opinions. General Douglas MacArthur, under authority of the Far Eastern Commission, established the Tokyo tribunal and enforced its sentences imposed, and it was under his authority as the highest American military officer in



RICHARD NIXON AND  
HENRY KISSINGER  
WITH ALEXANDER  
HAIG AT CAMP DAVID,  
1977

the Far East that the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings were held. The United States delegation to the United Nations presented the resolution by which the General Assembly mandated the Nuremberg trials.

Thus, the integrity of the nation is taken on these principles, and today the question is how they apply to our conduct of the war in Vietnam, and whether the United States Government is prepared to face the consequences of their application.

Facing and rejecting these responsibilities himself, General Taylor took issue with another United States officer, Colonel William Carson, who had written that

"[revelation of the existence of . . . the My Lai courts-martial and other legal actions, the police capacity for American judgment as to the effective prosecution of the war was badly shaken beginning to yield and that the objectives, alleged or otherwise, are a result of a failure of judgment, not criminal behavior."

To this Taylor responded:

Colonel Carson concludes, I fear, that negligent homicide is generally a crime of bad judgment rather than will intent. Perhaps he is right in the strictly moral sense that if there had been no failure of

judgment, the occasion for criminal conduct would not have arisen. The Germans in occupied Europe made gross crimes of judgment which cost lives and the conditions in which the slaughter of the inhabitants of Elmhurst in Czech village annihilated during the Occupation occurred, but that did not make the killing any the less criminal.

Referring this question to the chain of command in the field, General Taylor noted further that the senior officer corps had been

over- or less consciously in Vietnam, and splendidly equipped with helicopters and other aircraft, which gave them a degree of mobility unprecedented in earlier wars, and consequently endowed them with every opportunity to keep the course of the fighting and its consequences under close and constant observation. Communications were generally rapid and efficient, so that the flow of information and orders was unimpeded.

These circumstances are in sharp contrast to those that confronted General Yamashita in 1944 and 1945, with his responsibility for the loss of the American military POWs. But failure to control his forces as to protect the atrocities they committed, Brig. Gen. Hiram B. Delaney and Major Hirschfeld and Maj. Gen. James A. Lester, Lee Donagan and Russell P. Bennett found him guilty of violating the laws of war and sentenced him to death by hanging.

But did General Taylor omit the crucial link between the military command and its political supervision, again a much closer and more intimate relationship in the American-Vietnamese instance than in the Japanese-Filipino one, as the regular contact between, say, General Clough and Adams and Henry Kissinger and others show.

How much the President and his close advisors in the White House, Pentagon and Fanny Rotten knew about the violence and more of civilian casualties in Vietnam, and the planned decimation of the countryside, is speculation. Something was known, for the late John McNaughton (then Assistant Secretary of Defense) returned from the White House one day in 1967 with the message that "We seem to be proceeding on the assumption that the way to pacify the Vietnam is to destroy all the village structures, eliminate all the jungles, and then cover the entire surface of South Vietnam with asphalt."

This was reflected (by Lyndon and Hiram, a political antagonist of General Taylor's) before that outposts had been extended into other new countries, Laos and Cambodia, without a declaration of war, a notification to Congress, or a warning to civilians to evacuate. But Taylor misinterpreted the Kissinger case in many ways when he recalled the mind of the Japanese strategist Koki Hiroba, who served briefly as Prime Minister and for several years as Foreign Minister between 1933 and May, 1938, after which he held no office whatever. The

so-called "rape of Nanking" by Japanese forces occurred during the winter of 1937-38, when Hiroba was Foreign Minister. Upon receiving early reports of the atrocities, he demanded and received assurances from the War Ministry that they would be stopped. But they continued, and the Tokyo tribunal found Hiroba guilty because he was "deaf" in his duty in not insisting before the Chinese that immediate action be taken to put an end to the atrocities, and "was content to rely on assurances which he knew were not being implemented." On this basis, coupled with his conviction on the aggression war charge, Hiroba was sentenced to be hanged.

Melvin Laird, as secretary of defense during the first Nixon Administration, was open enough about the early beatings of Cambodia, and the businessmen about the legality or prudence of the intervention, to send a memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking "Are steps being taken, on a continuing basis, to maximize the risk of striking Cambodian people and structures? If so, what are the steps? Are we reasonably sure such steps are effective?" The evidence has surfaced that Henry Kissinger, as national security adviser or secretary of state, ever sought even such modest assurances. Indeed, there is much evidence of his deceiving Congress as to the true extent to which such assurances as were offered were deliberately false. Others involved—such as Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to both Kennedy and Johnson, and William Colby—have since offered canopies of apology or exoneration or at least explanation. Henry Kissinger, never General Taylor, described the practice of strikes against habitats suspected of "harboring" Vietnamese guerrillas as "flagrant violations of the Geneva Convention on Civilian Protection, which prohibits destruction penalties, and 'attacks against protected persons,' and equally in violation of the Rules of Land Warfare." He was writing before this atrocious precedent had been extended to reprisal raids that treated two whole countries—Laos and Cambodia—as if they were desirable habitats.

For Henry Kissinger, no great believer in the broasted claims of the war makers in the first place, a special degree of responsibility attaches. Not only did he have good reason to know that held noncombatants were exaggerating successes and claiming all dead to be enemy soldiers—a commonplace piece of knowledge after the spring of 1968—but he also knew that the issue of the war had been settled politically and diplomatically, for all intents and purposes, before he became national security adviser. Thus he had to know that every additional country, on either side, was not just a death but an avoidable death. With this knowledge, and with a strong sense of the domestic and personal political profit, he

urged the expansion of the war into two neutral countries—enduring international law—while pending in a breathtakingly high level of attrition in Vietnam itself.

For a huge roster of possible examples, I have chosen cases that involve Kissinger directly and in which I have myself been able to interview surviving witnesses. The first, as introduced above, is Operation "Speedy Express."

My friend and colleague Kevin Buckley, then a much admired correspondent and liaison bureau chief in Nonsuch, became interested in the "pacification" campaign that bore this bloody code name. Designed in the closing days of the Johnson-Liberal Administration, it was put in full effect in the last six months of 1969, when Henry Kissinger had assumed much authority over the conduct of the war. The objective was the American discipline, on behalf of the Thieu government, of the subversive Mekong Delta province of Kien Hoa.

On January 22, 1968, Robert McNamara had told the Senate that "no regular North Vietnamese units" were deployed in the Delta, and no military intelligence documents have surfaced to

## KISSINGER HAD TO KNOW THAT EVERY CASUALTY IN INDOCHINA AFTER 1968 WAS AVOIDABLE

undermine his claim, so that the cleaning of the area cannot be understood as part of the general argument about resisting Hanoi's sweeping will to conquer. The announced purpose of the North Division's sweep, indeed, was to reduce many thousands of villagers from political control by the National Liberation Front (NLF), or "Vietcong" (V.C.). As Buckley found, and as his magazine, *foreword*, partially disclosed at the rather late date of June 19, 1971,

All the evidence gathered pointed to a clear conclusion: a staggering number of enemy-subjected civilians—perhaps as many as 10,000 according to one official—were killed by U.S. troops or by "pacifists" Kien Hoa. The death toll alone made the My Lai massacre look trifling by comparison.

The North Vietnamese had had little opportunity right in second advantage to reward the heavily populated countryside, but contact with the civilian masses was rare. Thus, in its pursuit of pacification, the Division relied heavily on its strike force, 300 helicopters (accompanying each unit) and 100 ground and the deadly support unit by the Air Force. There were 3,300 tactical air units by higher headquarters "Speedy Express."

"Death is our business and business is good," was the slogan painted on the helicopters' tail rotors.

during the operation, and so it was. Corroborative statistics for "Speedy Express" show that 10,891 "enemies" were killed. In the month of March alone, "over 1,000 enemy troops were killed... which is the highest monthly total for any American division in the Vietnam War," said the division's official magazine. When asked to account for the enormous body counts, a division spokesman explained that helicopters gas, stress often caused "unnatural" deaths in open fields.

There is overwhelming evidence that virtually all the Viet Cong were well armed. Simple civilians were, of course, not armed. And the enormous discrepancy between the body count (11,000) and the number of captured weapons (749) is hard to ex-

plain—except by those who were conducting it. As one American official put it to Buckley:

"The actions of the Ninth Division in inflicting civilian casualties were some [than My Lai]. The main point of what the 9th did was overreaching. In fact, the horror was worse than My Lai. For with the 9th, the civilian casualties came in drobbles and were piled up over a long time. And most of them were collected from the air and at night. Also, they were sanctioned by the command's insistence on high body counts.... The result was an inevitable outcome of the unit's command policy."

The earlier sweep that had snipped up My Lai—during Operation "Wheeler Wolfpack"—had also at the time counted all corpses as those of enemy soldiers, including the civilian population of the village, who were casually included in the mind-bending overall total of 10,000.

Confronted with this evidence, Buckley and Shostkin abandoned a key and customary usage and replaced it, in a cable to Newsweek headquarters in New York, with a more telling and scathing one. The problem, said not "indiscriminate use of firepower" but "charges of quite disproportionate use—as a matter of policy in particular areas." Even the former allegation is a gross violation of the Geneva Convention; the second charge leads straight to the dock at Nuremberg or The Hague.

Since General Creighton Abrams publicly praised the Ninth Division for its work, and drew attention wherever and whenever he could to the tremendous success of Operation "Speedy Express," we can be sure that the political leadership in Washington saw our attack. Indeed, the degree of micromanagement revealed in Kissinger's memoir quite forbids the idea that anything of importance took place without his knowledge or permission.

Of nothing is this more true than his own individual involvement in the bombing and invasion of neutral Cambodia and Laos. Obsessed with the idea that Vietnamese insurgency could be traced to offices or resources external to Vietnam, itself, or could be overcome by tactics of mass destruction, Kissinger at one point contemplated using thermobaric weapons to obliterate the pass through which ran the railroad link from North Vietnam to China, and at another more considered bombing the dike that prevented North Vietnam's irrigation system from flooding the country. Neither of these measures (reported respectively in Ted Gurd's history of Nixon-era diplomacy, *The House of Peace*, and by Kissinger's former aide Roger Morton) was taken, which removes some potential war crimes from our bill of indictment but which also gives an indication of the regime's mentality. There

remained Cambodia and Laos, which supposed to be controlled or protected by North Vietnamese supply lines.

As in the cases postulated by General Telford Taylor, there is the same of aggressive war and then there is the question of war crimes. In the postwar period, or the period governed by the UN, Chamber and its related and incorporated conventions, the United States under Democratic and Republican administrations had denied even its closest allies the right to invade countries that allegedly gave shelter to their antagonists. Most famously, President Eisenhower exerted economic and diplomatic pressure at a high level to bring an end to the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel in October 1956. (The British thought Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser should not control "their" Suez Canal, the French believed Nasser to be the inspiration and source of their troubles in Algeria, and the Israelis claimed that he played the same role in preventing their difficulties with the Palestinians.) The United States maintained that even if these propaganda fantasies were true, they would not retrospectively legitimize an invasion of Egypt. Having the Algerian war of independence, the United States had also uprooted France's claimed right to attack a town in neighboring Tunisia that succeeded Algerian guerrillas, and in 1964, at the United Nations, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had condemned the United Kingdom for attacking a town in Yemen that allegedly provided a rear guard for rebels operating in its territory of Aden.

All this law and precedent was to be thrown to the winds when Nixon and Kissinger decided to upend the notion of "hot pursuit" across the borders of Laos and Cambodia. As William Shawcross reported in his 1979 book, *Sideshow*, even before the actual incursion into Cambodia, for example, and very soon after the accession of Jimmy Carter to power, a program of heavy bombardment of the country was proposed and executed in secret. One mafia with some invasion call for "waves" of bombardments, more the risk money for the raids were "Breakfast," "Lunch," "Snack," "Dinner," and "Dinner." The raids were done by B-52 bombers, which, as is important to note, fly at an altitude too high to be observed from the ground and carry massive warheads of high-explosive that give no warning of approach and are incapable of accuracy or discrimination. Between March 1969 and May 1970, 15,832 such raids were flown across the Cambodian frontier. The bombing campaign began as it was to go on—with full knowledge of its effect on civilians and innocent deaths by Mr. Kissinger in this precise respect.

To this, a two-paragraph prepared by the joint

Chiefs of Staff and sent to the Defense Department and the White House stated plainly that "some Cambodian casualties would be sustained in the operation" and that "the surprise effect of attack could tend to increase casualties." The target district for "Breakfast" (Base Area 253) was adjacent, explained the memo, to about 1,640 Cambodian civilians, "Lunch" (Base Area 608), to 196 of them, "Snack" (Base Area 351), to 333, "Dinner" (Base Area 352), to 270 and "Dinner" (Base Area 150), to about 120 Cambodian peasants. These oddly exact figures are enough in themselves to demonstrate that Kissinger must have been lying when he later told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that areas of Cambodia selected for bombing were "unpopulated."

As a result of the expanded and intensified bombing campaign, it has been officially estimated that as many as 350,000 civilians in Laos



and 600,000 in Cambodia lost their lives. (These are just the highest estimates.) Figures for refugees are several multiples of that. In addition, the widespread use of toxic chemical defoliants caused a massive health crisis that not only fell most heavily on children, causing leukemia, the aged, and the already infirm. That crisis persists to this day.

Although this appalling war, and insupportable consequences, can and should be taken as a moral and political crisis for American institutions, let at least five United States presidents, and for American society, there is little difficulty in identifying individual responsibility during that, in most situations and indisputable cases. Richard Nixon, as commander in chief, bears ultimate responsibility and only narrowly escaped a congressional move to include his crimes and disappointments in Indochina in the

THE NEW YORKER  
MAY 1970  
1008

## THE CHARGE OF KNOWINGLY KILLING CIVILIANS LEADS STRAIGHT TO THE DOCK AT NUREMBERG OR THE HAGUE

plains—except by the conclusion that many victims were innocent innocent civilians.

The people who still live to tell the story know all too well the devastation that American firepower brought to their lives in early 1969. Virtually every person to whom I spoke had suffered at one way. "There were 5,000 people in my village before 1969, but there were none in 1970," one village elder told me. "The Americans destroyed every house with artillery, air strikes, or by burning them down with napalm bombs. About 100 people were killed by bombing, others were wounded and others became refugees. Many were children killed by napalm from the boats which their small bodies could not withstand, even if they were hiding underground."

Other officials, including the village police chief, corroborated the man's testimony. I could not, of course, reach every village. But in each of the many places where I went, the testimony was the same: 100 killed here, 100 killed there.

Other sources by Buckley and his friend and collaborator Alex Shostkin (a worker for International Voluntary Services who was later killed in the war) discovered the same evidence in hospital statistics. In March 1969, the hospital at Ban Th reported 343 patients injured by "friendly" fire and 25 by "the enemy," an astonishing statistic for a government facility to record in a guerrilla war in which suspected treachery in the Viets could mean death. And Buckley's own notation for his magazine—of "perhaps as many as 5,000" deaths among civilians in this one sweep—is not alone a deliberate understatement of what he was told by a United States official, who actually said that "at least 5,000" of the dead "were what we refer to as non-combatants"—a not too exacting distinction, as we have already seen, and as you by then will understand, hardly none.

Well understood, that is to say, not just by



plans. He then put Pete Rolando on the line. "The President wants you to know if this doesn't work for you, it's now or never. And it's right, babe!" shared the commander in chief. (The conversation was monitored and transcribed by one of Kissinger's secretaries staffed. William Wells Jr. could be said that in this instance the national security was more under considerable pressure; nevertheless, he took the side of the pre-transition function and, according to the memoirs of General William

A somewhat kinder picture is presented by James chief of staff H. B. Holden in his *Diaries*. On November 11, 1970, he records

In his White House Years, Keating claims that he warped the customary chain of command whereby commanders in the field receive, or believe that they receive, their orders from the president and that the secretary of defense. He insists

Mixxit day. Kibitzer's "Cigarette Breakdown"  
 Really came off as J&K's own zone  
 Kibitzer really enjoyed it was thorough.

Hispanic's "Chicano Nation" a great success. He came bounding in with songs, one another.

The story is an episode in the Iron Chancellor. When Kissinger was finally expelled from Congress and the press for conducting unauthorized briefings, he weakly pleaded that the media were not all his secret, really, because Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia had known of them. He had to be persuaded that a foreigner princeling cannot give permission to an American bureaucrat to violate the United States Constitution. Not for that matter, can he give permission to an American bureaucrat to disregard basic canons of his "own" civility. It's difficult to imagine Kissinger cowering behind such a contemptible excuse. (Prince Sihanouk, it is worth remembering, later became an active puppet of the Khmer Rouge.)

It is therefore imperative for him to claim that he was unaware of the true extent of the fraud.

Chief Justice Sutherland, does recall, it cannot be admitted that Kissinger requested the bombing and the escalation of the Vietnam conflict. His explicit motive in making this request was to avoid or forestall complaints from the government of Prince Sihanouk. But this does not mean in itself that Kissinger did not know that Kissinger was aware of the possibility of escalation. He did. He knew enough to know of their likelihood, and was director of the policies that inflicted them, and therefore author of any actual precipitous and reprehensible act. Violence, then the case against him is legally and morally complete.

was able to make a dramatic appearance on Capitol Hill on April 27, 1971, at a hearing held by Senator Edward Kennedy's subcommittee on religion. His appearance was the State Department's entry, William Sullivan, a former neo-Nazi in Los Angeles, in a crucial line of action of the campaign of helping to conceal evidence that American society was being confronted by the heinous racial bombardment.

Partly as a consequence, Congressman Pete McCloskey of California read a wish in Los Angeles

"THE PRESIDENT WANTS YOU TO  
KNOW IF THIS DOESN'T WORK, HENRY,  
IT'S YOUR ASS." ---BEBE REBOZO

he kept a copy of an internal U.S. Embassy note of the bombing. He also revealed an FBI U.S. Air Force to furnish him with aerial photographs of the damage. Ambassador Sullivan was so disturbed by these pictures, some of them taken at night, that he, too, lost his appetite, was so disturbed by his own suspicions that the raids had occurred after he left his post in Vietnam, (he was later to learn that, for his part, his own telephone was being tapped at Henry Kissinger's instigation, one of the more such violations of American law that were so eventful in the Watergate taping and burglary scandal, a scandal that Kissinger was too the more in place—on an ascending path of vanity, deceit, and self-deceit—than he was able to reflect in the 1974 Clinton case.)

Having done what he could to bring the Nation magazine to the attention of those who considered it a job it was to supervise such question, Fontaine went back to Thailand and then to Boston Park, capital of Cambodia. Having gained access to a pilot's radio, he tape-recorded the conversations between pilots on bombing missions over the Cambodian interior. On no occasion did they run any checks designed to reassure themselves and others that the y were not bombing civilian targets. It had been definitely asserted, by named U.S. government spokesmen, that such checks were run. Fontaine handed the tapes to Sidney Schenberg, whose New York Times report on them was printed just before the Senate vote to prohibit further bombing of Cambodia (the only resolution that was blocked by Keesinger the following month).

From their base in Manila went back to Thailand and traveled north to Bangkok, Phnom, the new headquarters of the U.S. Seventh Air Force. Here, a new name was named Blue Chip, served as the command and control center of the bombing campaign. Gradually, the air force

pose even one recruit just up from Saigon and ultimately wound access to the war room itself. Computers and maps and screens plotted the progress of the bombardment. In conversation with the "bombing officer" on duty, he asked if pilots ever made contact before dropping their enormous loads of ordnance. Oh, yes, he was assured, they did. Were they worried about hitting the incorrect? Oh, no—merely concerned about the whereabouts of CIA "ground teams" infiltrated into the area. Brantison's report on this, which was carried by Jack Anderson's syndicated column, was uncontradicted by any official denial.

One reason that the American command in Southeast Asia finally ceased employing the crude and horrific tactic of "body counts" was that, as in the relatively small but specific case of Operation "Speedy Express" cited above, the figures began to look ominous when they were counted up. Sometimes, totals of "enemy" dead could turn out, when compared, to be significantly larger than the number of claimed "victories" in the field. Yet the war would somehow drag on, with new quantitative goals being set and enforced. Thus, according to the Pentagon, the following are the casualty figures between the first Lyndon Johnson bombing

# KISSINGER OFFHANDLY DESCRIBED CHILE AS "A DANGER POINTED TOWARD THE HEART OF ANTARCTICA"

halt in March 1968 and February 26, 1972:

Americans: 31,305

South Vietnamese regulars: 56,101

"Guns": 473,639

The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Defense estimated that in the same four-year period, rather more than 3 million civilians were killed, injured, or rendered homeless.

In the same four-year period, the United States dropped almost 4,500,000 tons of high explosive on Indochina. (The Pentagon's estimated total for the amount dropped in the entire Second World War is 2,044,000.) This total does not include massive quantities of chemical defoliants and pesticides.

It is unclear how we count the murder in abduction of 55,708 Vietnamese civilians by the CIA's counterinsurgency "Phoenix program" during the first two and a half years of the Nixon-Kissinger Administration. There may be some "overlap." There is also some overlap with the actions of previous administrations in all cases. But the truly exorbitant death tolls all occurred on Henry Kissinger's watch, were known and un-

derstood by him, were presented to Congress, the press, and the public by him and were, when questioned, the subject of political and bureaucratic vetoing ordered by him. They were also partly the outcome of a secretive and illegal process in Washington, unknown even to most Cabinet members, of which Henry Kissinger stood to be, and became, a prime beneficiary.

On that closing point one may once again cite H. R. Haldeman, who had no further reason to be and who had, by the time of his writing, paid for his crimes by serving a sentence in prison. Haldeman describes the comment in Florida when Kissinger was enraged by a New York Times story telling some part of the truth about Indochina:

Henry telephoned I. Edgar Hoover in Washington from Key Biscayne on the May morning the Times story appeared.

According to Hoover's notes of the call, Henry said the story read "correct information which was extremely damaging." Henry went on to tell Hoover that he "wondered whether I could make a major effort to find out where that came from...and to put someone resources I need to find out who did this. I told him I would take care of this right away."

Henry was no fool, of course. He telephoned Hoover a few hours later to remind him that the investigation he handled discreetly "as everyone will get out." Hoover must have smiled, but said all right. And by five o'clock he was back on the telephone to Henry with the report that the Times reporter "may have gotten some of his information from the Southeast Asian desk of the Department of Defense's Public Affairs Office." More specifically, Hoover suggested the source could be a man named Mort Halperin (a Kissinger staffer) and another man who worked in the Systems Analysis Agency....According to Hoover's notes, Kissinger "thumped I would follow it up as far as we can take it and they will learn, whoever did this if we can find him, no matter where he is."

The last line of that coming gives us an accurate reflection of Henry's rage, as I remember it.

Nevertheless, Nixon was one hundred percent behind the wiretaps. And I was, too.

And so the program started, inspired by Henry's rage but ordered by Nixon, who soon broadened it even further to include neocons. Eventually, everyone people were wrapped by the FBI including someone Kissinger's "MR." staff and those on the White House staff.

And thus the birth of the "plumbers" and of the assault on American law and democracy that they inaugurated. Commenting on the lamentable end of this process, Haldeman wrote that he still believed that ex-president Nixon (who was then still alive) should agree, to the release of the remaining tapes. But:

This firing was not opportunist nor shared by the man who was our master for the longest duration

to start the entire process. Henry Kissinger is determined to stop the tapes from reaching the public....

Nixon made the point that Kissinger was really the one who had the most to lose from the tapes becoming public. Henry apparently felt that the tapes would expose a lot of things he had said that would be very disadvantageous to him publicly.

Nixon said that in making the deal for custody of the Presidential papers, which was originally announced after his pardon for there was still doubt by Congress, that it was Henry who called him and insisted on Nixon's right to destroy the tapes. That was, of course, the thought that dominated the deal.

A society that has been "plumbed" has the right to demand that its phobots be compelled to make some restitution by way of full disclosure. The litigation to open the Nixon tapes to the public must be only partially complete, no truthful account of the Vietnam years will be made without Kissinger's part in what we already know has been made fully transparent.


Most that time, Kissinger's role in the violation of American law at the close of the Vietnam War makes the perfect counterpart to the 1968 covert action that helped him to power in the last place. The two paragraphs enclose a series of paranoid war crimes that still have power to stir the imagination.

## CHILE (PART II): STATESMAN AS HITMAN

In a famous expression of his contempt for democracy, Kissinger once observed that he was uncertain why a certain country should be allowed to "go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." The country concerned was Chile, which at the time of this remark had a polished reputation as the most highly evolved glacial democracy in the Southern Hemisphere of the Americas. The phrase also translated, in the years of the Cold War, into an acronym that stood about one-third anticommunist, one-third socialist and Communist, and one-third Christian Democratic and centrist. This had made it relatively easy to keep the Marxist element from having its turn in government, and ever since 1962 the CIA had—as it had in Italy and other comparable nations—largely cuttowed itself with funding the religious element. In September 1970, however, the left's candidate actually gained a slight plurality of 361 percent in the presidential election. Divisions on the right, and the adherence of some smaller right-wing Christian parties to the left, made it a moral certainty that the Chilean Congress would, after the traditional sixty-day inauguration, elect Dr. Salvador Allende as the next president. But the very name of Allende was

anathema to the extreme right in Chile, to certain powerful corporations (notably ITT, Pepsi-Cola, and the Chase Manhattan Bank) that did business in Chile and the United States, and to the U.S.A.

This heading quickly communicated itself to President Nixon. He was personally beholden to Donald Kendall, the president of Pepsi-Cola, who had given him his first international account when, as a failed politician, he had joined a Wall Street law firm. A series of Washington meetings, within eleven days of Allende's election victory, eventually settled the fate of Chilean democracy. After discussions with Kendall, with



David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan, and with CIA director Richard Helms, Kissinger went with Helms to the Oval Office. Helms's notes of the meeting show that Nixon wanted little breath in making his wishes known. Allende was not to assume office. "Not concerned risks involved. No involvement of embassy. \$100,000 available, more if necessary. Full-time job—best team we have.... Make the economy worse, 48 hours for plan of action."

Declassified documents show that Kissinger—who had previously neither known nor cared about Chile, describing it offhandedly as "a dot on a pointed at the heart of Antarctica"—took seriously disclosure of his plans to the press. A group was set up in London, Virginia, with the express purpose of running a "press check" policy for Chile, over the estimable diplomats, one and the others—unknown to the State Department or the U.S. ambassador to Chile, General Henry—a strategy of



6. PLEASE REVIEW ALL YOUR PRESENT AND PENDING BUSINESS ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE PROMAGANDA, BLACK OPERATIONS, SURFACING OF MISFEASANCE OR MISAPPROPRIATE FINANCIAL OPERATIONS OR ANYTHING

5. It was decided by these persons that the Agency



THAT THEY MAY ACT IN EXPERT EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER 24 OCTOBER." (Italics added.) The last three stipulations are an entirely accurate, not to say pertinent, description of what Viann actually did.

4) Casualty again the cable received by Henry Kissinger on October 20, referring to sources quoted "from high levels" about the fate of the failed attacks on Schneider. Thomas Karn-mann, when questioned by the Senate Intelligence Committee about the same phase in a similar cable sent to another CIA agent in Santiago, testified of his certainty that the same "high levels" referred directly to Kissinger. In all previous communications from Washington, as a glance above will show, that had indeed been the case. This on its own is enough to establish Kissinger's claim to have "turned off" "track two" (and its inferior tracks) on October 15.

5) Ambassador Edward Korry later made the obvious point that Kissinger was attempting to build a paper shield in the event of a failure by the Viann group: "His interest was not in Chile but in who was going to be blamed for what. He wanted me to be the one who took the heat. Henry didn't want to be associated with a failure, and he was trying up a second to blame the State Department. He brought me in to the President because he wanted me to say what I had to say about Viann; he wanted me to be the soft man."

The concept of "deniability" was not as well understood in Washington in 1973 as it has since become. But it is clear that Henry Kissinger wanted two things simultaneously: He wanted the removal of General Schneider, by any means and employing any proxy. (No instruction from Washington to leave Schneider unharmed was ever given; deadly weapons were sent by diplomatic pouch, and men of violence were carefully selected to execute them.) And he wanted to be out of the picture in case such an attempt might fail, or be uncovered. These are the normal motives of anyone who solicits or suborns murder. Kissinger, however, needed the crime very slightly more than he needed, or was able to design, the deniability. Without waiting for his many hidden papers to be released or subpoenaed, we can say with safety that he is *prima facie* guilty of direct collusion in the murder of a constitutional officer in a democratic and powerful country.

#### CONTEMPORARY LANDSCAPE

Two well-worked and separate but consistent styles may be noticed in Kissinger's successive, sergenty encounters with Indochina and Chile: in the first instance, a mega-style, replete with overblown operatic effects on his part and grand, terrifying consequences for others in the second

instance, a mega-style, involving an obsessive, almost busy manipulation of media forces. The two practices are actually quite congruent, and there is an obvious relation between the gross and comprehensive violence of the first case and the intimate and personal cruelty of the second.

In Indochina, the mega-scale of mass murder also required much individual fencing, the ruthless flustering of numerous secret committees, and the smiling betrayal of several associates. In Chile, the mega-scale of assassination assassination was paradoxically conceived with a certain grandeur, the objective being the destabilization of an entire government and, ultimately, the teaching of a sharp pedagogical lesson to a whole subcontinent.

In the March issue of *Harper's Magazine*, we shall again encounter these two contrasting but symmetrical tropes. In Chile, the destruction of an economy, a president, and a constitution is followed by the knowing extension of the "death squad" system across the Southern Cone. Venezuela, in other words—against Schneider and Allende—will never be realpolitik. In Bangladesh, it is calmly decided that the lives of millions of Bengalis are expendable: they are the price of a glorifying photo-op in Beijing, the returning of a loan to a military dictator, and payment for an old personal resentment by Kissinger's boss. Since the victim cannot be forgiven, the grudge is born passed on to the threshold of assassination and beyond. In Cyprus, a favored right is lost from an elected but inexperienced leader is enough to set the machinery of designated murder and other geopolitical "destabilization" clanking again: out of a perceived offense to power comes a bitter war and a continuing tragedy. In East Timor, an uncontrollable hill of copper resources that a covert and illegal handshake between Henry Kissinger and a bismarckian despot may be leveraged. While in Washington, D.C., a loose network catches and offends the world's childless eye and nearly loses both liberty and life as a consequence.

Finally—and in the most splendid illustration of the obscure connection between the vastly lethal and the merely paltry—we discover Henry Kissinger plotting explicitly as a private man from the crimes he committed as a public one. The main image of the "revolving door" is inadequate to depict the gross and grotesque of influence, as it generates misery and homicide in one corner and personal gain in another. Now that both corners can be illuminated, it has become both possible and necessary to set up the legal case against this person, a case that unsurprisingly consists of gross violations of broad international laws and de-liberate, manipulative, sleazebag branches of fiscal and national laws.

This is, in both declarations—and in both senses—an American responsibility.

## ONE ACRE

On devaluing real estate  
to keep land priceless

By Joy Williams

I had an acre in Florida, on a house-  
close by the Gulf of Mexico.

I am admirably partial this first line up against Jack Dawson's famous *casual* case: *I had a farm in Africa, at the foot of the Orange Hills*. When Dine-  
sen first came to Africa she confessed that she could not "live without get-  
ting a few specimens of such single kind of African game." For her the farm  
was an extended image of desire, "a love affair," whereas the "farm" was in  
reality a declaration of love. She must have blushed to read this stated bar-  
ter, for after ten years she found hunting "an unexcusable thing, indeed in-  
heredently and wrong, for the sake of a few hours enjoyment to put out a life  
thus beloved in the great landscape and had never up on it." One could  
say her thinking had changed, that she had become more conscientious.  
Still, when she was about to leave her beloved farm (the house, empty of  
furniture, was admirable "clean like a skull"), she planned to shoot her doves  
and horses, dispatched into doing so only by the pleas of her friends. The an-  
imals belonged to her, so had the land, which she named to own only when  
it became owned by another, and subject to that person's whims and poli-  
cies. Of course it became hers again, through writing about it, preserving it  
in *Out of Africa*. Once again, *Acres*, reflective poetry, never landscape.

I had an acre in Florida. This looks no dream. For what wonder  
could a single acre hold, what newness or relevance? Although the word  
"Florida" is curious, yes, and thus its own metaphor. It is an occasional  
place, a polished and elegant stage for transients. To hold fast to an acre  
in that can state is almost impossible. An acre is both too much and not  
enough, its value lies in its divisibility, in how many buildings become per-  
mitted in how many persons.

I once saw a white heron in a rambling landscape on the sprawling cap-  
sules of Naples, a rare that roared against the big Cypress National Pre-  
serve and Everglades National Park. The heron seemed to be hunting its  
head against a tree knocked down by lightning to widen a road. Water  
soil lay along the palm-tree-lined path, but pipes would soon carry it

Joy Williams is the author, most recently, of *The Quick and the Dead*, published last  
October by Knopf. A collection of essays, *Ill Nature*, will be published in March. Her  
most recent poem for *Harper's Magazine*, "The Invention of the Animal Troop," ap-  
peared in the August 1987 issue.

THE NOISE WE MAKE IS AN  
ANONYMOUS CHAIN LETTER THAT  
WE MAIL OUT EVERY DAY AND  
THAT COMES BACK WITH  
INTEREST SOONER OR LATER

be as dead as her complaint as she was to his cry. Kids fall all the time, right? From London, Jane Moore wrote me a letter about a friend who moved out of town because she was dying of cancer and the motorcycle noise was making the process more painful. And I imagined the same cynical voice responding, "Let me get this straight. You need quiet to die!"

Actually, the time may be coming when you will not even need quiet to be dead. A German media artist who finds the notion of a quiet grave "ridiculous" has recently created an exhibit of vocal torbomones, one of which "moans lustfully" when struck. I find myself thinking about the morning toiletstone whenever someone tells me, with a faith so innocent it can bring tears to your eyes, how Technology (invoked with a capital T) is going to be our solution to the noise problem. Of course it can be, with marvelous results. In Europe, where noise reduction has a much higher place on the political agenda than it does here, roads are being built that reduce traffic noise by as much as 70 percent. Even the Haders exported to Europe are designed to run quieter and, as an unintended result of such tinkering, turn out to have even more horsepower than their huggish American cousins. Mechanical noise, after all, is an inefficient loss of energy (though many American consumers still equate louder volume with higher performance). So it is sometimes possible, with a little know-how, to have the best of both worlds. But for every noise we quiet, we produce another. Most of all, we continue to produce a false sense of virtual quiet by distancing ourselves from the serial noise we make. This is the ultimate form of "civilized" nobility: the removal of my actions from their effects. I don't have to hear the printing presses that publish my words, the strip-mining equipment that feeds my computer. For a writer, you see, I practice a quiet occupation. Technology has carried that old suspicious adage about not shirking where you eat to a place perilously above suspicion, where highly intelligent people are capable of believing that they don't even shirk where they shirk. When I tried to suggest as much to some of the noisier and slozier in the noise movement—for instance, to the consultant for an airport noise group who told me that he logs 75,000 flight miles a year in his work—the response I got was often a hicch. Perhaps this was due to the understandable fear that someone already in danger of being branded a crank might also be branded a Luddite. But perhaps it rather had to do with a deal already struck with the successful manufacture of the first mud brick some nine or ten millennia ago. As the consultant told me, "The absolutist approach [i.e., the one I had just proposed to him] says we must change the way we live... but no one's going to stop the growth of cities. Why tilt at windmills you can't defeat? I wouldn't want to stop the evolution of our science, even though there are going to be losers."

So in the end the most common disturbance of the peace (or the most typical response to the complaint of those disturbed) may be nothing else but the hazy form of a more discreet and unlearned common-sense, the signed version of an anonymous chain letter that the rest of us mail out every day and that comes back with interest to everybody's mailbox sooner or later. (And sooner than later will be able to announce its arrival by nooning lustfully.) When this essay is done, for example, I will send it to New York City overnight mail because it absolutely positively has to be there, and because the other pursuits of my have-it-all life will undoubtedly push the project too close to its deadline. Overnight mail is only possible with overnight flight, which has made no small contribution to the 2,156 percent increase in air cargo traffic since 1980. Sometime in the night the plane carrying my little meditation on noise will fly over someone's roof, waking her in her aged totter or her colicky three-month-old from a sound sleep. Waking her robe furiously around herself, perhaps going so far as to light a cigarette with her trembling fingers, she will curse that plane, and, to some small degree that I cannot gauge and can never hear, she will be cursing me. And those cranky old gods of Summer and Winter, long since dead if not dead, will do no more than I will to help.

# THE CASE AGAINST HENRY KISSINGER

## PART TWO

Crimes against humanity  
By Christopher Hitchens

On the twentieth of December 2030, as the first part of this article was being readied for publication, we contacted Henry Kissinger's office, stipulating our areas of interest and requesting an interview. Receiving no direct response from him, we wrote again and graciously offered to match the usual standards fee that he charges for making pronouncements. This elicited only a pompous letter from a hitherto, and we were left to assume that there are some subjects Kissinger prefers not to discuss, not even for ready money.

Whether or not their perpetration rates to comment on them, the crimes discussed in Part I—the havoc visited on Indonesian civilians, the illegal subversion practiced on Cuban democracy—did in fact occur, and they set the tone for the remainder of his time in office. The murder of General René Schneider was soon eclipsed by coup and mass genocides in Chile and the Southern Hemisphere. And the same poor print of unchecked power was to be found in Cyprus and Greece, in Bangladesh and East Timor, in the succeeding years. These are not, as is now claimed, the results of geopolitical forces for which no one is to blame. They are crimes for which Henry Kissinger is, and should be held, responsible, and they vividly merit an accounting.

### CHILE (PART II): DEATH IN THE SOUTH

On November 9, 1970, Henry Kissinger authored National Security Council Decision Memorandum 93, which reviewed policy toward Chile in the in-

mediate wake of Salvador Allende's confirmation as president. Various working measures of economic harassment were proposed (as per Nixon's instruction to "make the economy scream"), with cutoffs in aid and investment. More significantly, Kissinger advised that "close relations" be maintained with military leaders in neighboring countries, in order to facilitate both the coordination of pressure against Chile and the incubation of opposition within the country. In addition, this prefigures the disclosures that have since been made about Operation "Condor," a secret technique of military dictatorship across the hemisphere, operated with the United States government's knowledge and indulgence.

The actual overthrow of the Allende government in a sanguinary coup d'état took place on September 11, 1973, while Kissinger was going through his own tenure confirmation process as secretary of state. He falsely assured the Foreign Relations Committee that the United States government had played no part in the coup. From a thicket of hard information to the contrary, one might select Strom Thurmond's Nov. 2, from the Navy Section of the United States Military Group in Chile and written by U.S. Naval Attaché Patrick J. Ryan. Mr. Ryan describes his close relationship with the officers engaged in overthrowing the government, both September 11, 1973, as "our D-Day," and observes with satisfaction that "Chile's coup de état [sic] was close to perfect." Or more precisely the declassified files on "Project FULBRIGHT"—the code name under which the CIA, in frequent contact with Kissinger and the

Christopher Hitchens, formerly Washington editor of *Harper's Magazine*, is the author of books on the Cuban crisis, Palestine, Palestine, and the Anglo-American relationship. He is a regular columnist for *Country Party* and *The Nation*.

Committee's coordinated cover operations against the legal and elected government of Chile.

What is striking, and what points to a much more direct complicity in individual crimes against humanity, is the microscopic detail in which Kissinger kept himself informed, after the coup, of Augusto Pinochet's atrocities. On November 16, Assistant Secretary of State Jack R. Korbisch delivered a detailed report on the Chilean junta's excesses policy, which, as he notes in the new secretary, "you requested by cable from Tokyo." The report goes on to enlighten Kissinger in various ways about the first nineteen days of Pinochet's rule. Summary overview during this period, we are told, totaled 320. (This contrasts with the publicly announced total of 100 and is based on "an inserted, confidential report prepared for the junta," to which American officials are evidently privy.) Looking on the bright side,

On November 14, we announced our second CECOM aid to Chile—\$24 million for food items. Our long-standing commitment to sell two surplus bushels to the Chilean navy has not a reasonably successful response to Senate consultations. The Chileans, meanwhile, have sent us several more requests for overpriced military equipment.

Korbisch then raises the awkward question of two American citizens murdered by the junta—Frank Teruggi and Charles Hornon—details of whose precise fate are still, more than a quarter century later, being sought by their families. The reason for the length of the search may be inferred from a telegram, dated February 11, 1974, which reports on a meeting with the junta's foreign minister and notes that Korbisch raises the matter of the missing Americans "in the context of the need to be careful to keep relations stable, issues in our relationship from making our cooperation more difficult."

To return, via this detour, to Operation "Condor": "Condor" was a machinery of cross-border assassination, abduction, torture, and intimidation coordinated among the secret police forces of Pinochet's Chile, Alfredo Stroessner's Paraguay, Jorge Rafael Videla's Argentina, and other regional crackpots. This internationalization of the death-squad principle is now known to have been

1 The JP Committee, named after the *Wall Street Journal* (holding room in which it met, now closed by Kissinger between 1969 and 1979. It maintained ultimate supervisory over U.S. covert actions during this period. For more, see Harper's Magazine, February 2004, page 40.

responsible for the murder of the dissident general Carlos Prats of Chile (and his wife) in Buenos Aires, the murder of the Bolivian general Juan José Torres, also in Argentina, and the maiming of a Christian Democratic Chilean senator, Bernardo Leighton. In Italy, no name only the most silent victims. A "Condor" team also detonated a car bomb in downtown Washington, D.C., in September 1976, killing the former Chilean foreign minister, Orlando Letelier, and his aide, Ronni Moffitt. United States government complicity has been uncovered at every level of this network. It has been established, for example, that the FBI aided Pinochet in capturing Jorge Isaac Fuenzalida Alarcón, who was detained and tortured in Paraguay, then turned over to the Chilean secret police and "disappeared." Astonishingly, the surveillance of Latin American dissident regimes in the United States was promulgated by "Condor" figures by American intelligence.

Stroessner has been overthrown; Videla is in prison; Pinochet and his henchmen are being or have been brought to account in Chile. And what of Kissinger? All of the above-cited crimes, and many more besides, were committed on his "watch" as secretary of state. And all of them were and are punishable under local or international law in both. It can hardly be argued, by himself or by his defenders, that he was indifferent to, or unaware of, the true situation. In 1999 a secret memorandum was declassified, giving excruciating details of a private conversation between Kissinger and Pinochet in Santiago, Chile, on June 8, 1976. The meeting took place the day before Kissinger was due to address the Organization of American States. The subject was human rights. Kissinger was at some pains to explain to Pinochet that the few previous remarks he was to make on that topic were by no means to be taken seriously. My friend Peter Kornblith has performed the service of comparing the "Memorandum of Conversation" with the account of the meeting given by Kissinger himself in his third volume of apologies, *Years of Renewal*.

The Memoir: A considerable amount of time in my dialogue with Pinochet was devoted to human rights, which were, in fact, the principal obstacle to close United States relations with Chile. I outlined the multipoint in my speech to the OAS which I would deliver the next day. Pinochet made no comment.

The Memoir: I will treat human rights in general terms, and human rights in a world context. I will refer in two paragraphs to the report on Chile of the OAS Human Rights Commission. I will say that the human rights issue has impaired relations between the U.S. and Chile. This is partly the result of Congressional activities. I will add that these points will shortly become the main obstacles. . . . I can do

no less, without producing a reaction in the U.S. which would lead to legislative restrictions. The speech is now stored at Chile. I wanted to tell you about this. My confidence is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world and that your position on was that you overthrew a government that was going Communist.

The Memoir: As Secretary of State, I felt I had the responsibility to encourage the Chilean government in the direction of greater democracy through a policy of understanding Pinochet's concerns. . . . Pinochet reminded me that "Tosca supports their people 100 percent. We are behind you. You are the leader. But you have a problem against the poor people." I repeated to my underling that one day I would help him to reach individuality, based on progress on human rights.


The Memoir: There is more to what you say. It is a common view in the U.S. . . . It is unfortunate. We have been through Viet Nam and Watergate. We have to wait until the 1978 elections. We endorsed the overthrow of the Communist-controlled government here. We are not not to withdraw your position.

In an unpleasant way, Pinochet twice mentioned the name of Orlando Letelier, the exiled Chilean opposition leader, accusing him of misleading the United States Congress. Kissinger's response, as can be seen, was to apologize for the Chicagoans and to admit a replay of his 1968 Paris tactic over Vietnam to suggest that the disaster happened for better days after the upcoming elections. Three months later, a car bomb in Washington killed Letelier, the only such outrage ever committed in the nation's capital by agents of a foreign regime (and an incident completely absent from Kissinger's memoirs). The man responsible for smuggling the crime, the Chilean secret policeman General Manuel Contreras, has since served in an affidavit that he took no action without specific and personal orders from Pinochet. He remains in prison, doubtless wondering why he trusted his superiors.

"I want to see our mission and friendship improve," Kissinger told Pinochet (that was the theme of his memoirs). "We want to help, not undermine you." In advising a murderer and despot, whose role he had helped expose, to disregard his upcoming remarks to a key Congress, Kissinger insulted democracy in both countries. He also gave the greatest of green lights to further cross-border and internal violence, neither of which could have been unknown to him. (By his comments, he also mention what he calls Pinochet's "counter-revolution intelligence agency.") Further colluding with Pinochet against the United States Congress, which was considering cutting off access to human rights violations via the Kennedy

Amendment, Kissinger subsequently commented,

I don't know if you know or in my phone, but if you have just heard the news yesterday in Washington to [about the Kennedy Amendment] it was that we will defend the U.S. from access to it.



AFTERMATH OF THE CAR BOMBING THAT KILLED ORLANDO LETELIER AND RONNI MOFFITT, SEPTEMBER 1976. (AP/WIDEWORLD)

The lingering passage is worth bearing in mind. It is a good key for decoding the usual relationship between fact and falsehood in Kissinger's ill-considered memoirs. (And it is a huge reproach to his editors at Simon & Schuster, and Weidenfield & Nicolson.) It should also act as an urgent prompting to members of Congress, and to human rights organizations, to reopen the assassination inquiry and to conduct investigations into the multitudinous crimes of this period. Finally, and read in the light of Chile's return to democracy and the decision of the Chilean courts to pursue truth and justice, it repudiates Kissinger's permitting in such connection the "misuse" of "irrelevant and humanly painful" facts that he took very much more than verbal insult in his hands.

A robe of thought in Washington holds that any late disclosure by officials will cement material that is worse than even the cynics suspected. In September 2000, however, the CIA dispensed the resultant internal inquiry on Chile, which had been reported at it by the Hinchey Amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for that fiscal year. And the most hardened critics and investigators were reduced to silence.

Support for *Condor* in 1973, under "Track II" of the strategy, CIA sought to acquire a copy of present Alaska, then taking place after he won a plurality in the 4 September election and before, as Congressmen reported because he did not win an absolute majority, the Chilean Congress met.



ORLANDO LETELIER IN 1976, THE LAST YEAR OF HIS LIFE

disposed his report. CIA was working with three different groups of plotters. All three groups took it clear that they would require the kidnapping of Army Commander Rene Schneider, who led deeply into the Constitution required that the Army allow Allende to assume power. CIA agreed with that assessment. Although CIA provided weapons to one of the groups, we have found no information that the plotter in CIA's opinion was for the general to be killed. Contact with one group of plotters was dropped only on because of its extreme incoherence. CIA provided tear gas, submachine guns, and ammunition to the second group, eventually wounding him in the attack. CIA had previously encouraged that group to launch a coup but withdrew support four days before the attack because, in CIA's assessment, the group could not carry it out successfully.

This repeats the old canard supposedly distinguishing a kidnapping or abduction from a murder, and once again raises the intriguing question: What was the CIA going to do with General Schneider once it had kidnapped him? (None, alas, the studied passivity whereby the report "found no information that the plotters" or CIA's intention was for the general to be killed. "What would satisfy this human criterion? But then we

Contras was the head of Pinochet's secret military police, and in that capacity organized the death, torture, and "disappearance" of numerous Chileans as well as the use of bombing and assassination techniques as far afield as Washington, D.C. The CIA admits early on in the document that it

had known relationships in Chile with the primary purpose of securing assistance in gathering intelligence on internal targets. The CIA offered these services assistance in internal organization and training in combat subversion and terrorism from abroad, not in combining internal operations of the government.

Such flattery, based on a distinction between the "external targets" and the more messy business of internal dictatorial discipline, invites the question: What external threat? Chile had no foreign enemy except Argentina, which disputed some sea lane rights in the Beagle Channel. In consequence, Chile helped Mrs. Thatcher in the Falklands war of 1982. And in Argentina, as we know, the CIA was likewise engaged in helping the military regime to survive. But, Chile had no external enemies in spite of, but the Pinochet dictatorship had many, many internal foes. They were the numerous Chileans forced to stand on their heads. Manuel Contreras's job was to hunt them down. As the report puts it,

During a period between 1974 and 1977, CIA maintained contact with Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, who later became notorious for his involvement in human rights abuses. The U.S. Government policy community approved CIA's contact with Contreras, given his position as chief of the primary intelligence organization in Chile, as necessary to accomplish the CIA's mission, in spite of concerns that this relationship might be the CIA open to charges of aiding internal political repression.

After a few bits of back-and-forth about the distinction without a difference between "external" and "internal" police tactics, the CIA report states candidly,

By April 1975, intelligence reporting showed that Contreras was the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta, but an intelligence committee directed the CIA to continue its relationship with Contreras. The U.S. Ambassador in Chile urged Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (General Vernon Walters) to request Contreras in Washington in the interest of maintaining good relations with Pinochet. In August 1975, with intelligence approval, this meeting took place.

In May and June 1975, elements within the CIA recommended establishing a paid relationship with Contreras to channel intelligence based on his unique position and access to Pinochet. This proposal was approved, citing the U.S. Government policy on

clandestine relations with the head of an intelligence service working for human rights abuses. However, given subordination in the context of this exchange, a cover story provided was given to Contreras.

This does not require too much parsing. Some time after it had been concluded, and by the CIA at that, that Manuel Contreras was the "principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy," he is given American taxpayer money and recruited at a high level in Washington. The CIA's memorandum is careful to state that, where duties exist, they are fulfilled by the "U.S. Government policy community" and by "an emergency committee." It also goes on to suggest, with unconvincing humor, that the head of a supranational foreign secret service was given a large bribe by mistake. One wonders who was reprimanded for this blunder, and how it got past the scrutiny of the 40 Committee.

The report also contradicts itself, stating at one point that Contreras's activities overseas were opaque and at another that


Within a year after the coup, the CIA and other U.S. Government agencies were aware of information concerning reported intelligence services to track the activities of and, in at least a few cases, kill political opponents. This was the precursor to Operation Condor, an intelligence sharing arrangement among Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay established in 1975.

So now we know: The implementation of the death-squad principle was ordered and approved by American intelligence and its political masters across two administrations. The senior person concerned in both administrations was Henry Kissinger. Whether "intelligence committee" is innocent, and whether it is the 40 Committee or the emergency committee on Chile, we are left back in the same corner.

On leaving the State Department, Kissinger made an extraordinary bargain whereby he gifted his papers to the Library of Congress (having first berated them for not keeping in the Rockefeller estate in Pocantico Hills, New York) on the sole condition that they remain under seal until five years after his death. Kissinger's friend Manuel Contreras, however, made a mistake when he killed an American citizen, Ronni Kayen Kofsky, in the Washington air bomb that also murdered Orlando Letelier in 1976. By late 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation had badly sought and recovered subpoena power to review the Library of Congress papers, a subpoena with which Kissinger dealt only through his attorney. It was a start, but it was pathetic when compared with the efforts of truth-and-justice commissions in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, which have been charged from years of Pinochet.

Untried dictatorship and are seeking a full accounting. We await the moment when the United States Congress will inaugurate a comparable process and finally subpoena all the hidden documents that obscure the view of unpunished crimes committed in our names.

## CYPRIUS: A TURBULENT PRIEST



In the textual volume of his collage of memoirs, *Years of Upheaval*, Henry Kissinger found the subject of the 1974 Cyprus catastrophe so straightforward that he decided to postpone consideration of it.

I must leave a full discussion of the Cyprus crisis to another occasion, for it straddled only the Ford Presidency and its legacies, which I cannot do.

This signed a certain nervousness on his part, if only because the subjects of Vietnam, Cambodia, the Middle East, Angola, Chile, Libya, and the SALT negotiations all bear legacies that are "unsettled today" and were unsettled then. (To say that these matters "straddled into the final Presidency" is to say, in effect, nothing at all except that this pulled into the region did, historically speaking, occur.)

In most of his writing about himself (and, one presumes, in most of his presentations to his clients) Kissinger projects a strong impression of a man at home in the world and on top of his brief. But there are a number of episodes when it was him to pose as a sort of Cardozo, naive and ill-prepared and easily unbalanced by events. No doubt this pose costs him something in self-

## HENRY KISSINGER APPROVED THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE DEATH-SQUAD PRINCIPLE

learn of the supposedly usually going that actually took its instructions seriously.

In November 1973 a member of the Voice group who modeled capture recruited the Agency and requested financial assistance on behalf of the group. Although the Agency had no obligation in the group because it acted on its own, in an effort to keep the group's interest, maintain the good will of the group, and for humanitarian reasons, \$35,000 was paid.

"Humanitarian reasons." One has to admire the sheer inventiveness of this explanation. At 1970 prices, \$35,000 was, in Chile, a considerable sum. But likely the sort of sum that a local section chief could have disbursed on his own. One wants to know how the 40 Committee and its vice-chairman, Henry Kissinger, decided that the best way to associate from a supposedly humanitarian going was to pay it a small fortune in cash after it had committed a cold-blooded murder.

The same question arises in an even more acute form with another disclosure made by the CIA in the course of the same report. This is backed "Relationship with Contreras." Manuel

For more on this episode, see Harper's Magazine, February 2001, pages 53-58.



meant. It is a pose, furthermore, that he often adopts at precisely the time when the record shows him to be knowledgeable and often knowledgeable or foreknowledge would also confirm him with charges of responsibility or complicity.

Cyprus in 1974 is just such a case. Kissinger now argues, in the third volume of his memoirs, *Years of Renewal*, that he was prevented and distracted by Watergate and the delinquency of

Kissinger's dual position, plus Nixon's eroded one, made him "no less than acting chief of state for national security."

Kissinger gives one hostage to fortune in *Years of Upheaval* and another in *Years of Renewal*. In the former volume he says, quite plainly: "I had always taken it for granted that the near communal crisis in Cyprus would preclude Turkish intervention"—i.e., would at least risk the prospect of a war within NATO between Greece and Turkey and would certainly involve the partition of the island. That this was indeed common knowledge may not be doubted by any person even lightly acquainted with Cypriot affairs. In the latter volume, where Kissinger finally takes up the challenge implicitly refused in the first volume, he repeatedly asks the reader why anyone (such as himself, so burdened with Watergate) would have sought "a crisis in the eastern Mediterranean between two NATO allies."

These two disingenuous statements need to be qualified in the light of a third one, which appears on page 199 of *Years of Renewal*. Here, President Makarios of Cyprus is described without adornment as "the proximate cause of most of Cyprus' tensions." Makarios was the democratically elected leader of a virtually unwarmed republic, which was at the time in an association agreement with the European Economic Community, as well as a member of the United Nations and of the Commonwealth. His rule was challenged, and the independence of Cyprus threatened, by a military dictatorship in Athens and a highly militarized government in Turkey, both of which sponsored right-wing gangster organizations on the island, and both of which had plans to annex the greater or lesser part of it. In spite of this, "intercommunal" violence had been on the decline in Cyprus throughout the 1970s. Most killings were, in fact, "internal" of Greek and Turkish democrats or internationalists by their respective national and authoritarian rivals. Several attempts, by Greek and Cypriot fanatics, had been made on the life of President Makarios himself. To describe his person as the "proximate cause" of most of the tensions is to make a wildly aberrant moral judgment.

This same aberrant judgment, however, supplies the key that unlocks the lie at the heart of Kissinger's chapter. If the elected civilian authority (and spiritual leader of the Greek Orthodox community) is the "proximate cause" of the tensions, then his removal from the scene is self-evidently the cure for them. If one can demonstrate that there was such a removal plan, and that Kissinger knew about it in advance, then it follows logically and morally that he

was not sincerely looking for a crisis—as he self-provingly asks us to disbelieve—but for a solution. The fact that he got a crisis, which was also a hideous calamity for Cyprus and the region, does not change the equation or undo the syllogism. The scheme to remove Makarios, on which the "solution" depended, was in practice a failure. But those who killed the means and wished the ends are not shocked from guilt by the refusal of reality to march their schemes.

It is, from Kissinger's own record and recollections, as well as the subsequent official inquiry, quite easy to demonstrate that he did have advance knowledge of the plan to depose and kill Makarios. He admits as much himself, by noting that the Greek dictator Dimitrios Ioannides, head of the secret police, was determined to mount a coup in Cyprus and bring the island under the control of Athens. This was one of the better-known facts of the situation, as was the same notorious fact that Brigadier Ioannides was dependent on American military aid and political sympathies. His palace state had long since been expelled from the Council of Europe and blocked from joining the EEC, and it was largely the advantage conferred by his agreement to "leave port" the U.S. Sixth Fleet, and host a string of U.S. air force and intelligence bases, that kept him in power. This lenient policy was highly controversial in Congress and in the American press, and the argument over it was part of Kissinger's daily bread long before the Watergate drama.

Thus it was understood in general that the Greek dictatorship, an American client, wished to see Makarios overthrown and had already tried to kill him or have him killed. (Overthrow and assassination, incidentally, are effectively synonymous in this account; there was no possibility of leaving such a charismatic leader alive, and those who sought his removal invariably intended his death.) This was also understood in particular. The most salient proof is this: In May of 1974, two months before the coup in Cyprus's capital, Nicosia, which Kissinger later claimed came as a shock to him, he received a memorandum from the head of his State Department Cyprus desk, Thomas Boyatt. Boyatt summarized all the cumulative and persuasive reasons for believing that a Greek junta attack on Cyprus and Makarios was imminent. He further argued that, in the absence of an American démarche to Athens, warning the dictator to desist, it might be assumed that the United States was indifferent to this. And he added what everybody knew: that such a thing, if it went forward, would beyond doubt trigger a Turkish invasion.

President memos are a dime a dozen in Washington after a crisis; they are often then read for

the first time, or looked to the press or to Congress in order to enhance (or protect) some bureaucratic reputation. But Kissinger now admits that he saw this document in real time, while engaged in his shuttle between Syria and Israel (back of them within half an hour's flying time of Cyprus). Yet no demerit bearing his name or carrying his authority was passed to the Greek junta.

A short while afterward, on June 7, 1974, the *Night and Day* magazine, which is the bi-weekly inside reading of all senior State Department, Pentagon, and national security officials, cited an American field report, dated June 3, that stated the views of the dictator in Athens:

Ioannides stressed that Greece is capable of removing Makarios and his key supporters from power in twenty-four hours with little if any blood being shed and without EOKA assistance. EOKA was a Greek-Cypriot leftist underground, armed and paid by the junta. The Turks would quickly acquiesce to the removal of Makarios, a key enemy. Ioannides stated that if Makarios decides on some type of extreme pro-Russian option Greece in close tactical advantage, he (Ioannides) is not sure whether he should merely push the Greeks out of Cyprus and let Makarios fend for himself, or remove Makarios once and for all and force Greece deal directly with Turkey over Cyprus' future.

This report and its contents were later authenticated before Congress by CIA staff who had served in Athens at the relevant time. The fact that it made Brigadier Ioannides seem benevolent and disinterested—both of which he was—should have underlined the risks and domestic danger.

At about the same time, Kissinger received a call from Senator William Fulbright, the chair-

## NIXON'S PROBLEMS MADE KISSINGER "NO LESS THAN ACTING CHIEF OF STATE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY"

man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Fulbright had been briefed about the impending coup by a senior Greek democratic politician in Washington named Elias F. Demetrioupolous. According to Demetrioupolous, Fulbright told Kissinger that steps should be taken to avert the planned Greek action, and he gave three reasons. The first was that it would repair some of the moral damage done by America's indifference to the junta. The second was that it would head off a confrontation between Greece and Turkey in the Mediterranean. The third was that it would enhance American prestige on the island. Kissinger declined to take the recommended steps, on the basis grounds that he could not intervene in Greek "internal af-

HENRY KISSINGER, PRESIDENT MAKARIOS OF CYPRUS, AND TED PAPPAS, 1974

the Nixon presidency, from taking a timely or informed interest in the crucial triangle of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. This is a bizarre disclaimer: the phrase "eastern flank of NATO" was then a geopolitical commonplace of the first importance, and the proximity of Cyprus to the Middle East was a factor never absent from American strategic thinking. There was no reason of domestic policy to prevent the region from engaging his attention. Furthermore, the very implosion of Nixonian authority, cited as a reason for Kissinger's own absence of mind, in fact bestowed extraordinary powers upon him. To restore the obvious came more: When he became secretary of state in 1973, he took care to retain his post as "special assistant to the president for national security affairs," or, as we now say, national security adviser. This made him the last and only secretary of state to hold the chairmanship of the NSC Committee, which, of course, considered and approved every action by the CIA. Meanwhile, as chairman of the National Security Council, he held a position in which every important intelligence plan passed across his desk. His former NSC aide, Roger Morris, was not exaggerating by mouth, if at all, when he said that

Photograph © David Johnson/CORBIS

ties" at a time when the Nixon Administration was resisting pressure from Senator Henry Jackson to link U.S.-Soviet trade to the free emigration of Russian Jews. However odd this line of argument, it still makes it quite impossible for Kissinger to claim, as he still does, that he had had no warning.

So there was still no American high-level concern registered with Athens. The difficulty is sometimes presented as one of protocol or etiquette, as if Kissinger's rigidly custom was no longer and need lightly. Ioannides was the de facto head of the regime but technically only its senior police chief. For the U.S. ambassador, Henry Fuchs, it was awkward to make diplomatic approaches to a man he described as "a cop." But again I remind you that Henry Kissinger, in addition to his formal diplomatic eminence, was also head of the 40 Committee, and therefore the supervisor of American covert action, and was dealing in private with an Athens regime that had long-standing ties to the CIA. The 1976 House Committee on Intelligence later phrased the problem rather deftly in its report:

Facts, caused by the CIA station chief that Ioannides would continue to deal only with the CIA, and not clearing the State Department desk officer's phone, was content to pass a message to the Greek leader indirectly. It is clear, however, that the Embassy took no steps to undermine the Ioannides' de facto U.S. concern over a Cyprus coup attempt. This episode, the exclusive CIA access to Ioannides, Fuchs' indication that he may not have seen all important messages to and from the CIA Station, Ioannides' suggestion of U.S. acquiescence, and Wash-

# KISSINGER FAILED TO OFFER CONDOLENCES ON THE REPORTED DEATH OF THE CYPRIOT PRESIDENT

ington's well-known reluctance to Makarios have led to public speculation that either U.S. officials were insensitive to the report of the developing crisis or simply allowed it to happen. ... [Editor added]

Thomas Beatty's memoranda, warning of precisely what was to happen (and echoing the views of several mid-level officials besides himself), were classified as secret and will have never been released. Asked to testify at the above hearings, he was at best forbidden by Kissinger to appear before Congress and was finally permitted to do so only on order that he might avoid a censure for contempt. His evidence was taken in Executive Session, with the hearing room cleared of staff, reporters, and visitors.

Makarios continued to gather pace. On July 1, 1974, three senior officials of the Greek foreign ministry, all of them known for their moderate

views on the Cyprus question, publicly rendered their resignations. On July 3, President Makarios made public an open letter to the Greek junta, which made the direct accusation of foreign interference and subversion:

In order to be absolutely clear, I say that the action of the military regime of Greece against and direct the aggression of the EOKA-B is most reprehensible. ... I have more than once so far felt, and some cases I have almost reached, a hard inability to understand from Athens and seek to liquidate my human conscience.

He called for the withdrawal from Cyprus of the Greek officers responsible.

Some days after the coup, which eventually occurred on July 15, 1974, and when challenged at a press conference about his apparent failure to foresee or avert it, Kissinger replied that "the information was not lying around on the streets." Actually, it wasn't. It had been available to him round the clock, in both its diplomatic and intelligence capacities. His decision to do nothing was therefore a direct decision to do something, or to let something be done.

To the rest of the world, two things were obvious about the coup. The first was that it had been instigated from Athens and carried out with the help of regular Greek forces, and was thus a direct intervention in the internal affairs of one country by another. The second was that it violated all the existing mores governing the status of the island. The obvious and necessary illegality was loudly emphasized by the junta itself, which chose a notorious chauvinist garrison leader Nikos Sampson to be its proxy "president." Sampson must have been well known to the chairman of the 40 Committee as a long-standing recipient of financial support from the CIA; he also received money for his fanatical Miletos newspaper Makhos ("Combat") from a pro-junta CIA proxy in Athens, Mr. Stavros Constantopoulos, the publisher of the pro-junta organ *Eleftheros Kosmos* ("Free World"). No illustration government treated Sampson as anything but a pariah during the brief nine days in which he held power and launched a campaign of murder against his democratic Greek opponents. But Kissinger told the American envoy in Nicosia to receive Sampson's "foreign minister" as foreign minister, thus making the United States the first and only government to extend the facade of recognition. (At this point, it might be emphasized, the whereabouts of President Makarios were unknown. His palace had been heavily shelled and his death announced on the junta's radio. He had in fact made his escape, and was able to broadcast the fact a few days afterward—to the enormous irritation of certain well-placed persons.)

In Washington, Kissinger's press spokesman,

Rufus Anderson, flatly denied that the coup—later described by Makarios from the podium of the United Nations as "an invasion"—constituted foreign intervention. "No," he replied to a direct question on this point. "In our view there has been no outside intervention." This surreal position was not contradicted by Kissinger when he met with the Cypriot ambassador and failed to offer the customary condolences on the reported death of his predecessor—the "proximate cause," we now learn from him, of all the unpleasantness.

When asked if he still recognized the elected Makarios government as the legal one, Kissinger doggedly and somewhat tactically refused to answer. When asked if the United States was moving toward recognition of the Sampson regime, his spokesman declined to deny it. When Senator Fulbright helped facilitate a visit by the exiled Makarios to Washington, the State Department was asked whether he would be received by Kissinger "as a private citizen, as Archbishop, or as President of Cyprus?" The answer? "[Kissinger's] meeting with Archbishop Makarios on Monday." Every other government in the world, once the rapidly collapsing Greek dictatorship recognized Makarios as the legitimate head of the Cypriot republic, Kissinger's inactionism on the point is without diplomatic precedent and argues strongly for his collusion and sympathy with the armed bandit who felt the same way.

It is worth emphasizing that Makarios was invited to Washington in the first place, as elected and legal president of Cyprus, by Senator William J. Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and by his counterpart, Congressman Thomas Morgan, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Credit for their invitation belongs to the above-mentioned Elias Demetriadopoulos, who had long worked of the coup and who was a friend of Fulbright's. It was he who conveyed the invitation to Makarios, who was by then in London meeting with the British foreign secretary. This initiative spawned a series of anti-junta activities by this guerrilla journalist and one-man band—who had already personally trained Kissinger and became a special object of his spite. At the very last moment, and with a very poor grace, Kissinger was compelled to announce that he was recognizing Makarios in his presidential and not his episcopal capacity.

Since Kissinger himself tells us that he had always known or assumed that another outbreak of violence in Cyprus would trigger a Turkish military intervention, we can assume in our turn that he was not surprised when such an intervention came. Nor does he seem to have been very much disconcerted. While the Greek junta remained in power, his efforts were principally directed to

shocking a firm resolution. He was opposed to the return of Makarios to the island and certainly opposed to Turkish or British use of force to undo the Greek coup (Greece being a parasitic power with a steady obligation and troops on Cyprus). This same counsel of inertia or inaction—single testified to, in Kissinger's own memoirs as well as everywhere else—was translated later into equally strict and repeated admonitions against any measures to block a Turkish invasion. Sir Tom McBride, then the chief political adviser to Britain's then foreign



CHIEF KISSINGER'S  
CHANGING TONE  
KISSINGER RELATIVES  
AFTER THE TURKISH  
INVASION, 1974

secretary and future prime minister, James Callaghan, has since disclosed that Kissinger "opposed" at least one British military action to prevent a Turkish landing.

This may seem paradoxical, but the long-standing sympathy for a partition of Cyprus, especially expressed by the State and Defense departments, makes it seem quite less so. The demographic composition of the island (87 percent Greek, 10 percent Turkish) made it more logical for the partition to be imposed by Greece. But a second aim was to have it imposed by Turkey. And once Turkey had conducted two brutal invasions and occupied almost 40 percent of Cypriot territory, Kissinger cannot be said to have been very much inclined to prevent Turkey from any congressional request for this curiously evolution of international law and prominent and illegal misuse of American weapons. He became so pro-Turkish, in fact, that it was if he had never heard of the Greek colonels (though his suppressed dislike of the returned Greek democratic leaders supplied an occasional reminder).


For all the elements of this partitionist policy can be charged to Kissinger personally, he inherited the Greek junta and the official dislike of Makarios. Even in the dark obfuscation given of

Photograph © David Johnson/CORBIS

his own controls, however, he does admit what may otherwise be concluded from independent sources. Using covert channels, and short-circuiting the democratic process in his own country, he made himself a silent accomplice in a plan of political assassination, and when this plan went awry it led to the deaths of thousands of civilians, the violent uprooting of almost 200,000 refugees, and the creation of an unjust and unstable impasse of Cyprus that constitutes a serious threat to peace a full quarter century later.

On July 12, 1976, the European Commission of Human Rights adopted a report, prepared by eighteen distinguished jurists and chaired by Professor J.E.S. Fawcett, resulting from a year's research into the consequences of the Turkish invasion. It found that the Turkish army had engaged in the deliberate killing of civilians, in the execution of prisoners, in the torture and ill-treatment of detainees, in the arbitrary collective punishment and mass detention of civilians, and in systematic and organized acts of rape, sexual, and looting. A large number of "disappeared" persons, both prisoners of war and civilians, are still "missing" from this period. This number included a dozen holders of United States passports, which is evidence in itself of an indiscriminate strategy when conducted by an army dependent on American aid and matériel.

Perhaps it was a reluctance to accept his responsibility for these atrocities, as well as his re-



sponsibility for the original Sanyon crop, that led Kissinger to tell a haughty sequence of lies to his new friends, the Chinese. On October 1, 1974, he held a high-level meeting in New York with Qiao Qunshu, vice foreign minister of the People's Republic. It was the first substantive Sino-Amer-

ican meeting since the visit of Deng Xiaoping, and the first act of business with Cyprus. The memorandum, which is headed "TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY," has Kissinger first rejecting China's public claim that he had helped engineer the removal of Makarios. "We did not. We did not oppose Makarios" in claims belied by his own memoirs. He says, "When the coup occurred I was in Moscow," which he was not. He says, "My people did not take these intelligence reports [concerning an impending coup] seriously," even though they had. He says that neither did Makarios take them seriously, even though Makarios had gone public in a denunciation of the Greek junta for its coup plot. He then makes the amazing claim that "we knew the Soviets had told the Turks to invade," which would make this the first Soviet-instigated invasion to be conducted by a NATO ally and paid for with American aid.

A good liar must have a good memory. Kissinger is a stupendous liar with a remarkable memory. So perhaps some of this hysterical lying is explained by its context: the need to enlist China's anti-Soviet instincts. But the total of fakery is so impressive that it suggests something additional, something more like denial or delusion, or even a confession by other means.

#### BLOODBATH IN BANGLADESH

Cyprus was not the first instance in which a perceived need to mollify China outweighed even the most rational concern for human life elsewhere. On April 6, 1971, a cable of protest was written from the United States Consulate in what was then East Pakistan, the Bengali "wing" of the Muslim state of Pakistan, known to its restive nationalist inhabitants by the name Bangladesh. The cable's senior signatory, the consul general in Dhaka, was named Archer Blood, though it might have become known as the Blood Telegram in any case. Sent directly to Washington, its purpose was, quite simply, to denounce the complicity of the United States government in genocide. Its main section reads:

YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO ENFORCE THE SUPREMACY OF DEMOCRACY. YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SUPPORTING BANGALADESHI REBELS AND THE WEST BANGALADESHI GOVERNMENT. YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS ENJOINED THAT MANY WILL CONSIDER MORAL DILEMMAS, ESPECIALLY AT A TIME WHEN THE LIVES OF PRESIDENT YAHYA KHAN A PERSONAL, DEPENDENT, USABLE, AND OBEDIENT LEADER OF A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED MAJORITY PARTY. . . . BUT WE HAVE CHOSEN NOT TO INTERFERE, EVEN SEVERELY, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE AMERICAN INTERESTS IN BANGALADESH ARE AT RISK.

THESE INTERESTS ARE AMERICAN, ESPECIALLY AN INTERNAL MATTER OF A SOVEREIGN STATE. PRIVATE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE PAST, AND THEIR SOCIAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE CURRENT POLICY AND REVENUE HAVE BEEN PUT AT RISK. AND LASTLY, WE BELIEVE THERE CAN BE PROGRESS ONLY IF WE INTERFERE. . . . (Italics added.)

This was signed by twenty members of the United States' diplomatic corps in Bangladesh and, on its arrival at the State Department, by a further nine senior officers in the South Asia division. It was the most public and the most strongly worded denunciation from State Department servants in the State Department, that has ever been recorded.

The circumstances fully warranted the protest. In December 1970, the Pakistani military elite had performed the first open elections in a decade. The vote was easily won by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Bengali-based Awami League, who won a large overall majority in the proposed National Assembly. (On the East alone, it won 167 out of 169 seats.) Thus, among other things, meant a challenge to the political and military and economic hegemony of the Western "wing." The National Assembly had been scheduled to meet on March 3, 1971. On March 1, General Yahya Khan, head of the supposedly reigning military regime, postponed its convening, which resulted in mass protests and nonviolent civil disobedience in the East.

On March 25, 1971, the Pakistani army struck at the Bengali capital of Dhaka. Having arrested and kidnapped Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and taken him to West Pakistan, it set about massacring his supporters. The foreign press had been prematurely expelled from the city, but much of the direct evidence of what then happened was provided via a radio transmitter operated by the American consulate. Archer Blood himself supplied an account of one episode directly to the State Department and to Henry Kissinger's National Security Council. Having reached the embassy, Pakistani regular soldiers set fire to the women's dormitory at the university and then moved the occupants down with machine guns as they sought to escape. (The guns, along with all the other weapons, had been furnished under American military assistance programs.)

Other reports, since amply vindicated, were supplied to the London Times and Sunday Times by the courageous reporter Anthony Mascarenhas and flashed around a horrified world. Rape, murder, dismemberment, and the mass murder of children were employed as deliberate methods of repression and intimidation. At least 10,000 civilians were butchered in the first three days. The eventual civilian death toll has never been placed at less than half a million and has been put as high as 1 million. Since almost all Hindu ci-

tizens were at risk by definition from Pakistani military domination in a state Pakistan's Muslim civil servants were spared), a vast movement of millions of refugees—perhaps as many as 10 million—began to cross the Indian frontier. To summarize, then, first, the direct negotiation of a

#### SOME OF KISSINGER'S HYSTERICAL LYING WAS MEANT TO ENLIST CHINA'S ANTI-SOVIET INSTINCTS

democratic election, second, the unleashing of a genocidal policy; third, the creation of a very dangerous international crisis. Within a short time, Ambassador Kenneth Keating, the ranking American diplomat in New Delhi, had asked his wife to leave the consulate. It was a time, he told Washington, when a principled stand against the authors of this aggression and atrocities would also make the best pragmatic sense. Keating, a former senator from New York, used a very suggestive phrase in his cable of March 29, 1971, calling on the administration to "REJECT, REPEL, REJECT AND REPEL THE OFFER OF THE BULLY." It was "THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE THE TAKING OF THE BULL BY THE REINS TO INEVITABLE AND INEVITABLE DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN TERROR."

Nixon and Kissinger acted quickly. That is to say, Archer Blood was immediately recalled from his post, and Ambassador Keating was described by the president to Kissinger, with some contempt, as having been "taken over by the Indians." In late April 1971, at the very height of the mass murder, Kissinger sent a message to General Yahya Khan, thanking him for his "delicacy and tact."

We now know of one reason why the general was so fascinated a time when he had made himself—and his patron—responsible for the greatest crimes against humanity. In April 1971 an American Ping-Pong team had accepted a surprise invitation to compete in Beijing, and by the end of that month, using the Pakistani ambassador as an intermediary, the Chinese authorities had forwarded a letter inviting Nixon to send an envoy. Thus there was one motive of realpolitik for the shame that Nixon and Kissinger were in debt on their own country for its complicity in the extermination of the Bengalis.

Those who like to play deadly brink, however, might wish to consider some further circumstances. There already was, and had been for some time, a "back channel" between Washington and Beijing. It ran through Nicholas Choussin's Rooming not a decorative choice but not, at that stage, a positively original one. To a serious person like



Chou En-Lai, there was no reason to conflict approaches to the narrow channel afforded by a blood soaked (and short lived, as it turned out) despot like the delicate and tactful Yehou Kiang. Either Chou En-Lai wanted contact, in other words, or he did not. As Lawrence Lifshutz, the primary historian of this period, has put it:

When Lord Kiang's deputy at the National Security Council, stressed to investigators the internal rationalization developed within the upper echelons of the administration, Lord told the staff



STARVATION IN  
BANGLADESH, 1977

of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "We had to demonstrate to China we were a reliable government to deal with. We had to show Chou that we respect a tactical friend." Thus, after two decades of intelligent animosity with the People's Republic, once support for Pakistan to its bloody civil war was supposed to demonstrate to China that the U.S. "was a reliable government to deal with" was a mystifying proposition which none

could observe of the merits, back it and possibly the U.S. government, consider to have been an excuse justifying the simple convenience of the Islamabad link—a link which Washington had no over-riding desire to shift.

Second, the knowledge of this secret diplomacy and its accompanying privileges obviously freed the Pakistani general of such restraints as might have inhibited him. He told his closest associates, including his minister of communications, C. W. Choudhury, that his private understanding with Washington and Beijing would protect him. Choudhury later wrote, "If Nixon and Kissinger had not given him that false hope, he'd have been more realistic." Thus the collusion with him in the matter of China increases the direct complicity of Nixon and Kissinger in the massacre.

Only a respected congressional inquiry with subpoena power could determine whether there was any direct connection, apart from the self-evident ones of consistent stonewall created by censoring and reliable testimony, between the secret genocidal diplomacy of 1971 and the secret destabilizing diplomacy of 1975. The risk of disavowing such a connection, meanwhile, would appear to rest on those who believe that everything is an accident.

#### TIMOR MORTIS

One small but significant territory has the distinction of being omitted—entirely omitted—from Henry Kissinger's memoirs. And since East Timor is left out of the third and final volume (*Years of Renewal*) it cannot hope, like Cyprus, for a timely later resurrection. It has, in short, been forgotten.

The date of the Indonesian invasion of this small neighboring country—December 7, 1975—is significant. On that date, President Gerald Ford and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, arrived in Hawaii, having concluded an official visit to Jakarta. Since they had come fresh from a meeting with Indonesia's military junta, and since the United States was Indonesia's principal supplier of military hardware (NATO ally, had broken relations with Indonesia on the point), it seemed reasonable to inquire whether the two leaders had given the invaders any impression concerning a "green light." The president was evasive:

When he landed in Hawaii, reporters asked him, Ford was contemptuous at the invasion of Timor. He smiled and said, "We'll talk about that later." But press secretary Ron Nessen, later gave reporters a statement saying: "The United States is always concerned about the use of violence. The President hopes it can be resolved peacefully."

The literal incoherence of this official utterance—a possible indication of a use of violence—may perhaps have possessed an honest coherence, the hope of a speedy victory for overwhelming force. Kissinger showed this suspicion a shade nearer to actualization in his own more candid comment, which was offered while he was still on Indonesian soil. He told the press in Jakarta that the United States would not recognize the republic declared by FRETELIN (Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor) and that "the United States understands Indonesia's position on the question."

So gossamer were the subsequent reports of mass slaughter, rape, and deliberate starvation that historians fell somewhat out of fashion. The killing of several Australian journalists who had witnessed Indonesia's atrocities, the devastation in the capital city of Dili, and the stubbornness of FRETELIN's largely purgatorial and resistance made East Timor an embarrassment, rather than an advertisement for Jakarta's new order. Kissinger generally attempted to avoid any discussion of his involvement in the extinction of the Timorese—an ongoing involvement, that he authorized backdoor shipments of weapons to those doing the extirpation—and was able to respond in this by his ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who later confided in his memoir, *A Dangerous Place*, that in the matter of East Timor the initial intention fell was "almost the preservation of a casualty experience by the Soviet Union during the Second World War." Moynihan continued:

If the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked in bureaucratic. The Department of State decided that the United Nations proved a very ineffective line in whatever measure it undertook. This took one given to me, and I carried it forward with an inextinguishable success.

The terms "United States" and "Department of State" are here fully protomimed, by this supposed pure matter, since they are used as synonyms for Henry Kissinger.

Twenty years later, on July 11, 1995, Kissinger was confronted with direct questions on the subject, protesting and promising his then boss back. Diplomacy, as an event sponsored by The Learning Exchange in the Park Central Hotel in New York City, he perhaps having acquired Timor from his book and from his talk I did not anticipate the best line of questioning that arose from the floor. Commemoria Pinto, a former resistance leader in Timor who had been captured and tortured and had escaped to the United States, opened the bidding:

There I am Timorese. My name is Commemoria Pinto. And I followed your speech today and it's really interesting. One thing that I know, you

didn't mention a ship loaded by Indonesians in 1975. It is in Southeast Asia. As a result of the invasion 200,000 people of the Timorese were killed. As far as I know Dr. Kissinger was in Indonesia the day before the invasion of East



Timor. The United States actually supported Indonesia in East Timor. So I would like to know what you were doing at that time.

KISSINGER: What was I doing at that time? The whole time of just about Timor... When most people who deal with government don't understand is one of the most overwhelming experience of being in high office. That there are always more problems than you can possibly address at any one period. And when you're in global policy, and you're a global power, there are so many issues... We had at that time, there was a war going on in Angola. We had just been driven out of Vietnam. We were conducting negotiations in the Middle East, and Lebanon had blown up. We were on a trip to China. Maybe, maybe, we weren't even thinking about Timor. I'm telling you what the truth of the matter is. The masses are sent to Indonesia was a really nice place. We had originally intended to go to China, we were going to Ford and myself and some others. We had originally intended to go to China for five days. This was the period when Mao was very sick and there had been an upheaval in China... So we came out of China down.

Timor was never discussed with us who we were in Indonesia. At the airport as we were leaving, the Indonesian told us that they were going to occupy the Portuguese colony of Timor. To us that did not seem like a very significant event, because the Indians had occupied the Portuguese colony of Timor one year earlier, and as it looked like another piece of decolonization. Nobody had the slightest idea of what would happen afterwards, and nobody asked one question.

and I don't know when we could have said if someone had asked our opinion...

There isn't been a terrible human tragedy in Timor after war. The population of East Timor has crashed, and I don't know whether the casualty figures are correct. I just don't know if they're not too significant, and there's no question that it's a huge tragedy. All I'm telling you is what we knew in 1975. That was not a big thing on the radar screen. Nobody has ever heard of it since the Indian occupation of... And to us, Timor, look at a map, it's a little speck of an island in a huge archipelago, half of which was Portuguese. We had no reason to say the Portuguese should stay there.

ALLAN NAJARI: Mr. Kissinger, my name is Allan Najari. I'm a journalist in the United States. I'm one of the Americans who received the message in East Timor on November 12, 1975, a message during which Indonesian troops entered with American M-49s ground forces at least 271 Timorese civilians in front of the Santa Cruz Catholic cemetery as they were gathered in the act of peaceful mourning and prayer. Since you just said that in your meeting with Suharto on the afternoon of December 6, 1975, you did not discuss Timor, why did you discuss it until you came to the airport. Well, I have been the official State Department spokesman of your and President Ford's conversation with General Suharto, the director of Indonesia... It has been almost under the freedom of information act, so the whole news isn't there. It's clear from the portion of the text that is here that in fact you did discuss the impending invasion of Timor with Suharto, a fact which was confirmed to me by President Ford himself in an interview I had with him. President Ford told me that in fact you discussed the impending invasion of Timor with Suharto and that you gave the U.S.S....

KISSINGER: What's in it?

NAJARI: That you and President Ford together gave U.S. approval for the invasion of East Timor. There is another internal State Department memo... This is a memo of a December 18, 1975, meeting held at the State Department. This was held right after you return from that trip.

KISSINGER AND FORD  
HOLDING THE  
LINE ON  
TIMOR  
FOR THE  
U.S. POL. HEADLESS GIANT

and you were boasting your staff for having put out paper a finding by the State Department legal adviser Mr. Leigh that the Indonesian invasion of East Timor was illegal, that it not only violated international law, it violated a treaty with the U.S. because U.S. weapons were used, and it's clear from that statement, which I invite anyone in the audience to peruse, that was wrong at that time because you feared this memo would leak and second because you were supporting the Indonesian invasion of East Timor... If you

look at the public actions, statesmen after you left that meeting with Suharto the Indonesian invasion began para-bombing over Dili the capital of East Timor. They came aboard and began the massacres that culminated in a third of the Timorese population being killed. You announced an immediate ceasefire, U.S. military aid withdrew once the time...

NAJARI: Look, I think we all got the point...

Dr. Kissinger, my question, Mr. Kissinger, my question, Dr. Kissinger, is twofold. First, will you give a written order to the President and to support full denunciation of this matter so we can see exactly what you and President Ford said to Suharto? Secondly, would you support the continuing of an international war a times without under U.S. supervision on the subject of East Timor, and would you agree to make it an index in regard to your own conduct?

NAJARI: Unless, oh, really, this sort of document is one of the reasons why the conduct of foreign policy is becoming more and more impossible under these conditions. Here is a letter who's got one objection... As a scholar of documents, you don't know what is in these documents... I think I have your audience to read them.

It's interesting to notice the final denunciation of Kissinger's normally efficient if nebulous syntax in that final sentence. It's also interesting to see, once again, the operations of his denial mechanism. If Kissinger and his partner Nixon were identified with any one one belief, it was that the United States should never be, or even appear to be, a "pitiful, helpless giant." Kissinger's own writings and speeches are heavily loaded with rhetoric about "credibility" and the need to impress both friend and foe with the muscle of American resolve. Yet, in response to any inquiry that might implicate him in crime and blood, he rushes to facilitate his own country and its professional servants, suggesting that they know little, care less, are poorly informed, and are easily misled by the pace of events. He also resorts to a demagogic nationalism. This is as much as to claim that the United States is a purveyor for any ambition or wickedness of its own people.

This semiconsciousness of rhetoric also leads to renewed episodes of hysterical and improvised lying. (Recall his claim to the Chinese that it was the Soviets who had instigated the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.) The idea that Indonesia's annexation of Timor may be compared to India's occupation of Goa is too absurd to have been cited in any apology before or since. What Kissinger seems to like about the comparison is the rapidity with which Goa was forgotten. What he overlooks is that it was forgotten because (1) it was not a bloodbath on the scale of Timor and (2) it completed the decolonization of India. Timor represented the cementing of colonialism by Indonesia. And, quite clearly, an Indonesian

invasion that began a few hours after Kissinger had left the campus of Jakarta airport must have been planned and required several days before he arrived. Such plans would have been known by any embassy military attaché and certainly by any visiting secretary of state. We have, in fact, the word of C. Philip Leach, a former CIA operations officer in Indonesia, that

Suharto was given the green light to do what he did. There was discussion in the embassy and in traffic with the State Department about the problems that would be created for us if the public and Congress became aware of the kind and type of military actions that was going to Indonesia at that time... Without continued heavy U.S. logistical support the Indonesian might not have been able to pull it off.

The desire to appear to have been understood may... If we are charitable... since in part from the fact that even Indonesia's foreign minister, Adam Malik, conceded in public a toll of between 30,000 and 80,000 Timorese civilians in the first eighteen months of Indonesia's war of subjugation; in other words, on Kissinger's watch, and inflicted with weapons that he lent American hands to furnish to the killers. Now that a form of democracy has returned to Indonesia, which in its first post-democratic act returned the annexation of East Timor and called for a bi-lateral last payment by its auxiliaries... whether from the territory, we may be able to learn more exactly the extent of the quagmire.

Kissinger's arguments in 1975 did not dispose of two matters of legal, both of them in the province of the State Department. The first was the violation of international law by Indonesia, in a case where jurisdiction clearly rested with a Portuguese and (DATO) government of which Kissinger (partly as a result of its support for "decadentism") did not approve. The second was the violation of American law, which stipulated that weapons supplied to Indonesia were to be employed only in self-defense. State Department officials, bound by law, were likewise bound to conclude that United States aid to the generals in Jakarta would have to be cut off. Their memo summarizing this case was the cause of the transgression internal row that is recounted below:

#### SECRET/SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants:  
The Secretary (Henry Kissinger)  
Deputy Secretary (Richard Goodell)  
Under Secretary for External Affairs (Joseph Sisco)  
Under Secretary (L. Paul Bremer)  
Deputy Under Secretary (Lawrence Eagleburger)  
Assistant Secretary (Philip Habib)  
Attorney (Leigh, Legal Advisor)  
John Bremer, Notetaker

Date: December 18, 1975

Subject: Department Policy

The Secretary (Kissinger): I want to raise a little bit of hell about the Department's conduct in its decision. One week I thought we had a decision. One week we've gone on going completely. Take the cable on Timor. You know my attitude and attitude when I know the position on how do most know that I would not have approved it. The only consequence it does put you



INDONESIAN MILITARY PROTESTING THE OCCUPATION OF TIMOR

self on record. It is dangerous to treat the Secretary of State that way... What possible explanation is there for all I had told you to stop it quickly. What is your plan? Well, that's the important part is the important

Habib: Our assessment was that if it was going to be possible, it would come up before your return. And I was told they decided it was desirable to go ahead with the cable.

The Secretary: Kissinger, I said do it for a few weeks; and then, open up again.

Habib: The cable will not leak.

The Secretary: You're well and it will go to Congress and then we will have hearings on it.

Habib: I was given a new cable that it had come on.

The Secretary: That means that there are two cables.

And that means every copy has been sent.

Habib: No, I got it back channel—it was just one paragraph double rail and cryptic so I knew what it was talking about. I was told that Leigh thought that there was a legal requirement to do it.

Leigh: No, I said it could be done administratively.

It was not in our interest to do it on legal grounds.

Secretary: We were told that you had decided we had to stop.

The Secretary: Just a minute. Just a minute. You all know the view on this... The one has complained that it was aggression.

Leigh: The Indonesian were violating an agreement with us.

The Secretary: The Israelis when they go into Lebanon—when was the last time we protested that?

Leigh: That's a different situation.

Moore: It is self-defense.

The Secretary: And we can't consume a Communist government in the middle of Indonesia as self-defense?

Leigh: Well...

The Secretary: Then you're saying that arms can't be used for defense?

Holih: No, they can be used for the defense of Indonesia.

The Secretary: Now take a look at this last defense that is coming out on Angola. These SCOs are breaking all of due staff to [New York Times reporter] Les Gelb.

Moore: I can tell you what:

**KISSINGER: "ON THE TIMOR THING IT WILL COME OUT THAT KISSINGER VIOLATED THE LAW"**

The Secretary: What?

State National Security Council member Witham Hyland spoke to him.

The Secretary: What a minute—Hyland said...

Moore: He said he treated Gelb.

The Secretary: I want these people to know that our concern in Angola is not the economic wealth or a naval base. It has to do with the U.S. supplying 8,000 miles from home school all the surrounding states are asking for that help. This will affect the Burghers, the Florians, and China.

On the Timor thing, that will leak in three months, and it will come out that Kissinger would be prime barometer and would be the law. But on side of how many people in the legal adviser's office know about this?

Leigh: Three.

Holih: There are at least two in my office.

The Secretary: Plus everybody in the meeting who's talking about no less than 15 or 25.

You have a responsibility to recognize that we are living in a constitutional situation. Everything on paper will be used against me.

Holih: We do that and take account of that all the time...

The Secretary: Every day some SCOs in the Department are carrying on about Angola but no one is defending Angola. Ford got one again in the Gelb article defending not policy in Angola.

Holih: I think the leaks and dissemination of the burden you have to bear...

The Secretary: This is not about leaks stuff. We are going to lose big. The President says to the Chinese that we're going to stand firm in Angola. In two weeks later we get out. I go to a NATO meeting and meanwhile the Department leaks that we're worried about a naval base and says it's an exaggeration or abbreviation of

Kissinger's. I don't care about the oil or the base but I do care about the African reaction when they see the Soviets pull it off and we don't do anything. The Chinese will say we're a country that was not out of Indonesia for \$200 million and is now being run out of Angola for less than \$50 million...

The Secretary: It cannot be that our agreement with Indonesians that this was for internal purposes only. I think you will find that it says that they are legitimately used for self-defense.

There are two problems. The origin of the case which you had a duty to raise with me. The second is how to join these to me. But to put it in a cable 10 hours before I return, knowing how cables are handled in this building, guarantees that it will be a national disaster and that thousands of people (I repeat Legal Adviser General) Adkins has in his feverish mind.

I took care of it with the administration thing by ordering Charlie Adkins not to make any more sales.

How will the situation get better in six weeks?

Holih: They can get it cleaned up for them.

The Secretary: The Department is talking again and has reached the point where it disobeys clear-cut orders.

Holih: We sent the cable because we thought it was needed and we thought it needed your consent. This was sent days ago.

The Secretary: Nonsense. When did I get the cable, Jerry?

Moore: Not before the weekend. I think perhaps on Sunday.

The Secretary: You had to know what my view on this was. No one who has worked with me in the last two years could not know where my view would be on Timor.

Holih: Well, let me look at it—talk to Leigh. There are still some legal requirements. I can't understand why it went out if it was not legally required.

The Secretary: Am I wrong in assuming that the Indonesians will go up in smoke if they hear about this?

Holih: Well, it's better than a cutoff. It could be done at a low level.

The Secretary: We have four weeks before Congress comes back. That's plenty of time.

Leigh: The way so handle the administration matter would be that we are stopping the situation.

The Secretary: And 16 hours was going to be a non-problem?

Leigh: We had a meeting in State's office and decided to send the message.

The Secretary: I know what the law is but how can it be in the U.S. national interest for us to give up on Angola and kick the Indonesians in the teeth? Once it is on paper, there will be a lot of SCOs who can make themselves feel good who can write for the Open Forum Panel on the thing even though I will turn out to be right in the end.

Holih: The second problem on leaking of cables is different.

The Secretary: No it's not empirical fact.

Leigh: Forget that. It's a fact. You can't see that any SCOs (I repeat "SCOs") the most restricted level of classification cable will leak but you can't count on three more months long someone asking for it in Congress. If it's part of the situation record, it will be dragged out eventually.

The Secretary: You have an obligation as the national interest. I don't care if we sell equipment to Indonesians or not. I get nothing from it. I get no credit. But you have an obligation to figure out how to serve your country. The Foreign Service is not to serve itself. The Service stands for service to the United States and not service to the Foreign Service.

Holih: I understand that that's what the cable would do.

The Secretary: The minute you put this into the news you cannot resolve it without a leak.

Leigh: That's only one question. What do we do in Congress if we're asked?

The Secretary: We cut it off while we are studying it. We intend to start again in January.

Nobody, it must be said, comes out of this meeting especially well. The secretary's civil servants were anything but "private." Still it can be noted of Kissinger that, in complete contrast to his public statements, he (1) forbids from any mention of One (1) did not trouble to conceal his long-held views on the matter, bearing his undertakings for being so dense as not to know them (2) did not offer to be taken by surprise by events in East Timor (3) admitted that he was breaking the law; and (4) felt it necessary to deny that he could predict personally from the arms shipments, a denial for which nobody had asked him.

That Kissinger unforgotten Portugal's continuing legal sovereignty in East Timor is shown by a SCODS memorandum of a Camp David meeting between himself, General Suharto, and President Ford on the preceding July 5, 1975. Almost every line of the text has been deleted by official redactions, and much of the discussion is unilluminating except about the eagerness of the administration to supply naval, air, and military equipment to the junta, but at one point, just before Kissinger makes his exordium, President Ford asks his guest: "Have the Portuguese set a date yet for allowing the Timor people to make their choice?" The entire answer is obliterated by deletion, but let it never be said that Kissinger's State Department did not know that Portugal was entitled, indeed mandated, to hold a free election for the Timorese. It is improbable that Suharto, in the excited answer, was assuming his boss that such an open election would be won by candidates favoring annexation by Indonesia.

<sup>1</sup> The delivery of heavy weapons for use against civilian opponents did indeed resume in January, after a short interval in which Congress was called as advertised.

On November 9, 1979, Jack Anderson's syndicated column published an interview with ex-President Ford on East Timor along with a number of classified U.S. intelligence documents relating to the 1975 aggression. One of the latter papers describes how Indonesian's generals were pressing Suharto "in an orchestrated military intervention," while another informs Ford and Kissinger that Suharto would raise the East Timor issue at their December 1975 meeting and would "try and elicit a sympathetic attitude." The reluctant, pale-faced Ford was happy to tell Anderson that the American national interest "had to be on the side of Indonesia." He may or may not have been aware that he was thereby giving the lie to everything ever said by Kissinger on the subject.



PRELIMINARY REPORT  
FIGHTER, 1975

#### A WET JOB IN WASHINGTON?

As we have now seen, Kissinger has a tendency to personify his policies. His policies have led directly and deliberately to the deaths of numerous hundreds of thousands but have also involved the targeting of certain Indonesian individuals: General Schneider, Amilaboy Makulua, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. And, as we have already seen, once glimpsed, Kissinger has a special relish for legalised revenge.

It seems possible that these two tendencies converge in a single case: a plot to kidnap and murder Elias P. Demomopoulou, a distinguished Greek journalist with an unexampled record of opposition to the dictatorship that disfigured his homeland between 1967 and 1974. In the course of those years, he made his home in Washington, D.C., supporting himself as a consultant to a respected Wall Street firm, luminous senator, congressman, Hill staffers, diplomats, and reporters have testified in the extraordinary case.



man campaign of lobbying and information that he waged against the military groups who had usurped power in Athens. Since that same junta enjoyed the sympathy of powerful interests in Washington, Demetriopoulos was compelled to conduct on two fronts, and he made some influential enemies.

After the collapse of the Greek dictatorship in 1974, Demetriopoulos gained access to the secret police files in Athens and confirmed what he had long suspected: there had been no or, at the most, one attempt made to kidnap and eliminate him. Files held by the KYP—the Greek equivalent of the CIA—revealed that the then dictator, Georgios Papadopoulos, and his deputy security chief, Michael Koufogiannis, several times contacted the Greek military mission in Washington with precisely this end in view. Stomped with the words "COBALT: Eyes Only"—the highest Greek security classification—this topic involved a plethora of schemes. They had in common a desire to see Demetriopoulos removed from Washington and repatriated. An assassination in Washington might

even have been, Demetriopoulos told in 1974, engaged an agency—William A. Dobson of the D.C. firm of Dobson, Osken, Gelhardt, and Seidl—and brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. He was able to obtain many hundreds of documents from the FBI, the CIA, and the State Department, as well as from the Department of Justice and the Pentagon. A number of these papers indicated that copies had been furnished to the National Security Council, then the domain of Henry Kissinger, but requests for documentation from this source were unavailing. As previously noted, Kissinger had upon leaving office made a list of his own papers—copying them, classifying them as "personal," and donating them to the Library of Congress on condition that they be held privately. Thus Demetriopoulos learned with a stone's throw what he used the law to try and prove: anything from the NSC. In March 1977, however, the NSC finally responded to repeated legal initiatives by releasing the so-called "computer tapes" of the files that had been kept on Demetriopoulos. Paging through these, his attention was not immediately caught by the following:

JOHN'S DOCUMENTS, SEE PAGE 6 OF 1  
KEYWORDS: DEMETRIPOULOS, DEMETRI  
BURDICK GRAVEL RE MR DEMETRA  
CORPUS, DEATH IN ATHENS PRISON  
DATE 12/11/77

"Well, it's not every day," said Demetriopoulos when I interviewed him, "that you read about your own death in a state document." His attorney was bound to agree, and he wrote a series of letters to Kissinger asking for copies of the file to which the indices referred. For some years Kissinger declined to favor Demetriopoulos's lawyer with a reply. When eventually he did respond, it was only through his own lawyer, who wrote that

efforts were made to search the collection for copies of documents which cover the description provided. No such copies could be found.

"Efforts were made" is, of course, a piece of obfuscation that might describe the most perfunctory inquiry. We are therefore left with the question: Did Kissinger know of, or approve, or form a part of, that "cooperation of the various agencies of the U.S. Government" out of which foreign despots had been counting for a design of kidnapping, torture, and execution?

To begin with an obvious question: Why should a figure of Kissinger's stature either know about, or care about, the existence of a lone dissident journalist? This question is quite easily answered: the record shows that Kissinger knew very well who Demetriopoulos was and despised him. The two men had actually met in Athens in 1956, when Demetriopoulos had heated a

handgun at the Chios Benaghe Hotel for the visiting professor. Over the next decade Demetriopoulos had been prominent among those warning of, and insisting, a military intervention in Greek politics. The CIA generally favored such an intervention and maintained intimate contacts with those who were planning it. In November 1963 the director of the CIA, John McCone, signed an internal message asking for "any substantive derogatory data which can be utilized to deny [Demetriopoulos] subsequent entry to U.S." No such derogatory information was available, and when the coup came Demetriopoulos was able to sail in Washington, D.C., and begin his exile campaign.

He began it suspiciously enough, by supplying his own derogatory information about the Nixon and Agnew campaign of 1968. This campaign—already tainted badly enough by the betrayal of the Vietnam peace negotiations—was also receiving illegal donations from the Greek military dictatorship. The money came from Michael Bonagolis at the KYP and was handed over, in cash, to John Mitchell by an ultra-conservative Greek-American businessman named Thomas Pappas. The sum involved was \$549,000, a considerable amount by the standards of the day; his receipt was closely illegal; foreign governments are prohibited from making campaign donations (to are foreigners in general), and, given that the KYP was in receipt of CIA subsidies, there existed the further danger that American intelligence money was being recycled back into the American political process—in direct violation of the CIA's own charter.

Demetriopoulos took his findings to Larry O'Brien, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, who issued a call for an inquiry into the activities of Pappas and the secret relations existing between the Nixon-Agnew campaign and the Athens junta. A number of inquiries have since speculated as to whether it was evidence of this "Greek connection," with its immense potential for damage, that Nixon and Mitchell's bargains were seeking when they entered O'Brien's Watergate office under the cover of night. Considerable weight is lent to this view by one whom later when the Nixon White House was seeking "hard money" for the bargain, it turned to Thomas Pappas to provide it.

How Demetriopoulos's dangerous knowledge of this party center, and his insistent lobbying on the Hill and at the press against Nixon and Kissinger's client regime in Athens, drew unrelenting attention. He later said both the FBI and the CIA—becoming the first person ever to do so—succeeded in—and received written admission from both agencies that they possessed "no derogatory in-

formation" about him. In the course of these years, he also seemed on occasion to have been under "rather extensive" surveillance on and between the following dates: November 9, 1967, and October 2, 1969; August 25, 1971, and March 14, 1973; and February 19 and October 24, 1974. Unaware of the precise extent of this surveillance, Demetriopoulos nonetheless more than once found himself troubled by a heavy hand. On September 7, 1971, he had lunch at Wash-

## WHY SHOULD KISSINGER KNOW OR CARE ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF A LONE DISSIDENT JOURNALIST?

ington's fashionable Jockey Club with Nixon's chief henchman, Murray J. Friedman, who told him bluntly, "Lay off Pappas. You can be in trouble. You can be deported. It's not smart politics. You know Tom Pappas is a friend of the President." The next month, on October 27, 1971, Demetriopoulos was lunching with Robert Novak at Seasport and was threatened by Pappas himself, who came over from an adjacent table to tell him and Novak that he could make trouble for anyone who wanted him investigated. On the preceding July 17, Demetriopoulos had testified before the European subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Congressman Benjamin Rostenberg of New York, about the influence of Pappas on U.S. foreign policy and the Athens dictatorship (and the reversal. Before his oral testimony could be printed, a Justice Department lawyer appeared at the subcommittee's office and demanded a copy of the statement. Demetriopoulos had then, on September 17, furnished a memorandum on Pappas's activities to the same subcommittee. His written deposition closed with the words, "Finally, I have submitted separately to the subcommittee items of documentary evidence which I believe will be useful." This statement, written by Howard Evans and Robert Novak in the syndicated column, caused "extreme nervousness in the Nixon White House."

Demetriopoulos then received a letter from Louis C. Gore, Mr. Gore having become once identified as the cousin of Vice President Al Gore and the popularity of the Fairfax Hotel in Washington, U.C., where the key politician grew up. She was then quite celebrated in her own right, as a Republican state senator from Maryland and as the woman who introduced Spiro Agnew to Richard Nixon. She was a close friend of Attorney General Mitchell's and had been appointed as Nixon's representative to UNESCO. Demetriopoulos lived, along with many congressional



have been embarrassing, moreover, there seems to have been a need to interrogate Demetriopoulos before dispatching him. One proposal was to smuggle Demetriopoulos out and a Greek civil-war military; another, to put him on a Greek military plane and still another, to get him aboard a ship. If it were not for the proven record of irrationality and paranoia among the leaders of the junta, one might be tempted to dismiss at least the third of these plans as a farce.

A lone sentence in particular stands out in the COSMIC subject:

WE CAN REVEAL THE COOPERATION OF THE GREEK AGENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, BUT ESTIMATE THE COINCIDENTAL REACTION TO OR FROM.

Seeking to discover what kind of "cooper-

and political types, as a tenant of an apartment in her hotel. He had also been a tenant since 1959. On January 24, 1972, the writer to him,

Dear Elias—

I went to Perle's (Perle Meza's) luncheon for Martha Mitchell yesterday and sat next to John. He is funny as you—and your testimony against Pappas. He kept threatening to have you deported!

As fast I tried to ask him if he had any reason to think you could be deported and he didn't have any answer. But then tried to comfort by asking me what I know about you and why we were friends.

It really got out of hand. It was all he'd talk about during lunch and everyone at the table was listening.

Among those present at the table were George Bush, then ambassador to the United Nations, and numerous other diplomats. The attorney general's lack of restraint and want of tact, on such an occasion, and at the very table of legendary hostess Perle Meza, were clearly symptomatic of a considerable mutation, even rage.

I have related this background in order to show that Demetriacopoulos was under surveillance, that he possessed information highly damaging to an important Nixon-Kissinger client, and that his identity was well known to those in power, in both Washington and Athens. Henry Tassa, the United States ambassador in Athens at the time, was a Nixon and Kissinger crony with a very legitimate animus toward the dictatorship. He later testified before a closed session of Congress that he had known of the 1968 payments by the Greek secret police to the Nixon campaign (in July 1971, shortly after Demetriacopoulos testified before Congressman Rosenthal's subcommittee,

DEMETRIACPOULOS TO IDENTIFY HIS SPONSORS, HIS SO-CALLED SPONSORS, HIS SPONSORS, HIS SPONSORS OF MONEY, AND HIS BELIEF IN CONSPIRACIES. . . .

I BRING THIS MATTER TO YOUR ATTENTION NOW, BELIEVING THAT AS AN AIDED PERSON IN THE UNITED STATES IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO SUBMIT HIM TO THE KIND OF HEARDING AND PROFESSIONAL INVESTIGATION WHICH WOULD LIFT SOME OF THE MYSTERY.

The cable was addressed, as is usual from an ambassador, to Secretary of State William Rogers. Yet it was also addressed—highly unusually—to Attorney General John Mitchell. Mitchell, as we have seen, was the only attorney general ever to serve on Henry Kissinger's supervisory 40 Committee.

The State Department duly urged that "the Department of Justice do everything possible to see if we can make a Foreign Agents case, or any kind of a case for that matter" against Demetriacopoulos. Of course, as was later admitted, these investigations turned up nothing, as Demetriacopoulos's influence did not derive from any sinister source or nexus. But when he said that the Greek dictatorship had trampled its own society, used censorship and torture, threatened Cyprus, and bought itself political influence in Washington, he was uttering potent truths. When himself confirmed the connection between the junta and Pappas and Tassa on a post-Watergate White House tape dated May 23, 1973, he is talking in his uncorrupted confidential secretary, Rose Mary Woods:

Good old Tom Pappas, as you probably know or heard, if you haven't already heard it is me, helped, at Mitchell's request, fundraising for some of the defendants. . . . He came up to see me on March 7th, Pappas did. Pappas came to see me about the ambassador to Greece, that he wanted to—be wound up to keep [Henry] Tassa there.

This same dictatorship had in June 1972 revoked Demetriacopoulos's Greek citizenship, so he was a stateless person traveling only on a flimsy document giving him leave to reenter the United States. This fact assumed its own importance in December 1975, when his blind father was dying of pneumonia, alone, in Athens. Demetriacopoulos sought permission to return home under a safe conduct, or *hukou* passet, and was able to enlist numerous congressional friends in the attempt. Among those who signed a letter, dated December 11, to the Greek government and to Ambassador Tassa were Senators Frank E. Moss of Utah, Quentin N. Burdick of North Dakota, and Mike Gravel of Alaska. Senators Kennedy and Fulbright also responded personally.

Neither the Athens regime nor Tassa replied directly, but on December 23, four days after the old man had died without seeing his only son,

Senator Moss, Burdick, and Gravel received a telegram from the Greek Embassy in Washington. This instructed them that Demetriacopoulos should have applied in person to the embassy—an odd demand to make of a man whose passport and citizenship had just been canceled by the dictatorship. Meanwhile, Demetriacopoulos received a telephone call at his home, from Senator Kennedy, advising him not to accept any safe conduct offer from Greece even if he was offered it. Had Demetriacopoulos presented himself at the junta's embassy, he might well have been detained and kidnapped, to accede to one of the plans we now know had been drafted for his "disappearance." Of course, such a scheme would have been extremely difficult to carry out in the absence of some "cooperation" from local American intelligence officials.

Declassified cable traffic between Ambassador Tassa in Athens and Kissinger's deputy, Joseph Sisco, in the State Department shows that Senator Kennedy's misgivings were amply justified. In a cable dated December 14, 1975, from Sisco to Tassa, the ambassador was told,

IF YOU [Department of State] PERMIT DEMETRIACPOULOS TO ENTER GREECE, YOU WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR A VIOLATION OF GUARANTEEING AND ASSURANCE THAT HE MAY HAVE OF BEING ABLE TO DEPART.

Concurring with this extraordinary statement, Tassa added that there was a possibility of Senator Gravel attending the funeral of Demetriacopoulos Sr. Also, wrote the ambassador,

UNEXPECTEDLY, I HAVE TO POINT OUT THAT YOUR VIEW TO PROSECUTE SOME REASON FOR THE FACT THAT CERTAIN REASONS ARE AN OBSTACLE AS TO HIS REENTRY TO GREECE. IT IS A VIOLATION OF THE GUARANTEEING AND ASSURANCE THAT HE MAY HAVE OF BEING ABLE TO DEPART.

The shrewdness of this—Demetriacopoulos has no record whatsoever of the advocacy or practice of violence—also has its sinister side. Suggested here is just the sort of pretext that the junta might need for a frame-up, or a cover on a "disappearance." The entire correspondence reeks of the priorities of both the embassy and the State Department, which reflect their contempt for elected U.S. senators, their dislike of dissent, and their need to gratify a group of Greek gangsters who are now tightly serving terms of life imprisonment.

Now look again at the computer index disclosed, after years of litigation, from Kissinger's NSC files. It shows the date of December 18, 1970, and appears to apprise Senators Moss, Burdick, and Gravel that Demetriacopoulos had met his end in an Athens prison. Was this a contingency plan? A cover story? As long as Mr. Kissinger maintains his stubborn silence, and the

control over his "papers" some papers, it will be impossible to determine.

Having avoided the trap that seems to have been set for him in 1970, Demetriacopoulos kept up his facade of fealty and docility, aimed at deceiving the Greek junta and embarrassing its American friends. He also earned the junta's designs on the independence of Cyprus and of American indifference to, or complicity in, that policy. In this capacity he became a source of annoyance to Henry Kissinger. In a Memorandum for the Record on a briefing presented to President Gerald Ford in October 1974, there are references to "derogatory news from our files" about Demetriacopoulos, to "the derogatory blind memo" about him, and to "the long Kissinger memo" on him. Once again, and despite repeated requests from lawyers, Kissinger has declined to answer my queries about the whereabouts of these papers, or to shed any light on their contents. His National Security Council, however, asked the FBI to smother any information that might discredit Demetriacopoulos, and between 1972 and 1974, according to papers since declassified, the bureau furnished Kissinger with hundreds and false material concerning, among other things, a romance that Demetriacopoulos was allegedly conducting with a woman now dead and a supposed relationship between him and Daniel Ellsberg, a man he has never met.

This might seem trivial, were it not for the memories of Constantine Panagiotakis, the ambassador of the Greek junta in Washington, D.C. Arriving to take up his post in February 1974, as the ambassador wrote in his later memoirs, entitled in the First Line of Defense,

I was informed about some . . . plans to kidnap and transport Elias Demetriacopoulos to Greece, plans which reminded me of KGB methods. . . . On 19 May a document was transmitted to me from Spyros Vlados, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, giving the chief of the United States ambassador Henry Tassa, which he agreed with, about the most efficient means of dealing with the conspirators and the whole activity of Demetriacopoulos. Tassa's views are included in a memorandum of conversation with the Foreign Ministry Special Telegram of 27 May.

Finally, another brilliant idea of the most brilliant members of the Foreign Ministry in Athens, transmitted to me on 12 June, was for me to seek useful advice on the extermination of Elias Demetriacopoulos from George Chioschidis, director of the

\* The Greek word here, which is *ekadestros*, is pretty strong. It is usually translated as "extermination," though "elimination" might be an alternate reading. It is not a recipe for inconspicuous or compassionate assassination but for getting rid of him.

## THE FBI FURNISHED KISSINGER WITH SLANDEROUS MATERIAL ABOUT ELIAS DEMETRIACPOULOS

Tassa sent a four-page secret cable from Athens. It began:

FOR SOME TIME I HAVE FELT THAT ELIAS DEMETRIACPOULOS IS BEING OF A WELL-ORGANIZED CONSPIRACY WHICH PERVERTS GENUINE INVESTIGATION. WE HAVE BEEN UNDER OBSERVATION. HE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH KISSINGER IN GREECE. THE AIM IS TO DESTROY OUR RELATIONS WITH GREECE, TO WEAKEN OUR GREEK ALLIANCE AND WEAKEN THE U.S. POSITION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

This was certainly taking Demetriacopoulos seriously. So were the closing paragraphs, which read,

I AM THEREFORE BRINGING THE MATTER TO YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION IN THE HOPE THAT A WAY WILL BE FOUND TO SET UP AN INVESTIGATION OF



Czech desk at the State Department, who was one of the more vocal critics (Hushes added.)

Senator Patrick later wrote in a detailed letter, which is in my possession, that he had direct knowledge of a plan to abduct Demetrioupolos from Washington. His testimony is corroborated by an affidavit, which I also possess, signed by (Dimitrios) Papadopoulos. Mr. Papadopoulos was at the time the political counselor to the Greek Embassy—the number three position—and was taken to lunch at the home of Jacky Chik in late May or early June of 1974, by Ambassador Panayiotakis and the assistant military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Stefan Vionis. At the lunch, Vionis touched the question of kidnapping Demetrioupolos, who was to be smuggled aboard a Greek NATO submarine at a harbor in Virginia.

Papadopoulos, who was Greek ambassador to Pakistan at the time he wrote his affidavit, has since said that he was misled that Henry Kissinger was fully aware of the proposed operation. By that stage, the Greek junta had only a few weeks to live because of its crimes in Cyprus. Since the fall of the dictatorship, even more extensive evidence of the junta's assassination plans has been uncovered, if only at the Atlantic end of the plot. But that was not a regime that ever acted without Washington's "understanding." Attempts to unearth more detail have also been made in Washington. In 1975, Senator George McGovern and James Aboumadi, seconded by Congressman Don Edwards of the House Intelligence Committee, asked Senator Frank Church to include the kidnapping plot against Demetrioupolos in the investigation work of his famous committee on U.S. intelligence. As first reported by the New York Times and then confirmed by Seymour Hersh,

## KISSINGER ON KILLING WEAPONS TO INDONESIA: 'GET NOTHING FROM IT, I GET NO RAKEOFF'

Kissinger intervened personally with Church, citing grave but unspecified matters of national security, to have this aspect of the investigation shut down.

Some of this may seem farfetched, but we do know that Kissinger was conducting a vendetta against Demetrioupolos (as was Ambassador Henry Tasak); we do know that Kissinger was involved in high-level collusion with the Greek junta and had advance knowledge of the plot to assassinate Archbishop Makarios; and we do know that he had used the American Embassy in Chile to purchase explosives for the contract killing of Chilean . . . as the cover story in that

case, too, was that the hired guns were "only" trying to kidnap him.

Thus the Demetrioupolos story, told here in full for the first time, creates a prima facie case that Henry Kissinger was at least aware of a plan to abduct and interrogate, and also—of certainty kill, a civilian and journalist in Washington, D.C. In order to be cleared of the suspicion, and to explain the mysterious reference to Demetrioupolos's death in his own archives, Kissinger need only make those same archives at last accessible, or else be subpoenaed to do so.

## THE PROFIT MARGIN

In his famous meeting at the State Department on December 18, 1975, shortly after his moment of complicity with the Indonesian generals over East Timor, Kissinger makes the following peculiar statement:

I don't care if we sell opium to Indonesia or not. I get nothing from it. I get no rakeoff.

One might have taken it for granted that a serving secretary of state had no direct interest in the sale of weapons to a foreign dictatorship; nobody at the meeting had suggested any such thing. How peculiar that Kissinger should deny an allegation that had not been made, among a question that had not been asked.

It isn't possible to state with certainty when Kissinger began to profit personally from his association with the ruling circles in Indonesia, nor can it be definitely asserted that this profit was part of any "understanding" that originated in 1975. And yet there is a perfect congruence between Kissinger's foreign-policy counsel and his own business connections. One might call it a "harmony" of interests rather than a "conflict." (See map, page 56.)

Six years after he left office, Kissinger set up a private consulting firm named Kissinger Associates, which exists to maintain and facilitate contact between multinational corporations and foreign governments. The client list is secret, and contracts with the "Associates" contain a clause prohibiting any mention of the arrangement, but corporate clients include or have included American Esso, Shearson Lehman Hutton, Amco, Daewoo of South Korea, H. J. Heinz, ITT, Lockheed Corporation, Amherst-Byrd, the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Coca-Cola, Fiat, Revlon, Union Carbide, and Medinol Bank. Kissinger's initial fellow "associates" were General Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Hayslburger, both of whom had worked closely with him in the foreign-policy and national-security branches of government.

Nonetheless, insurance of a harmony between this firm and Kissinger's policy pronouncements can be cited. The best-known is probably that of

the People's Republic of China. Kissinger helped several American conglomerates, notably H. J. Heinz, to gain access to the Chinese market. As it was glowingly phrased by Anthony J. F. Chubb, CEO of Heinz,

Kissinger and his associates make a lot of connections and we think the very particularly helpful in connection with more centrally planned economies, where the principal players and the dynamics among the principal players are of critical importance. This is particularly true in China, where for it is a very hot issue and is viewed with particular respect.

Chubb, basically, we seem well on our way to establishing the high-level presence there before Henry got involved. But once we decided to move, he had practical points to offer, such as the relationship between Taiwan and Peking. He was helpful in seeing that we did not overstep that as well as how he was helpful in Peking. His relevance obviously varies from market to market, but he's probably at his best in helping with contacts in the shadowy world where these moves

The Chinese term for this sort of shadowy transactions is *guanxi*. In less judgmental American speech it would probably translate as "connections." Selling baby food in China may seem innocuous enough, but when the Chinese regime turned its guns and tanks on its own children in Tiananmen Square in 1989, it had no more staunch defender than Henry Kissinger. Arguing very strongly against sanctions, he wrote that "China remains too important for America's national security to risk the relationship on the emotions of the moment." Taking the Deng Xiaoping view of the democratic movement, he added that "no government in the world would have tolerated having the main square of its capital occupied for eight weeks by tens of thousands of demonstrators." It is perhaps just as well that Kissinger's services were not retained by the Stalinist regime of Romania, Cardinal Wyszyński, and East Germany, which succeeded in just such public misdeeds later in the same year.

Not was Kissinger's influence preying confined to Henry's marionette puppets. He assisted Austrian Richard Hain in the marketing of oil deposits discovered in China. He helped ITT to corporation that had once helped him to overthrow the elected government of Chile to hold a post-banking bond meeting in Beijing, and he performed similar services for David Rockefeller and the Chase Manhattan Bank, which held on

international advisory committee meeting in the Chinese capital and met with Deng himself.

Six months before the massacre in Tiananmen Square, Kissinger set up a limited investment partnership named China Ventures, of which he personally was chairman, CEO, and general partner. Its brochure helpfully explained that CV involved itself only with projects that "enjoy the unquestioned support of the People's Republic of China." The more precise phraseology: the climate for investment on the Chinese mainland soared after the post-Tiananmen repression and the limited sanctions approved by Congress. This no doubt contributed to Kissinger's criticism at the criticism of Deng, but while China Ventures lasted, it drew large commitments



KISSINGER ON THE 1975 CHINESE, 1976

from American Esso, Coca-Cola, Heinz, and a large mining and extraction conglomerate named Freeport-McMoRan.

Many of Kissinger's most extreme acts and positions have been taken, at least ostensibly, in the name of anti-Communism. So it is amusing to find him exerting himself on behalf of a regime that can guarantee safe investment by virtue of a one-party ideology, a ban on trade unions, and a slave labor prison system. Nor is China the sole example here. When Lawrence Hayslburger left the State Department in 1988, having been ambassador to Yugoslavia, he became simultaneously a partner in Kissinger Associates, a director of LBS Bank, a subsidiary of a bank then owned by the Serbian regime, and the American representative of the "Yugo" mini-car. Yugo duly be-

came a client of Kissinger Associates, as did a Yugoslav construction concern named Energoexport. The Yugo is of particular interest because it was produced by the large state-run conglomerate that also functioned as Yugoslavia's military-industrial and arms-manufacturing complex. This complex was later seized by Slobodan Milosevic, along with the other stewards of what had been the Yugoslav National Army, and used to prosecute years of aggression against four neighboring republics. At all times during this protracted crisis, and somewhat out of step with many of his usually hawkish colleagues, Henry Kissinger urged a consistent policy of conciliation with the Milosevic regime. (Mr. Engelbarger in due course rejoined the State Department as deputy secretary and briefly became secretary of state. So it goes.)

Much the same can be said for the dual involvement of the "Associates" with Slobodan Milosevic. When Slobodan was riding high in the late 1980s, and having his way with the departments of Commerce and Agriculture, and throwing money around like the providential drunken sailor, and using poison gas and chemical weapons on his Kurdish population without a murmur from Washington, the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum provided a veritable fruit machine of contacts, transactions, and opportunities. Kissinger's partner Alan Stages, who had also been the economist attached to the Reagan-era Commission on Central America, featured prominently on a junket to Baghdad. At the same time, Kissinger's firm represented the shady Italian Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, which was later shown to have made illegal loans to Slobodan's Bosnian regime.

In the same year—1989—Kissinger made his lucrative connection with Freeport-McMullan, a globalized firm based in New Orleans. Its business is the old-fashioned one of extracting oil, gas, and minerals. Its chairman, James Moffett, has profitably earned the favorite titles bestowed by the business and financial pages, being beyond any doubt "flamboyant," "boomerang," and a "venture capitalist." In 1989, Freeport paid Kissinger Associates a retainer of \$200,000 and fees of \$600,000, not to mention a promise of a 2 percent commission on future capital investments made with the Associates' advice. Freeport also made Kissinger a member of its board of directors at an annual salary of at least \$30,000. In 1990 the two concerns went into business in Burma, the most gaudily repressive state in all of South Asia. Freeport would drill for oil and gas, according to the agreement, and Kissinger's other client Dae-woo would build the plant. That year, however, the Burmese generals, under their wonderful collective title of SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council), lost a popular election to the democratic opposition, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and decided to annul the result. This de-

velopment—yet more distressing calls for the isolation of the Burmese junta—was unfavorable to the Kissinger-Freeport-Dae-woo trio, and the proposal lapsed.

But the next year, in March 1991, Kissinger was back in Indonesia with Mr. Moffett, closing a deal for a thirty-year license to continue exploiting a gigantic gold-and-copper mine. The mine is of prime importance for three reasons. First, it was operated as part of a joint venture with the Indonesian military government and with that government's maximum leader. Second, it is located on the island of Irian Jaya (an area formerly known as West Irian), a part of the archipelago that, like East Timor, is only Indonesian by right of arbitrary conquest. Third, its operations commenced in 1973—two years before Henry Kissinger visited Indonesia and helped unleash the Indonesian bloodbath in East Timor while unlocking a flow of weaponry to his future business partners.

This could mean no more than the "harmony of interest" I suggested above. No more, in other words, than a happy coincidence. What is too coincidental is the following:

(1) Freeport's enormous Grasberg mine in Irian Jaya stands accused of creating an environmental and social catastrophe. In October 1995 the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a federal body that exists to help American companies overseas, decided to cancel Freeport's investment insurance because of political risk, the very element on which Kissinger had furnished soothing assurances in 1991. OPIC concluded that Freeport's mine had "erected and continues to pose unresolvable or major environmental, health or safety hazards with respect to the rivers that are being impacted by the tailings, the surrounding terrestrial ecosystem, and the local inhabitants."

(2) The "local inhabitants" who came last on that list are the Amungkar people, whose protests at the environmental rape, and at working conditions in the mine, were met by Indonesian regular soldiers at the service of Freeport-McMullan and under the orders of Suharto. In March 1996 large-scale mining nearly closed the mine at a cost of four deaths and many injuries.

Freeport-McMullan mounted an intense lobbying campaign in Washington, with Kissinger's help, to get its OPIC insurance reinstated. The price was the creation of a trust fund of \$100 million for the repair of the Grasberg site after it, and its surrounding ecology, has eventually been picked clean. All of this became moot with the overthrow of Suharto's dictatorship, the denunciation of Suharto himself, and the unmasking of an enormous nexus of "crony capitalism" involving him, his family, his military colleagues, and certain favored multinational corporations.

This political revolution also restored, at incalculable human cost, the independence of East Timor. There was even a suggestion of a serious inquiry and a human-rights tribunal to settle some part of the account for the years of genocide and occupation. Once again, Henry Kissinger has had to scan the news with anxiety and wonder whether even worse revelations are in store for him. It will be a rational and informed judgment if the answer to this question is left to the pillaged and misgoverned people of Indonesia, rather than devolving onto an American Congress that has for so long shirked its proper responsibilities.

The subject awaits its historians.

#### A NOTE ON THE LAW

As Henry Kissinger now understands, there are increasingly possible rents and tears in the cloak of immunity that has dogged him until now. Recent evolutions in national and international law have made his position an exposed and, indeed, a vulnerable one. For convenience, the distinct areas of law may be grouped under four main headings:

1) International Human Rights Law. This comprises the grand and numerous covenants on the rights of the individual in relation to the state; it also protects the individual from other actors in the international community who might violate those rights. Following from the French Revolution's "Declaration of the Rights of Man," international human rights law holds that political associations are legitimate only insofar as they preserve the dignity and well-being of individuals, a view that challenges the traditional privilege given to the "national interest." The United States is directly associated with sponsoring many of these covenants and has ratified several others.

2) The Law of Armed Conflict. Somewhat obscure and unexciting, this represents the gradual emergence of a legal consensus on what is, and what is not, permissible during a state of war. It also comprises the various humanitarian agreements that debar the customary "law of war" and thus attempt to reduce the explosive element in this ancient debate.

3) International Criminal Law. This concerns any individual, including an agent of any state, who commits direct and grave atrocities against either his "own" citizens or those of another state: covered here are genocide, crimes against humanity, and other crimes of war. The Rome Statute, which also establishes an International Criminal Court for the trial of individuals, including governmental offenders, is the codified version of this law as revised and updated since the

Nuremberg protocols. It commands the signatures of most governments as well as, since December 11, 2000, that of the United States.

4) Domestic Law and the Law of Civil Liberties. Most governments have similar laws that govern crimes such as murder, kidnapping, and forgery, and many of them treat any offender from any country as the same. These laws in many cases permit a citizen of any country to seek redress in the courts of the offender's "host" country or country of citizenship. In United States law, one particularly relevant statute is the Alien Tort Claims Act.

The United States is the most generous in granting immunity to itself and partial immunity to its servants, and the most lagged in adhering to international treaties (ratifying the Genocide Convention only in 1988 and signing the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights only in 1992). And the provisions of the Rome Statute, which would expose Kissinger to due punishment if they had been law from as early as 1948, are not unattractive. The Nuremberg principles, however, were in that year announced by an international convention to have no binding force. International customary law would affect any signatory country (again exempting the United States) in being suit against Kissinger for crimes

### THERE ARE INCREASINGLY NOTICEABLE RENTS AND TEARS IN KISSINGER'S CLOAK OF IMMUNITY

against humanity in Indochina.

More importantly, United States federal courts have been found able to exercise jurisdiction over crimes such as assassination, kidnapping, and terrorism, even when these are supposedly protected by the doctrine of state or sovereign immunity. Of a number of landmark cases, the most salient one is the finding of the U.S. Circuit Court in 1980, concerning the car-bomb murder, by Pinochet's agents, of Orlando Letelier and Romo Moffett. The court held that "foreign policy options may extend to a foreign country," the Pinochet regime "has no discretion" to perpetrate conduct designed to result in the assassination of an individual or individuals, actions that are clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and international law. Reciprocally speaking, this would apply to an American official seeking to assassinate a Chilean. Assassination was illegal both in a private and a public act when Henry Kissinger was in power and when the verdicts on General Schneider of Chile and President Salvador Allende took place.

As the Hinchey report to Congress in 2000

now demonstrates that U.S. government agents were knowingly party to acts of torture, murder, and "disappearance" by Pinochet's death squads, Chilean citizens will be able to bring suit in America under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which grants U.S. federal courts "subject-matter jurisdiction" over a claim when a non-U.S. citizen sues for a civil wrong committed in violation of a U.S. treaty or other international law. Chilean relatives of the "disappeared" and of General Schneider have recently expressed an intention to do so, and I am advised by several international lawyers that Henry Kissinger would indeed be liable under such proceedings.

The Alien Tort Claims Act would also permit victims in other countries, such as Bangladesh or Cambodia, to seek damages from Kissinger, on the model of the recent lawsuit filed in New York against Li Peng, among the Chinese Communist officials most accountable for the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square.

A significant body of legal theory can be brought to bear on the application of "customary law" to the bombardment of civilians in Indochina. The Genocide Convention was not ratified by the United States until 1988. In 1951, however, it was declared by the International Court of Justice to be customary international law. The work of the International Law Commission is in full agreement with this view. There would be argument over whether the numberless victims were a "protected group" under existing law, and also as to whether their treatment was sufficiently indiscriminate, but such argument would place heavy burdens on the defense as well as the prosecution.<sup>5</sup>

An important recent development is the enforcement by third countries—most notably Spain—of the international laws that bind all states. Baltasar Garçon, the Spanish judge who initiated the successful prosecution of General Pinochet, has also secured the detention in Mexico of the Argentine torturer Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, who is now held in prison awaiting extradition. The parliament of Belgium has recently empowered Belgian courts to exercise jurisdiction over war crimes and breaches of the Geneva Convention committed anywhere in the world by a citizen of any country. This practice, which is on the increase, has at minimum the effect of limiting the ability of certain people to travel or to avoid extradition. The Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, and Germany have all recently employed the Geneva Conventions to prose-

<sup>5</sup> See especially Nicole Barrett: "Holding Individual Leaders Responsible for Violations of Customary International Law," *Columbia Human Rights Law Review*, Spring 2001.

cure war criminals for actions committed against non-nationals by non-nationals. The British House of Lords decision in the matter of Pinochet has also decisively negated the defense of "sovereign immunity" for acts committed by a government or by those following a government's orders. This has led in turn to Pinochet's prosecution in his own country.

There remains the question of American law. Kissinger himself admits that he knowingly broke the law in continuing to supply American weapons to Indonesia, which used them to violate the neutrality of a neighboring territory and to perpetrate gross crimes against humanity. Kissinger also faces legal trouble over his part in the ethnic cleansing of the British colonial island of Diego Garcia in the early 1970s, when indigenous inhabitants were displaced to make room for a United States military base. Lawyers for the Chagos Islanders have already won a judgment in the British courts on this matter, which now moves to a hearing in the United States. The torts cited are "forced relocation, torture, and genocide."

In this altered climate, the United States faces an interesting dilemma. At any moment, one of its most famous citizens may be found liable for terrorist actions under the Alien Tort Claims Act, or may be subject to an international request for extradition, or may be arrested if he travels to a foreign country, or may be cited for crimes against humanity by a court in an allied nation. The non-adherence by the United States to certain treaties and its reluctance to extradite make it improbable that American authorities would cooperate with such actions, though this would gravely undermine the righteousness with which Washington addresses other nations on the subject of human rights. There is also the option of bringing Kissinger to justice in an American court with an American prosecutor. Again the contingency seems a fantastically remote one, but, again, the failure to do so would expose the country to a much more obvious charge of double standards than would have been apparent even two years ago.

The burden therefore rests with the American legal community and with the American human-rights lobbies and non-governmental organizations. They can either persist in averting their gaze from the egregious impunity enjoyed by a notorious war criminal and lawbreaker or they can become seized by the exalted standards to which they continually hold everyone else. The current state of suspended animation, however, cannot last. If the courts and lawyers of this country will not do their duty, we shall watch as the victims and survivors of this man pursue justice and vindication in their own dignified and painstaking way, and at their own expense, and we shall be put to shame.

## SEIZE THE DAY JOB

Sacrificing Saul Bellow on the altar of one's own career

By Lee Siegel

Discussed in this essay:

*Bellow: A Biography*, by James Atlas. Random House, 2000. 688 pages. \$35.

The novelist Saul Bellow is many things to many people. To some, he is the self-made literary Bourbon who restored the soul to American letters; to others, the Jewish Jackie Robinson who smashed his own idiom through WASP exclusions. To still others, he is the wisecracking custodian of the best that has been thought and said; or the patient stylist in Flaubert's line, laboring to make language a prehensile attachment to the eye. To my mind, this is all either piffle or partial truth. Bellow's genius consists in his being one of the greatest meshuganas who ever lived.

"Meshuga" means harmlessly crazy in Yiddish, but I am going to take liberties and use it in the sense of being gripped by divine laughter. Bellow himself characterizes this state of being in "Him with His Foot in His Mouth," a story about a man, Shawmut, whose truth-compulsion guarantees his social isolation: "In vari-

ous ways I have been trying to say this to you, using words like seizure, rapture, demonic possession, frenzy, *Fatum*, divine madness, or even solar storm—on a microcosmic scale." Shawmut's irresistible urge to tell it straight manifests itself in witticisms that arouse the wildest life-giving laughter. It is the opposite of the spasms of blind self-regard that destroyed many of Bellow's friends and contemporaries: John Berryman, Randall Jarrell, Robert Lowell, Jean Stafford, Delmore Schwartz. Meshuga is the other side of destruction, a reconstitution in the form of a momentary flying-apart. The Meshuga Principle ventilates what self-destructive outbursts of deep forces actually work to repress.

Bellow has written a wise and affecting essay called "Mozart: An Overture" about his lifelong love for the composer. Mozartean laughter is, in fact, the very quality that fuels his meshuga energy. "That's the animal sides in me, the laughing creature, forever rising up,"



thinks Augie March to himself at the conclusion of *The Adventures of Augie March*, a novel that begins almost farcically with an old woman at the mercy of an animal—a dog—and ends with several dogs bounding into the air and kissing the face of their master, an image of happy parity between humans and their physical nature. This communion between the individual and his or her animal power is one of Bellow's great themes. Here is most of the final paragraph of *Hertog*:

Coming back from the woods, he picked some flowers for the table. He wondered whether there was a corkscrew in the drawer. Had Madeleine taken it to Chicago? Well, maybe Ramona had a corkscrew in her Mercedes. An unreasonable thought. A nail could be used, if it came to that. Or you could break the neck of the bottle as they did in old movies. Meanwhile, he filled his bat-

Lee Siegel is a contributing writer for *Talk magazine* and a contributing editor for *The New Republic*. His last piece for *Harper's Magazine*, "Every Sweatshop Has a Silver Lining," was published in February 2000.

Illustration by Matthew Perloff

Jordan  
6220  
b6 -1  
b7C -1  
310

July 19, 2001

[Redacted]  
[Redacted] CA [Redacted]

b6 -2  
b7C -2

Dear Mr. [Redacted]

Your April 30th communication to Attorney General John Ashcroft concerning the recently published book, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, was referred to the FBI, where it was received July 5th. Your interest in bringing this information to the attention of the Department of Justice and sharing your views with the Attorney General are appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

151

[Redacted]

Unit Chief  
Office of Public and  
Congressional Affairs

b6 -5  
b7C -5

MAILED 71

JUL 25 2001

1 - ADIC, WFO (185A-WF-184222) - Enc.

ReBucal of 7/17/01 to SSA [Redacted] TTF.

62C-HQ-1077231 - 22876

NOTE: This response was coordinated with SSA [Redacted] WFO, and Unit Chief [Redacted] [Redacted] Unit, OGC, both of whom concurred with reply. Response was used previously in reply to a similar citizen inquiry which was prompted by excerpts of the book The Trial of Henry Kissinger appearing in Harper's Magazine and was coordinated with SSA [Redacted] Based on available information, [Redacted] is not identifiable in ACS.

b6 -1,2  
b7C -1,2

Dep. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Chief of Staff \_\_\_\_\_  
Off. of Gen. \_\_\_\_\_  
Counsel \_\_\_\_\_  
Asst. Dir. \_\_\_\_\_  
Admin. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Citizenship \_\_\_\_\_  
Crim. Inv. \_\_\_\_\_  
CJIS \_\_\_\_\_  
Finance \_\_\_\_\_  
Info. Res. \_\_\_\_\_  
Insp. \_\_\_\_\_  
Inv. Serv. \_\_\_\_\_  
Lab. \_\_\_\_\_  
National Sec. \_\_\_\_\_  
OPR \_\_\_\_\_  
Off. of Public & Cong. Affs. \_\_\_\_\_  
Training \_\_\_\_\_  
Off. of EEOA \_\_\_\_\_  
Director's Office \_\_\_\_\_

MAIL ROOM

upload by [Redacted] 8/6/01

[Redacted]

b6 -1  
b7C -1

FBI/DOJ

FBI (23-cv-10741)-4004

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 23-cv-10741

Total Deleted Page(s) = 19

Page 1 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 2 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 3 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 4 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 5 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 6 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 7 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 8 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 9 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 10 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 11 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 12 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 13 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 14 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 15 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 16 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 17 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 18 ~ Referral/Consult;  
Page 19 ~ Referral/Consult;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/16/1998

[redacted] at KISSINGER AND ASSOCIATES, 350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, New York, 10022, telephone number 212-759-7919, was interviewed telephonically. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6 -2  
b7C -2

[redacted] for KISSINGER AND ASSOCIATES and for HENRY KISSINGER. [redacted] handled the KISSINGER finances in 1996. [redacted] checked the bank account records for KISSINGER AND ASSOCIATES and for HENRY KISSINGER's personal accounts for two months straddling [redacted] reported that there were no money transfers to any KISSINGER account from [redacted]

b6 -2, 4  
b7C -2, 4Investigation on 11/16/1998 at Los Angeles, California (telephonically)File # 58A-HQ-1193317 - [redacted] -302 -4364b6 -1,4  
b7C -1,4by SA [redacted] Date dictated 11/16/1998

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET  
FOI/PA# 23-cv-10741

Total Deleted Page(s) = 31

Page 3 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 4 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 5 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 6 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 7 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 8 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 9 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 10 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 11 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 12 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 13 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 14 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 15 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 16 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 17 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 18 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 19 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 20 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 21 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 22 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 23 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 24 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 25 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 26 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 27 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 28 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 29 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 30 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 31 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 32 ~ Duplicate;  
Page 33 ~ Duplicate;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X For this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX